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I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
1. Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar 
Den, Inc. 
 
No. 16-1498, 139 S.Ct. 1000 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2019). Wholesale fuel 
importer owned by a member of the Yakama Nation, which was 
incorporated under Yakama law and designated by the Yakama 
Nation as its agent to obtain fuel for members of the tribe, sought 
review of the decision of the Washington State Department of 
Licensing, which concluded that the Tribe's right under treaty to 
travel on highways did not preempt state fuel taxes and assessed 
importer $3.6 million in taxes, penalties, and licensing fees. The 
Superior Court, Yakima County, No. 14-2-03851-7, Michael G. 
McCarthy, J., reversed. The Department appealed. The Supreme 
Court of Washington, Johnson, J., 188 Wash.2d 55, 392 P.3d 1014, 
affirmed. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Justice 
Breyer, held that: (1) Washington's fuel tax burdened the treaty right 
of the Yakama Nation to travel upon all public highways in common 
h c e  f he U ed S a e , a d (2) Wa h g  a ca  
f  f e  a   e  a  ee ed b  ea  e e a   
the Yakama Nation of the right to travel upon all public highways. 
Affirmed. 
 
2. Sturgeon v. Frost 
No. 17-949, 139 S.Ct. 1066 (Mar. 26, 2019). Hunter, who sought to 
use hovercraft to reach moose hunting grounds, brought action 
against National Park Service (NPS), challenging NPS's 
enforcement of a regulation banning operation of hovercrafts on the 
Nation River, which partially fell within a federal preservation area. 
State of Alaska intervened as a plaintiff. The United States District 
Court for the District of Alaska, H. Russel Holland, Senior District 
Judge, 2013 WL 5888230, entered summary judgment for NPS. 
Hunter and State appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, Nguyen, Circuit Judge, 768 F.3d 1066, affirmed 
in part, vacated in part, and remanded. Certiorari was granted. The 
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts, 136 S.Ct. 1061, 194 L.Ed.2d 
108, vacated and remanded. On remand, the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, Nguyen, Circuit Judge, 872 F.3d 927, held that 
regulation preventing use of hovercraft in federally managed 
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conservation areas applied to the river. Certiorari was granted. The 
Supreme Court, Justice Kagan, held that: (1) the Nation River was 
 b c a d  h  he ea g f he A a a Na a  I e e  
Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA); (2) even if United States held 
title to a reserved water right in the Nation River, that right could 
not justify applying NPS's hovercraft rule; (3) ANILCA exempts 
non-public lands, including waters, located within national park 
boundaries in Alaska from NPS's ordinary regulatory authority; (4) 
hovercraft rule does not apply to non-public lands in Alaska, even 
when those lands lie within national parks; and (5) NPS had no 
authority to regulate conduct on navigable waters in Alaskan 
national parks. As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit has held in three 
cases the so-called Katie John trilogy ha  he e  b c 
a d ,  he  ed  ANILCA  b e ce-fishing provisions, 
encompasses navigable waters like the Nation River. See Alaska v. 
Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698 (1995); John v. United States, 247 F.3d 1032 
(2001) (en banc); John v. United States, 720 F.3d 1214 (2013). 
Those provisions are not at issue in this case and we therefore do not 
d b he N h C c  h d g  ha  he Pa  Se ce a  
regulate subsistence fishing on navigable waters. See generally, 
Brief for State of Alaska as Amicus Curiae at 29 35 (arguing that 
this case does not implicate those decisions); Brief for Ahtna, Inc., 
as Amicus Curiae 30 36 (same). Reversed and remanded. Justice 
Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Ginsburg 
joined. 
 
3. Herrera v. Wyoming 
No. 17-532, 139 S.Ct. 1686, 2019 WL 2166394, at *1691-1713 
(U.S. May 20, 2019). Defendant, a member of the Crow Tribe, was 
convicted of taking elk off-season or without a state hunting license 
and with being an accessory to the same. He appealed. The District 
Court of Wyoming, Sheridan County, affirmed. Supreme Court of 
Wyoming denied defendant's petition for review. Certiorari was 
granted. The Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor, held that: (1) 
defendant was not precluded from arguing the right to hunt under 
1868 Treaty between United States and Crow Tribe of Indians 
barred his conviction; (2) Wyoming's admission to the Union did 
 ab ga e he C  T be f I d a  gh   h  de  he 
treaty; (3) Wyoming's statehood did not render all the lands in the 
state occupied within the meaning of the treaty; (4) the Bighorn 
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National Forest did not become categorically occupied, within the 
meaning of the treaty, when it was created; and (5) the presence of 
exploitative mining and logging operations in the Bighorn National 
Forest did not render the forest occupied within the meaning of the 
treaty. Vacated and remanded. Justice Alito filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice 
Kavanaugh joined. 
 




4. Oneida Indian Nation v. United States Department of 
the Interior 
No. 5:17-cv-913, 336 F.Supp.3d 37 (N.D. N.Y. Aug. 24, 2018). 
New York Native American tribe brought action against Department 
of the Interior under Administrative Procedure Act (APA) alleging 
abuse of discretion and violation of United States Code. This suit 
arose out of Assistant Secretary's decision to publish changed name 
of Wisconsin tribe to Oneida Nation, who filed petition to cancel 
New York tribe's trademark registration in Federal Register, and 
approval of constitutional amendment in Department's regional 
office's secretarial election. Department filed motion to dismiss. The 
District Court, Mae A. D'Agostino, J., held that: (1) alleged injury 
in fact arising out of ongoing trademark action was not redressable 
by New York tribe's action against Department; (2) confusion 
arising from Department's decisions was not sufficient injury in fact; 
and (3) confusion was not traceable to Department of the Interior's 
decision. Motion granted. 
 
5. Kialegee Tribal Town v. Zinke 
 
No. 17-cv-1670, 330 F.Supp.3d 255 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2018). 
Federally recognized Indian tribe brought action against Secretary 
of the Interior and other federal officials, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief in its favor in connection with its claims that it was 
successor to Creek Nation, and as such, had treaty-protected rights 
of shared jurisdiction over land within the boundaries of the historic 
Creek Nation reservation. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure 
to state claim. The District Court, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, J., held 
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that: (1) court had subject-matter jurisdiction, but (2) tribe failed to 
adequately allege specific conduct by Secretary of Interior and other 
officials that violated Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), as required 
to state claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. Motion granted. 
 
6. California Valley Miwok Tribe v. Zinke 
 
No. 17-16321, 745 Fed.Appx. 46 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 2018). Plaintiff 
Ca f a Va e  M  T be ( T be ), e e e ed b  he B e  
Council, appealed from summary judgment entered in favor of 
Defendants the California Valley Miwok Tribe, represented by the 
Dixie Council, and the United States. The district court held that the 
2015 Dec  ( Dec ) b  he A a  Sec e a Indian 
Affa  ( A a  Sec e a ) d d  ate the Administrative 
P ced e Ac  ( APA ). The d c  c  c ec  he d ha  he 
Decision did not violate the APA. Tribal membership is a matter to 
be determined by the tribe, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 
49, 72 n.32, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978), but the 
Department of the Interior also has the responsibility to ensure that 
organized tribes are representative of potential membership, Aguayo 
v. Jewell, 827 F.3d 1213, 1226 (9th Cir. 2016). The Decision 
comported with that responsibility. The Assistant Secretary 
ec ed he be  g ga  h  b  d d  e   h e 
earlier court holdings to reach a decision. Instead, the Assistant 
Secretary independently examined the facts and the law, before 
determining that: (1) the tribe was not reorganized, (2) its 
membership is not limited to five individuals, and (3) the United 
States does not recognize leadership of the tribal government. The 
Decision was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with the law, and therefore, did not 
violate the APA. Aguayo at 1226. Affirmed. 
 
7. Comanche Nation of Oklahoma v. Zinke 
 
No. 17-6247, 754 Fed.Appx. 768 (10th Cir. Dec. 14, 2018). Native 
American nation brought action against Secretary of Interior under 
Administrative Procedure Act and National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA), challenging acquisition of land in trust for benefit of 
other Native American nation and seeking preliminary injunction 
against operation of casino. The United States District Court for the 
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Western District of Oklahoma, Joe Heaton, Chief Judge, 2017 WL 
6551298, denied motion for preliminary injunction. Nation 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Carlos F. Lucero, Circuit Judge, 
held that: (1) Nation did not have substantial likelihood of success 
on merits of challenge to regulations governing trust acquisitions, 
and (2) Nation did not have substantial likelihood of success on 
merits of NEPA claim. Affirmed. 
8. Tsi Akim Maidu Of Taylorsville Rancheria v. United 
States Department of Interior 
No. 2:17-cv-01156-TLN-CKD, 2019 WL 95511 (E.D. Calif. Jan. 
03, 2019). For the reasons set forth below, the Court granted 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff challenged Defendants' 
determ a  ha    a  a  a fede a  ec g ed I d a  
tribe when the United States sold the Taylorsville Rancheria (the 
Ra ch)  1966 a   C g e a  a da e.  I  1958, 
C g e  e ac ed he Ca f a Ra che a Ac  ( CRA ), h ch 
authorized the Department of the Interior to distribute forty-one 
a che a '  a e   d d a  I d a ; see Pub. L. 85-671, 72 
Stat. 619 (Aug. 18, 1958), as amended Pub. L. 88-419, 78 Stat. 390 
(Aug. 11, 1964). After such distribution under the CRA, the 
ec e  d  be e ed  g e e  e ce  beca e f 
their status as Indians ... [A]ll statutes of the United States which 
affect Indians because of their status as Indians [would] be 
inapplicable to them, and the laws of the several States [would] 
a   he   he a e a e  a  he  a   he  c e .  
Plaintiff alleged that Defendants sold the Taylorsville Rancheria to 
P a  C   1966. I  1998, P a ff a eged  f ed a e e  of 
e   e  f  ac edg e  a  a  I d a  be.  P a ff 
f he  a eged  a e  gh  c a f ca  f  he Defe da  
ab   a  a  a fede a  ec g ed I d a  be,   h ch he 
then-Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs responded by letter in 
June 2015. In the letter, the government allegedly explained that 
Plaintiff's relationship with the government terminated upon the 
1966 sale of the Taylorsville Rancheria. Plaintiff challenged 
Defe da ' c c  ha  he a e f he Ranch corresponds with 
he e a  f he a  f he be.  P a ff b gh   
against the Department of Interior, its Secretary, and the Assistant 
Secretary for Indian Affairs. Defendants argued that: (1) general 
jurisdiction statutes do not waive sovereign immunity; (2) although 
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he Ad a e P ced e Ac  ( APA ) a e  e e g  
immunity, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the APA; and (3) 
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff 
responds that: (1) the action is not barred by the statute of 
limitations, and (2) the complaint sufficiently states a claim under 
the APA. Because the statute of limitations argument is dispositive, 
the Court will not address the parties' other arguments. As a 
preliminary matter, the parties do not dispute that the six-year statute 
of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2401 ( section 2401 ) a e   
Plaintiff's APA claims. Under section 2401, e e  c  ac  
commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the 
complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first 
acc e .  28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). Defendants argued that Plaintiff's 
claims stem from one common allegation: that Defendants 
misinterpreted the CRA to find that the sale of the Taylorsville 
Rancheria had the legal effect of terminating Plaintiff's status as a 
federally recognized tribe. Defendants stated in response that 
Congress enacted the Federally Recognized Tribe List Act, which 
requires the Secretary of the Interior to publish annually a list of all 
federally recognized tribes. According to Defendants, Plaintiff has 
not been included on the list of federally recognized tribes since its 
initial publication in 1979. As such, Defendants argued that 
Plaintiff's claims accrued upon the 1979 publication of the list of 
federally recognized tribes because Plaintiff could or should have 
known it was not a federally recognized tribe at that point. 
Defendants alternatively argue that, at the very latest, Plaintiff's 
claims accrued in 1998, when Plaintiff allegedly filed a letter of 
intent to petition for acknowledgment as an Indian tribe. Thus, the 
Court found that Plaintiff's claims as currently alleged are time-
barred and should be dismissed. 
9. National Lifeline Association v. Federal 
Communications Commission 
No. 18-1026, 915 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. Feb 01, 2019), amended by 921 
F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. April 10, 2019). Petitions for review were filed 
challenging Federal Communications Commission (FCC) order 
limiting enhanced tribal telecommunications support to service 
provided using tribal facilities, and to low-income consumers living 
on rural areas of tribal lands. The Court of Appeals, Rogers, Circuit 
Judge, held that: (1) FCC action in changing its policy to limit 
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enhanced tribal telecommunications subsidy to service provided 
using tribal facilities was arbitrary and capricious; (2) FCC action in 
changing its policy to limit enhanced tribal telecommunications 
subsidy to service provided to low-income consumers living on rural 
areas of tribal lands was arbitrary and capricious; (3) FCC's notice 
was insufficient under Administrative Procedure Act requirements 
for notice-and-comment rulemaking; and (4) FCC improperly made 
substantive changes to its former policy without commencing new 
notice-and-comment-rulemaking proceeding. Petitions granted, 
order vacated, and matter remanded. 
10. Cayuga Nation v. David Bernhardt 
No. 17-1923, 374 F.Supp.3d 1 (D.C. D.C. Mar. 12, 2019). The 
Cayuga Nation is a federally recognized Indian nation. This case 
dealt with decisions by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the 
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs of the Department of the 
Interior (DOI) that recognized one faction within the Cayuga 
Nation, Defendant-Intervenor now referring to itself as the 
Ca ga Na  C c ,  h gh a e a e  efe ed   he 
ad a e ec d a  he Ha f  G as the governing 
body of the Cayuga Nation for the purposes of certain contractual 
relationships between that Nation and the United States federal 
government. These decisions were the product of an adversarial 
process between Defendant-Intervenor and Plaintiffs, a rival faction 
within the Cayuga Nation who asserted that they represent the 
Na  gh f  g vernment. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking to 
overturn the BIA and DOI decisions. The court denied Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and granted both Defendants' and 
Defendant-I e e  C -Motions for Summary Judgment. 
The court concluded that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that 
Defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 
making decisions recognizing Defendant-Intervenor as the 
governing body of the Cayuga Nation for purposes of certain 
contractual relationships between the Nation and the United States 
federal government. The Court further concluded that Plaintiffs 
failed to establish that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' due process 
gh   a g he e dec . I  2015, he Ca ga Na  
leadership dispute came to a head. The BIA received two requests 
to modify existing federal-tribal contracts under the Indian Self-
Determination Act (ISDEAA). One request came from Plaintiffs' 
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group: the BIA determined that the other request came from Mr. 
Halftown acting as the federal representative for the last Nation 
Council which had been formally recognized by the BIA in 2006.  
In response to these competing requests, the BIA declined to address 
he e  f he Na  eade h  d e. I ead, he BIA 
continued to recognize the last undisputed government of the 
Cayuga Nation which had been identified by the BIA in 2006. The 
BIA concluded that the 2006 Nation Council, with Mr. Halftown 
acting as federal representative, had the authority to draw funds 
f  he Na  ISDEAA contract. In recognizing the 2006 Nation 
Council for purposes of deciding the 2015 ISDEAA request, the 
BIA e ha ed ha  [ ]h  e  ec g  dec   e ded 
to provide additional time to the members of the Nation to resolve 
this dispute using tribal mechanisms and prevent the need for the 
BIA to examine Nation law and make a subsequent determination 
ba ed  he e  f ha  de e a .  A  a  a  a e , 
Plaintiffs contended that Assistant Secretary Black was required to 
use de novo review on questions of Cayuga Nation law when 
e e g Reg a  D ec  Ma bb  dec . B , ead f 
using de novo review, Plaintiffs argued that Assistant Secretary 
B ac  e b  defe ed  Reg a  D ec  Ma bb  
analysis of Cayuga law. The court concluded that Assistant 
Secretary Black was not required to use de novo review over 
Reg a  D ec  Ma bb  a a  f Ca ga Na  a . 
While it is generally true that the Interior Board of Indian Appeal s 
(IBIA) reviews questions of law de novo, that is not the case with 
I d a  a . I ead, e  ... ba  a  c ea  d c a e[ ] a 
particular outcome, [the IBIA] will afford BIA latitude to exercise 
discretion in determining with whom it will deal in carrying on the 
government-to-g e e  e a h  h he be.  Picayune 
Rancheria, 62 IBIA at 114; see also LaRocque v. Aberdeen Area 
Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 29 IBIA 201, 204 (1996) (deferring 
 BIA  ea ab e e e a  f ba  a ). I  a , he 
Court determined that Assistant Secretary Black was not required to 
conduct a de novo review of Cayuga law. If he had been so required, 
Assistant Secretary Black conducted an independent review of the 
parties' arguments concerning Cayuga law and concluded that 
Reg a  D ec  Ma bb  de e a  e e a d. The 
standard of review used by Assistant Secretary Black was not 
contrary to law.  
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11. Cross v. United States Department of Interior 
 
No. CIV 18-220-TUC-CKJ, 2019 WL 1425141 (D.C. D. Ariz. Mar. 
29, 2019). U ed S a e  De a e  f he I e  ( he 
g e e ) f ed a M   D  (MTD). C   a  e ed 
member of the Three Affiliated Tribes (TAT). The TAT is a 
federally recognized Indian tribe and resides on the treaty-
established Fort Berthold Reservation (Reservation) in northwestern 
North Dakota. Cross is the spokesman for an ad hoc group of tribal 
members who have decided to request a Secretarial Election, via a 
Secretarial Petition, that would be administered by the Secretary. 
More specifically, this ad hoc group sought to petition the Secretary 
f he I e  ( he Sec e a )  ca  a Sec e a a  E ec  f  he 
purpose of repealing a 1986 constitutional amendment that had 
extinguished the pre-existing right of ALL (emphasis added) of the 
[Three Affiliated Tribes'] non-resident, but otherwise 
constitutionally qualified, tribal voters to vote by absentee ballot in 
a  ba  e ec .  The C a  a e ed ha  a  -resident 
tribal voters have found returning to the Reservation to be 
economically or physically impracticable and unduly burdensome. 
The C a  a eged he b d g f he d  a ge  ea h-
f ed da   he Re e a   e  156,035 f TAT  be  a d 
last remaining agricultural lands. This resulted in the destruction of 
nine historic river bottom communities, geographically fragmented 
the Reservation, and caused the exodus from the Reservation of 
TAT  ge  a d d c e e be . A a e  75%-80% 
f TAT  e ed e be  e a d  ff he Reservation. On 
July 14, 2017, Cross provided a Notice of Appeal (NOA) to Danks 
pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 2.9. The NOA referenced both Danks 
decisions as to the number of signatures required and the conclusion 
that this decision was not appealable. The decision on appeal stated: 
...Y  c cede   a ea  ha  he S e e de  e  
calculated the number of signatures needed for a valid petition based 
on the tribally provided number of tribal members who were 18 
ea  f age a d de  a  f Ma  18, 2017. If he S e e de  
basic mathematical calculation is correct as you concede, other than 
that unchallenged calculation, the Superintendent made no decision 
and merely acted as a pass-through for information provided by the 
tribe as required by 25 C.F.R. § 81.57(a)(2)(i) and (ii).  The 
government asserted that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
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of this matter. As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts are 
presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions. Kokkonen v. 
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The burden 
of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 
jurisdiction. The Complaint asserted federal question jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as the primary basis for subject matter 
jurisdiction. However, the United States has not waived its 
sovereign immunity by the enactment of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1343. Cuevas v. Department of Homeland Security, 233 F. App'x 
642, 643 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing N. Side Lumber Co. v. Block, 753 
F.3d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir. 1985) ); 14 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 
3655 (4th ed. Nov. 2018). Similarly, the Declaratory Judgment Act 
did not provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Skelly Oil Co. 
v. Phillips Petr. Co., 399 U.S. 667, 671 (1950); Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc. v. Mortgage Guar. Ins. Corp., 642 F.3d 849, 852 (9th 
Cir. 2011); 14 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3655 (4th ed. Nov. 2018). 
The Complaint also refers to the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA). The APA c a  a ec f c a e  f he U ed S a e ' 
e e g  .  Matsuo v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 2d 982, 
988 (D. Haw. 2006) (citing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 
891 92 (1988) ); see also Navajo Nation v. Dep't of the Interior, 876 
F.3d 1144, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017). While the APA waives the 
g e e  e e g  , he APA a  c de  
requirements for judicial review. As a general matter, the APA 
e   aga  he U ed S a e  b  [a] e  ffe g egal 
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved 
b  age c  ac  h  he ea g f e e a  a e[.]  5 U.S.C. 
§ 702. This portion of the statute constitutes the APA's judicial 
review provision. See e.g. Navajo Nation, at 1168. Claims asserted 
pursuant to the APA must satisfy section 702'  age c  ac  
requirement and the further requirement under section 704 of the 
APA ha  a a ff  de f  a f a  age c  ac   obtain 
judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 704. The APA does not permit review 
he e a e  ec de d c a  e e  a d he e he age c  
ac   c ed  age c  d c e  b  a .  5 U.S.C. § 701(a). 
The finality requirement is considered a necessary element of any 
APA claim. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469 (1994); Wild Fish 
Conservancy v. Jewell, 730 F. 3d 791, 800 (9th Cir. 2013) ( T  
maintain a cause of action under the APA, a plaintiff must challenge 
age c  ac  ha   f a . ). A a ff ha  he b de  f 
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de f g ec f c fede a  c d c , e a g h    f a  
age c  ac ,  Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 
871, 882 (1990), and identifying a discrete agency action that the 
federal agency was legally required to take but failed to do so, 
Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 
64 (2004). In considering these factors, the court found no final 
agency action occurred in this matter. Rather, the government 
provided information to Cross, but did not take any action that 
e e e  he c a  f a  age c  dec -making 
process. As the government had not yet reviewed any Secretarial 
Petition submitted by Cross, no rights or obligations had been 
determined. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 117 S1154 (1997). As 
Cross was not challenging a final agency action, his cause of action 
could not proceed under the APA. Jewell, 730 F.3d at 800. The court 
found it did not have subject matter jurisdiction of this matter and 
dismissal was appropriate. To the extent Cross argued the 
government acted in excess or its statutory jurisdiction or authority, 
the court declined to address these arguments as it had not been 
established this court had subject matter jurisdiction over this 
matter. This matter was dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  
12. Agua Caliente Tribe of Cupeño Indians of Pala 
Reservation v. Sweeney 
 
No. 17-16838, 932 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. Aug 07, 2019). The Agua 
Caliente Tribe of Cupeño Indians (the Cupeño) argued they were a 
federally recognized tribe, and as such, the Assistant Secretary of 
Indian Affairs (Assistant Secretary) within the Department of the 
Interior (Interior) must place the tribe on a list of federally 
recognized tribes published in the Federal Register. The Cupeño 
sent a letter to the Assistant Secretary, requesting that they be listed 
as a federally recognized tribe. When the Assistant Secretary denied 
their request, the Cupeño filed suit to compel such action. Having 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1361, and 5 U.S.C. § 
706, the district court refused to compel the listing of the Cupeño 
because they had failed to exhaust the administrative process. The 
district court further concluded that the Assistant Secretary provided 
a rational explanation for refusing to make an exception to the 
administrative process for the Cupeño. The court determined that 
they had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirmed. 
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The Part 83 process applies to the relief the Cupeño seek, and the 
Cupeño failed to exhaust the process. We agree with the district 
c  de e a  ha  he C e   e ha  ad a e 
remedies, and until they do so, the Cupeño are not entitled to the 
relief they seek in this lawsuit. On three occasions since 1979, 
Interior has recognized tribes outside of the Part 83 process. To treat 
the Cupeño differently from those three tribes, the Cupeño argued, 
is arbitrary and capricious, and a violation of the Cupe  e a  
protection rights. To prevail on an equal protection claim, the 
plaintiff must show the government has treated it differently from a 
a  a ed a  a d he g e e  e a a  f  
different treatment does not meet the relevant level of 
scrutiny. Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 708 F.3d 209, 215 
(2013). The c  ha  he d, he ec g  f I d a  tribes remains 
a ca , a he  ha  ac a  de e a ,  a d he ef e a [ e ] 
a a  ba  e e .  Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271 (9th 
Cir. 2004). The three tribes that Interior has recognized outside of 
the Part 83 process are: the Ione Band of Miwok Indians (the Ione), 
the Lower Lake Rancheria, and the Tejon Indian Tribe (the Tejon). 
Because Interior has rationally distinguished the Cupeño from the 
other tribes that were listed outside of the administrative process, we 
cannot order Interior to add the Cupeño to the list of federally 
recognized tribes published in the Federal Register. The court 
affirmed the district c  de  g a g a  dg e  f  
Interior. 
 
13. Robert Doucette v. United States Department of the 
Interior 
 
No. C-18-859 TSZ, 2019 WL 3804118 (W.D. Wash. Aug 13, 2019). 
This matter came before the Court on (i) a motion for summary 
judgment, brought by plaintiffs Robert Doucette, Bernadine 
Roberts, Saturnino Javier, and Tresea Doucette, and (ii) a cross-
motion for summary judgment brought by defendants United States 
Department of the Interior (Interior), Interior Secretary David 
Bernhardt, Assistant Secretary Tara Sweeney, and Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary (PDAS) John Tahsuda IIII. Plaintiffs were 
unsuccessful candidates for four open positions on the Nooksack 
Tribal Council, the governing body of the Nooksack Indian Tribe of 
Washington. They allege that, prior to the most recent change in 
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presidential administrations, Interior had established a policy of 
e e g T ba  c a , a , a d c  a   
determine whether the Tribal Council was validly seated as the 
governing body of the tribe  f  e  of government-to-
government relations. The court concluded that plaintiffs are not, as 
a matter of law, entitled to relief because Interior never adopted a 
policy of construing Nooksack law with respect to how Nooksack 
Tribal Council elections should be conducted, and defendants could 
not have behaved inconsistently with a non-existent policy. In 
refusing, for a period of time before the 2017 elections, to recognize 
actions taken by the Nooksack Tribal Council, Interior did not 
purport to interpret Nooksack law concerning the manner in which 
elections must be administered, but rather effectuated the 
consequences to the Tribe of having failed to even hold an election 
before the terms of half of the council members expired. Moreover, 
during the course of and subsequent to the 2017 elections, Interior 
admirably balanced the deference it owes the tribe, as a sovereign 
entity, with its responsibility to ensure that it deals only with a duty 
constituted governing body for the tribe. The court determine that 
Plaintiffs have not made the requisite showing to survive summary 
judgment, and their Administrative Procedure Act claim and this 
action were therefore dismissed with prejudice. 
 
Child Welfare Law and ICWA 
 
14. Matter of P.T.D 
 
No. DA 17-0306, 391 Mont. 376, 424 P.3d 619 (S. Ct. Mont. Aug 
22, 2018). Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child 
and Family Services Division, filed a petition to terminate putative 
father's parental rights to child, who was a member of, or eligible 
for, membership in the Fort Peck Indian Tribe. The District Court, 
12th Judicial District, Hill County, No. DN-15-010, Daniel A. 
Boucher, J., granted the petition. Father appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Mike McGrath, C.J., held that: (1) family relationship did not 
exist between Indian child and putative father, and therefore, 
requirements of Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply; 
and (2) argument that oral pronouncement, minute entry, and order 





15. In re E.H 
 
No. D073635, 26 Cal.App.5th 1058, 238 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 07, 2018). County health and human services agency 
brought action against mother to terminate her parental rights. The 
Superior Court, San Diego County, No. SJ13241, Michael J. 
Popkins, J., entered judgment terminating parental rights. Mother 
appealed. The Court of Appeal, Aaron, Acting P.J., held that 
agency's failure to provide Tohono O'odham Nation with notice of 
information in determining whether child was an Indian child was 
prejudicial. Reversed and remanded. 
 
16. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming 
 
No. 17-1135, 904 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. Sept. 14, 2018). Native 
American tribes and several tribe members brought 1983 Putative 
Class Action against state officials; alleging policies, practices, and 
procedures during 48 hour custody hearings relating to the removal 
of Native American children from their homes based on abuse and 
neglect allegations violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due 
process clause and the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) by 
denying parents a meaningful post-deprivation hearing after their 
children were taken into temporary state custody. The United States 
District Court for the District of South Dakota, Jeffrey L. Viken, 
District Judge, 993 F. Supp.2d 1017, denied defendants' motion to 
dismiss, 100 F.Supp.3d 749, granted plaintiffs' partial summary 
judgment motion, and, 2016 WL 7324077, granted declaratory and 
injunctive relief. Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Colloton, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) Younger abstention was 
warranted, and (2) exception to Younger abstention for patently 
unconstitutional actions did not apply. Vacated and remanded. 
 
17. In re K.L 
 
No. C079100, 27 Cal.App.5th 332, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 18, 2018). After minor's mother was arrested for child 
cruelty and possession of a controlled substance, county health and 
human services agency filed petition to establish child, who was an 
Indian child, as court dependent. The Superior Court, Alpine 
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County, declared child to be dependent and placed child with 
presumed father. Noncustodial biological father appealed. The 
Court of Appeal, Hull, Acting P.J., held that: (1) placement with 
presumed father was not foster care placement and thus did not 
trigger Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) placement preference 
requirements, and (2) placement with presumed father was not 
placement with a guardian and thus also did not trigger ICWA 
placement preference requirements. Affirmed. 
 
18. In re N.G 
 
No. E070338, 27 Cal.App.5th 474, 238 Cal.Rptr.3d 304 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 21, 2018). After Department of Public Social Services 
(DPSS) sent Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) notices to the 
Blackfeet Tribe of Montana, the Navajo Nation, the Colorado River 
Indian Tribes, and the Colorado River Tribal Council, the Superior 
Court, Riverside County, No. RIJ1100389, Jean P. Leonard, Retired 
Judge, sitting by assignment, terminated mother's parental rights. 
Mother appealed. The Court of Appeal, Fields, J., held that: (1) trial 
court, on remand, was required to order DPSS to send ICWA notices 
to all federally recognized Cherokee tribes; (2) trial court, on 
remand, was required to fully investigate child's paternal lineal 
ancestry; and (3) substantial evidence did not show that DPSS 
complied with sending ICWA notices. Reversed and remanded. 
 
19. In re A.S 
 
No. D073561, 28 Cal.App.5th 131, 239 Cal.Rptr.3d 20 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Oct. 03, 2018). Dependency proceeding was initiated. The 
Superior Court, San Diego County entered orders selecting tribal 
customary adoption proposed by Mesa Grande Band of Mission 
Indians as permanent plan for children. Parents appealed. The Court 
of Appeal, Aaron, J., held that: (1) record demonstrated that parents 
were afforded sufficient opportunity to present evidence to tribe, in 
accordance with due process; (2) All-County Letter issued by 
Department of Social services was interpretive, and thus was not 
binding; (3) any error in trial court's failure to expressly confirm that 
parents were afforded due process opportunity to present evidence 
to tribe was harmless under the circumstances; (4) father failed to 
demonstrate that his due process rights were violated at selection 
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and implementation hearing; (5) mother's testimony about visitation 
with children and bond with children was relevant to detriment, and 
thus was admissible in selection and implementation hearing; (6) 
trial court acted within its discretion in determining that parents' 
testimony regarding visitation narratives, visitation scheduling, and 
progress with services was irrelevant, and thus inadmissible, in 
selection and implementation hearing; and (7) any error in admitting 
such testimony about visitation and progress with services was 
harmless. Affirmed. 
20. Brackeen v. Zinke 
 
No. 4:17-cv-00868-O, 338 F.Supp.3d 514 (N.D. Texas Oct 4, 2018). 
Foster and adoptive parents and states of Texas, Louisiana, and 
Indiana brought action against United States, United States 
Department of the Interior and its Secretary, Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) and its Director, BIA Principal Assistant Secretary for 
Indian Affairs, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
and its Secretary seeking declaration that Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA) was unconstitutional. Cherokee Nation, Oneida Nation, 
Quinalt Indian Nation, and Morengo Band of Mission Indians 
intervened as defendants. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. 
The District Court, Reed O'Connor, J., held that: (1) ICWA's 
mandatory placement preferences violated equal protection; (2) 
provision of ICWA granting Indian tribes authority to reorder 
congressionally enacted adoption placement preferences violated 
non-delegation doctrine; (3) ICWA provision requiring states to 
apply federal standards to state-created claims commandeered the 
states in violation of the Tenth Amendment; (4) BIA exceeded its 
statutory authority in promulgating regulations, in violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA); (5) BIA regulations were not 
entitled to Chevron deference; and (6) prospective and adoptive 
parents whose adoptions were open to collateral attack under ICWA 
had no fundamental right to care, custody, and control of children in 
their care. Motions granted in part and denied in part. 
 
21. Matter of L.A.G 
 
DA 18-0119, 393 Mont. 146, 429 P.3d 629 (S.C. Mont. Oct. 16, 
2018). Department of Public Health and Human Services filed 
petition for termination of mother's parental rights as to her two 
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minor children. Following termination hearing, the District Court, 
Cascade County, Nos. ADN 16-175 and ADN-16-176, Gregory G. 
Pinski, P.J., terminated mother's parental rights. Mother appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Beth Baker, J., held that: (1) trial court violated 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) when it terminated mother's 
parental rights before having conclusive determination of children's 
status in Indian tribe; (2) trial court's oral findings and comments 
within written order did not implicitly establish that court agreed, 
active efforts to prevent the breakup of Indian family were made, as 
required under ICWA; but (3) mother's due process rights were not 
violated when Department raised issue of abandonment during 
closing argument. Reversed and remanded with instructions. 
 
22. In re L.D. 
 
No. H045544, 32 Cal.App.5th 579, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 894 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 6th Dis. Jan. 24, 2019). County Department of Family and 
Children's services filed juvenile dependency petition on behalf of 
nine-year-old child who may have Native Alaskan ancestry. The 
Superior Court, Santa Clara County, No. 17JD024833, Michael L. 
Clark, J., found sufficient notice was sent, pursuant to the Indian 
Child Welfare Act (ICWA), to Athabascan Indian tribe in Alaska 
before declaring child dependent. The court subsequently issued 
restraining order protecting child from mother, and mother was later 
found to have violated restraining order by possessing or having 
access to handgun. Mother appealed to challenge the ICWA notice. 
The Court of Appeal, Grover, J., held that mother's challenge to 
ICWA notice was untimely. Appeal dismissed. 
 
23. Mitchell v. Preston 
 
 No. S-18-0166, 439 P.3d 718, 2019 WL 1614606 (S.Ct. Wyo. Apr. 
16, 2019). Following extensive litigation in child custody action, 
2018 WY 110, 426 P.3d 830, father, an Indian tribe member who 
kept child on reservation, filed motion to establish jurisdiction in 
tribal court and motion for change of venue, seeking an order 
relinquishing permanent child custody jurisdiction to the tribal 
court. Mother, who was not a member of the tribe and who had been 
awarded primary custody of child, filed motion to strike. The 
District Court, Sheridan County, Norman E. Young, J., granted 
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mother's motion, and father appealed. The Supreme Court, Kautz, 
J., held that: (1) Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply; 
and (2) even assuming ICWA applied, tribal court's emergency 
orders under Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) did not 
give tribal court jurisdiction to make permanent custody decisions. 
Affirmed. 
 
24. Navajo Nation v. Department of Child Safety 
 
No. 1 CA-JV 18-0276, 246 Ariz. 463, 441 P.3d 982 (Ct. App. Ariz., 
Div. 1, Apr. 18, 2019). The Navajo Nation appealed the juvenile 
c  de  a g a e a e  g a d a  f  a ch d b ec   
he I d a  Ch d We fa e Ac  ( ICWA ) h  he e  f a 
a f ed e e  e  ha  he a e   he I d a -relative 
custodia  c ed c d  d e  e   e  
emotional or physical damage to the child. The court held that 
ICWA applies to guardianships and that it requires a qualified expert 
witness to provide this testimony. Because such testimony was not 
prov ded  h  ca e, he c  aca ed he e e c  de  a d 
remand the case for a new hearing. In September 2017, the 
Department informed the court and parties that its designated expert 
witness was unwilling to provide the requisite testimony for the 
guardianship. That same month, Mother proposed Ian Service as her 
e e  e . The De a e      Se ce  
qualifications as an expert witness, but the Navajo Nation objected. 
The court held a voir dire hearing to determine whether Service was 
qualified. During that hearing, Service testified that he had been an 
attorney for about ten years, mostly as a public defender or 
prosecutor in Idaho. He stated that ten to fifteen percent of his cases 
involved ICWA in some way and that he had served as an expert 
witness in two cases. He admitted, however, that both cases were 
before the same judge and involved the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe
not the Navajo Nation. He also acknowledged that he was not a 
member of any Indian tribe, was not recognized as an expert witness 
by the Navajo Nation, had never been contacted by the Navajo 
Nation to testify as an expert witness, and was not familiar with the 
Na a  Na  a e g c . Se ce f he  a ed ha  he 
had only minimally reviewed the record and that he had not talked 
to the proposed Indian- e a e ace e , R.Y., he De a e  
expert witness who had refused to testify, or the Navajo Nation case 
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ec a  a g ed  h  ca e. Sec  1912(e)  a  a g age 
states that no foster care placement, which includes permanent 
guardianships, may be ordered without expert-witness testimony on 
he he  a a e   a  I d a - e a e c d a  c ed 
custody of a child will likely result in serious emotional or physical 
damage to the child. Therefore, a court must hear expert-witness 
testimony before ordering a permanent guardianship. The record 
shows that R.Y. was subject to ICWA and a guardianship 
proceeding took place. Thus, ICWA required the juvenile court to 
hear expert-witness testim   he he  M he   he I d a -
e a e c d a  c ed c d  f R.Y. d e  e   
serious emotional or physical damage to R.Y. Because such 
e  a   ded, he c  de   aca ed. 
 
25. In re Marriage of Stockwell and Dees 
 
No. 17CA1482, 446 P.3d 957 (Colo. Ct. App. June 27, 2019). In this 
proceeding concerning the Allocation of Parental Responsibilities 
(APR) for L.D-S., Je fe  L  Dee , he ch d  he , a ea ed 
he d c  c  de  de g he    aca e a 2013 de  
giving majority parenting time to Joseph Cody Stockwell, the 
ch d  ega  b   b g ca  fa he . Dee  c e ded ha  he c rt 
erred because it issued the APR order without first inquiring into the 
ch d  b e Indian heritage as required by the Indian Child 
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 to 1963 (2018). 
Dees is right. In agreeing with her, the court clarified that: (1) a legal 
fa he  de  C ad  a    ece a  a a e  f  e  
of ICWA and, (2) an APR to a legal father who does not qualify as 
a a e  de  ICWA  a ch d c d  ceed g  de  
ICWA. Because the APR to Stockwell here constituted a child 
custody proceeding and the court did not comply with ICWA, the 
c  e e ed he de  de g Dee   a d e a ded f  
further proceedings. According to ICWA an Indian child who is the 
subject of an action for foster care placement or termination of 
parental rights; any parent or Indian custodian from whose custody 
such child was removed; and the Indian ch d  tribe may petition a 
court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a 
showing that the action violated ICWA provisions. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 
(2018). ICWA places no time limit on such a petition. Moreover, 
ba g a a e  ICWA c a  a  e   a ed de  a e 
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a  d c ad c   S e e C  ec g  ha  ICWA 
is also intended to protect the tribe, which was not at fault for the 
timing of the ICWA claim and whose interest may have been 
harmed. See B.H., 138 P.3d at 304 ( Beca e he ec  f a 
separate tribal interest is at the core of the ICWA, otherwise 
sufficiently reliable information cannot be overcome by the 
statements, actions, or waiver of a parent, or disregarded as 
e . ) (c a  ed); see also Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 
L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). The court reversed the order denying the ICWA 
motion and remand for further proceedings as discussed below. 
Dees argued that the district court failed to comply with ICWA 
before issuing the October 2013 APR order. Stockwell responded 
that ICWA is inapplicable because he and Dees are parents of L.D-
S. Stockwell is correct that ICWA does not apply to an award of 
custody to one of the parents, including in a divorce proceeding. 25 
C.F.R. § 23.103(b)(3) (2018); see also In re J.B., 178 Cal. App. 4th 
751, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 682 (2009) (a child custody proceeding 
does not include a proceeding in which a child is removed from one 
parent and placed with the other because placement with a parent is 
not foster care). But whether Stockwell qualifies as a parent for 
purposes of ICWA requires a closer look. As noted, Stockwell is 
L.D-S.  ega  fa he . Ba ed  h  a , he e  a  he gh  
and responsibilities of legal fatherhood under state law. But 
Stockwell is neither L.D-S.  b g ca  a e ,  a  Indian person 
who has adopted the child. So, Stockwell is not a parent as defined 
by ICWA. Because Stockwell is not L.D-S.  a e  de  ICWA, 
we consider whether the APR  S c e  a  a f e  ca e 
ace e ,  h ch  def ed a  a  ac  e g a  I d a  child 
from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement in a 
foster home or institution or the home of a guardian or conservator 
where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have the child returned 
upon demand, but where parental rights have not been terminated[.] 
A foster care placement, which here takes the form of an APR to a 
person who is not a parent under ICWA, is a child custody 
proceeding under ICWA because the parent cannot have the child 
returned upon demand but must instead overcome procedural and 
substantive barriers to regain custody and control of the child. See 
also 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 ( U  de a d ea  ha  he a e  
or Indian custodian can regain custody simply upon verbal request, 
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h  a  f a e   c ge c e . ). I  , he APR  
Stockwell was a child custody proceeding for purposes of ICWA. 
The District Court, however, did not inquire into whether L.D-S. 
was an Indian child. That was error requiring a remand for further 
proceedings. See 25 U.S.C. § 1914. 
 
26. Oliver N. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office 
f Child e  Se ice  
 
No. S-17067, 444 P.3d 171, 2019 WL 2896647 (Ak. S. Ct. July 5, 
2019). The issue was whether new federal regulations have 
materially changed the qualifications required of an expert testifying 
in a child in need of aid (CINA) case involving children subject to 
the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The court concluded that 
they had. To support the termination of parental rights, ICWA 
e e  he e  f a f ed expert witnesses ... that the 
continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is 
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the 
ch d.  Under the new federal regulations, experts who formerly 
could be presumptively qualified  based on their ability to testify 
ab  e a g c a  a d c a  a da d   he ch d  tribe, for 
example    a  be a f ed  e f  ab  he ca a  
relationship between the particular conditions in the home and the 
likelihood that continued custody of the child will result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to the particular child who is the 
subject of the child-c d  ceed g.  The c  c c ded ha  
in these two cases the challenged expert witnesses failed to satisfy 
this higher standard imposed by controlling federal law. For this 
ea , he c  e e ed he de  e a g he a e  
parental rights and remand for further proceedings. In December 
2016 the Bureau of Indian Affairs issued formal regulations 
accompanied by new guidelines discussing their implementation. 
The introduction to the new regulations notes they were enacted 
beca e he De a e  f he I e  f d ha  e e a  
and interpretation of [ICWA] has been inconsistent across state  
a d ha  [ ]h  d a a e a ca  f ICWA ...  c a   he 
f   [f]ede a  a da d  e ded b  C g e .  The 
regulations set out relevant expert witness requirements and the 
a da d f  he e h d f ha  f d g: Wh  ay serve as a 
a f ed e e  e ?   e a ed a  25 C.F.R.  23.122 (a): A 
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qualified expert witness must be qualified to testify regarding 
he he  he ch d  c ed c d  b  he a e  
or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or 
physical damage to the child and should be qualified to testify as to 
the prevailing social and cultural standards of the 
Indian ch d  Tribe. (Emphasis added). Regarding the likelihood of 
harm finding, 25 C.F.R. § 23.121 states: (c) For ... termination of 
parental rights, the evidence must show a causal relationship 
between the particular conditions in the home and the likelihood that 
continued custody of the child will result in serious emotional or 
physical damage to the particular child who is the subject of the 
child-custody proceeding; (d) Without a causal relationship 
identified in paragraph (c) of this section, evidence that shows only 
the existence of community or family poverty, isolation, single 
parenthood, custodian age, crowded or inadequate housing, 
substance abuse, or nonconforming social behavior does not by 
itself constitute clear and convincing evidence or evidence beyond 
a reasonable doubt that continued custody is likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to the child. In these two 
a e a  gh  e a  a ea , e c de  he e  c  
reliance on experts whose expertise is primarily rooted in their 
knowledge of tribal customs rather than professional training; the 
question before us is whether, based on their tribal expertise alone, 
he  ha e ha  he   ha e   be a f ed  e f  de  he 
new regulations. Oliver N. and Lisa B. argue on appeal that in their 
respective trials, the witnesses were not qualified under ICWA to 
testify as experts ab  he he  e g  he a e  ca e d 
likely result in serious harm to the child. The court concluded that 
under the new BIA regulations, neither Encelewski nor Dale were 
shown to be qualified expert witnesses under ICWA for this type of 
testimony. The court recognized that this represented a departure 
from our precedent but found conclusion was compelled by the 
ece  cha ge   fede a  a . I  b h ca e , he S e  C  
order terminating parental rights was reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
27. Watso v. Lourey 
 
No. 18-1723, 929 F.3d 1024, 2019 WL 3114047 (8th Cir. July 16, 
2019). Mother, individually and for her children, and grandmother 
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brought action against county human services commissioner, tribal 
courts, and tribal judges contesting tribal courts' jurisdiction over 
her children's child custody proceedings. The United States District 
Court for the District of Minnesota, 2018 WL 1512059, Ann D. 
Montgomery, J., adopted report and recommendation of Katherine 
M. Menendez, United States Magistrate Judge, 2017 WL 9672393, 
and dismissed complaint. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Benton, Circuit Judge, held that: 1) Indian Child Welfare 
Act (ICWA) did not preclude commissioner from referring tribal-
member children's child protection proceedings to tribal courts; 2) 
federal statute giving Minnesota jurisdiction over civil causes of 
action to which Indians were party did not require that state court 
hearing be held before tribal court could exercise jurisdiction; and 
3) absence of state court proceeding did not violate Plaintiffs' due 
process rights. Affirmed. Petition for Certiorari docketed October 
28, 2019.  
 
28. Brackeen v. Bernhardt 
 
No. 18-11479, 2019 WL 3759491(5th Cir. Aug 9, 2019). This case 
presented facial constitutional challenges to the Indian Child 
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and statutory and constitutional 
challenges to the 2016 administrative rule (the Final Rule) that was 
promulgated by the Department of the Interior to clarify provisions 
of ICWA. Plaintiffs are the states of Texas, Indiana, and Louisiana, 
and seven individuals seeking to adopt Indian children. Defendants 
were the United States of America, several federal agencies and 
officials in their official capacities, and five 
intervening Indian tribes. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, ruling that provisions of ICWA and 
the Final Rule violated equal protection, the Tenth Amendment, the 
nondelegation doctrine, and the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Defendants appealed. Although the court affirmed the district 
c  g ha  P a ff  had a d g, e e e e he d c  
c  g a  f a  judgment to Plaintiffs and render 
judgment in favor of Defendants. The district court concluded that 
ICWA  Indian Ch d  def  a  a ace-based classification. 
We conclude that this was error. Congress has exercised plenary 
e  e  he ba  elations of the Indians ... from the beginning, 
and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject 
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to be controlled by the Judicial Department of the 
g e e .  Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). 
The S e e C  dec  ea e  d b  ha  fede a  
legislation with respect to Indian tribes ... is not based upon 
e b e ac a  c a f ca .  United States v. Antelope, 430 
U.S. 641, 645 (1977). L e a  e e  ece f eg a  dea g 
with Indian tribes and reservations ... single[s] out for special 
treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near 
e e a .  Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974). The 
district court concluded that ICWA sections 1901 2312 and 1951
5213 violated the anticommandeering doctrine by requiring state 
courts and executive agencies to apply federal standards to state-
created claims. The district court also considered whether ICWA 
preempts conflicting state law under the Supremacy Clause and 
concluded that preemption did not apply because the law 
directly eg a ed a e .  Defe da  a g e ha  he 
anticommandeering doctrine does not prevent Congress from 
requiring state courts to enforce substantive and procedural 
standards and precepts, and that ICWA sets minimum procedural 
standards that preempt conflicting state law. We examine the 
constitutionality of the challenged provisions of ICWA below and 
conclude that they preempt conflicting state law and do not violate 
the anticommandeering doctrine. The Tenth Amendment provides 
ha  [ ]he e   de ega ed  he U ed S a e  b  he 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
S a e  e ec e ,   he e e.  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
C g e  eg a e e  a e ed  h e e umerated under 
the Constitution. Murphy v. Na l Collegiate Athletic Ass n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018). [C] c  ab e  f  he  f 
powers given to Congress is the power to issue direct orders to the 
g e e  f he S a e .  Id. The anticommandeering doctrine, an 
expression of this limitation on Congress, prohibits federal laws 
commanding the executive or legislative branch of a state 
government to act or refrain from acting. Federal statutes 
enforceable in state court do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce 
he , b  h   f fede a  d ec  f a e dge   a da ed 
b  he e  f he S e ac  C a e.  New York, 505 U.S. 144, 178-
179 (1992). The district court determined that ICWA provisions 
violated the nondelegation doctrine, reasoning that section 1915(c) 
grants Indian tribes the power to change legislative preferences with 
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binding effect on the states, and Indian tribes, like private entities, 
are not part of the federal government of the United States and 
cannot exercise federal legislative or executive regulatory power 
over non-Indians on non-tribal lands. However, the Supreme Court 
has long recognized that Congress may incorporate the laws of 
another sovereign into federal law without violating the 
nondelegation doctrine. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 
95 S.Ct. 710 (1975). ( [I] de e de  ba  a h   e 
ff c e   ec  C g e  dec   e   ba  c c  h  
 f   a h   eg a e C e ce ... h he 
Indian tribes. ). The B ea  f I d a  Affa  e e a  
of section 1915 is also entitled to Chevron deference. Plaintiffs had 
Article III standing, but this court rendered judgment in favor of 
Defendants on all claims. 
 
29. In re. A.W. 
 
No. C086160, 38 Cal.App.5th 655, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 
3d Dist. Aug. 12, 2019). Having reason to know the minor may be 
an Indian child, the juvenile court ordered the County to provide 
notice to the Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians tribe in 
accordance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The County 
knew that the maternal grandfather was a member of that tribe and 
ha  he ed  he be  e e a . I  a  e ,  h d ha e 
known, that mother was found to be an Indian child when she was a 
dependent of the court and that the Picayune Rancheria of the 
Chukchansi Indians tribe had intervened in that case. The court 
concluded that the County was required to send ICWA notice to the 
Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians tribe in this case. 
Here the County only gave the tribe notice of a hearing which had 
already passed. Less than 60 days after that notice, the juvenile court 
held an unnoticed ICWA compliance hearing and found the ICWA 
did not apply, although it is well established that a non-Indian parent 
has standing to assert an ICWA notice violation on appeal. In re 
Jonathon S., 129 Cal.App.4th 334, 339 (2005). Nonetheless, the 
County argued that this court does not have jurisdiction and parents 
do not have standing because they did not first bring a petition for 
invalidation in the juvenile court. The County argued that because a 
specific remedy [25 U.S.C. 1914] for ICWA violations exists, 
appeal is an improper remedy. It argued that a petition for 
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invalidation is the exclusive remedy available for ICWA notice and 
inquiry violations and, as such, parents were required to 
unsuccessfully pursue such a petition in the juvenile court prior to 
seeking relief on appeal. Yet despite arguing that a petition for 
invalidation is the exclusive remedy for an ICWA violation, the 
County also argued parents do not have standing to file such a 
petition for invalidation. It argued the petition is only available to 
parents of Indian children not parents of a potential Indian child 
for whom ICWA inquiry and notice was not effectuated.  The Court 
dec ed he C  a   ee a e he -forfeiture 
d c e or, more accurately described as the principle that a 
parent is not foreclosed from raising an ICWA inquiry or notice 
violation even if the issue could have been more timely raised by 




30. Fort McDermitt Paiute and Shoshone Tribe v. Price 
 
No. 17-837, 2018 WL 4637009 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2018). This case, 
brought under the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
A a ce Ac  ( ISDEAA ), 25 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq., concerned a 
medical clinic in McDermitt, Nevada, a small hamlet located in a 
remote area of the state near the Oregon border. In February 2016, 
he F  McDe  Pa e a d Sh h e T be ( he T be ) 
informed the Indian Health Service ( IHS ) an agency within the 
De a e  f Hea h a d H a  Se ce  ( HHS ) that it wished 
to take over operation of the clinic. In March 2016, IHS announced 
that it intended to close the clinic. The Tribe and IHS began 
eg a g a e f-governance compac  a d f d g ag ee e  
pursuant to Title V of ISDEAA, under which the Tribe would 
operate the clinic. The parties were able to reach agreement in some 
areas, but not all. On October 13, 2016, the Tribe set forth its 
position on five remaining sticking p   a f a  ffe  
submitted pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 5387(b). IHS responded on 
N e be  23, 2016, h a e e  ( he Dec a  Le e ) 
e ec g he T be  a   a  f e . The a e  
subsequently resolved three of the five issues through further 
negotiations. The parties still disagreed whether IHS properly 
e ec ed  f he T be  a  de  IDSEAA, h ch e   
limited grounds on which IHS may do so. First, the parties disputed 
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he he  IHS  e ec  f he T be  e ested funding level was 
proper. IHS asserts that it properly rejected the request, because the 
amount of funds the Tribe proposed exceeded the funding level to 
h ch he T be a  e ed. The T be  f a  ffe  e e ed 
$1,106,453.00 in funding. IHS claimed in its Declination Letter that 
the Tribe was entitled to no more than $375,533.00. Second, the 
a e  d ed he he  IHS e  e ec ed he T be  a  
to include a provision related to housing for clinic employees in the 
funding agreement. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment 
on these issues. The court denied both motions without prejudice as 
they relate to the funding issue, and order further proceedings. The 
court did, however, enter summary judgment for the Tribe on the 
employee-housing issue. 
 
31. Cook Inlet Tribal Council v. Mandregan 
 
No. 14-cv-1835, 348 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2018 WL 5817350 (D. D.C. 
Nov. 07, 2018). Non-profit corporation that provided services to 
Alaskan Native people brought action against Indian Health Service 
(IHS), Department of Health and Human Services, and agency 
officials, challenging decision declining proposed amendment to 
self-determination contract pursuant to the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) seeking 
increased funding for substance abuse programs to account for 
increased facility support costs. Parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment. The District Court, Emmet G. Sullivan, J., held 
that: (1) funding provision in ISDEAA was ambiguous regarding 
whether facility support costs needed to be funded exclusively from 
the Secretarial amount; (2) facility support costs were eligible as 
contract support costs; and (3) remand to IHS was warranted to 
determine amount of increased funding non-profit corporation was 
entitled to under ISDEAA. Plaintiff's motion granted in part; 









32. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Michigan 
 
No. 17-1932, 748 Fed.Appx. 12, 2018 WL 4183717 (6th Cir. Aug. 
30, 2018). Indian tribe that maintained separate health insurance 
group policies for its members and its employees brought action 
against plan administrator, alleging that administrator breached its 
fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Ac  (ERISA) b  f a g be  ed ca  b  h d c ed 
administrative fees, failing to authorize payment of Medicare-like 
rates for certain health services obtained by tribe's members, and 
charging hidden fees in connection with its physician group 
incentive program. The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan, Thomas L. Ludington, J., 200 F. Supp. 3d 697, 
dismissed tribe's claim related to administrator's failure to pay 
Medicare-like rates, and, 2017 WL 3007074, granted in part and 
denied in part parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment 
as to remaining claims. Tribe appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Boggs, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) presumption that employee 
health benefits offered by employer constituted single ERISA plan 
was not applicable; (2) tribe's health insurance group policies for its 
members and its employees were separate plans; (3) tribe's policy 
for its members was not governed by ERISA; (4) tribe stated breach 
of fiduciary duty claim relating to Medicare-like rates; but (5) 
administrator did not violate its fiduciary duties under ERISA 
through its operation of incentive program; and (6) tribe forfeited 
any claim to prejudgment interest as component of its damages. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
 
33. Luiz v. Northern Circle Indian Housing Authority 
 
No. 18-cv-04712-RMI, 2018 WL 5733652 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 
2018). This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed on August 
6, 2018. Respondents moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief can be 
granted. The court will grant Respondents' motion. In his petition, 
Pe e  a e  ha  he  cha e g g he de a  f e  
compensation benefits by the Northern Circle Indian Housing 
Authority (NCIHA) and AMERIND Risk Tribal WC Program 
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(AMERIND), as administered by the Berkeley Risk Administrators. 
Petitioner further alleges the following: (1) NCIHA is a tribal 
housing authority on Indian land in Ukiah, California, which 
provides assistance for native Americans in Northern California; (2) 
AMERIND  a fede a  cha e ed c a  d g e  
c e a ; (3) h gh c ac , AMERIND de  e  
c e a  f  NCIHA h gh he AMERIND T ba  W e  
C e a  P g a ; (4) Pe e  c a   administered by 
Berkeley Risk Administration in Scottsdale, Arizona. Petitioner was 
a non-native employee of NCIHA, where he worked as an IT 
professional for eighteen years before his claimed injury. On 
January 22, 2018, and on February 14, 2018, Petitioner filed a claim 
f  e  c e a  be ef  h NCIHA f  a    h  
neck and shoulder. The claim was denied by Berkeley Risk 
Administrators as falling outside the coverage plan because the plan 
d e   e d a h c e  a g f  an obscure cause or 
 ca e.  Re de  e  d   he g d ha  
the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction based on tribal sovereign 
. T ba  e e g    a a e  f b ec  a e  
jurisdiction, which may be challenged by a motion to dismiss under 
Fed. R. C . P. 12(b)(1).  Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) 
Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting E.F.W. v. St 
S e he  I d a  H gh Sch., 264 F.3d 1297, 1302-03 (10th Cir. 
2001)). As a court of limited jurisdiction, the federal courts are 
presumed to lack subject matter jurisdiction unless the party 
asserting jurisdiction establishes otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian 
Life Ins. Co. of America., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). When a 
defendant moves to dismiss a case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of providing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the court possesses jurisdiction. 
Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). Generally, 
a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an Indian tribe 
because of tribal sovereign immunity. Alvarado v. Table Mountain 
Rancheria, 509 F. 3d 1008, 1015-16 (9 h C . 2007). A be  
sovereign immunity will extend to both tribal governing bodies and 
tribal agencies which act as arms of the tribe. Allen v. Gold County 
Casino, 464 F. 3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (tribal casino held 
e ed  e e g  ). I  e e d   age c e  a d 
subdivisions of the tribe and has generally been held to apply to 
h g a h e  f ed b  be .  Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. 
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Auth., 455 F.3d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (vacated in part on other 
g d ). Th , [ ]  aga  I d a  be  a e ... ba ed b  
sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or 
c g e a  ab ga .  Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991). 
Petitioner provides no basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction 
over this action in his petition. To the contrary, he admits in his 
petition that NCIHA and its insurer AMERIND enjoy sovereign 
immunity. Petitioner claims a violation of the Indian Civil Rights 
Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 1303, on the ground that he was not fully 
informed of his rights, duties, and obligations before his claim was 
denied by the claims administrator and a final order issued by a 
hearing examiner denying his benefits. The ICRA does not establish 
or imply a federal civil cause of action except that it provides for a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Snow v. Quinault Indian 
Nation, 709 F. 2d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1983); Pink v. Modoc Indian 
Health Project, 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9 h C . 1998). The e  
de e   he a e  be e e ed a   he  
c d  e e e   he  habea  c e .  Jeffredo v. 
Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 918 (9 h C . 2010). H e e , [a]  he e 
C g e  e ac ed he ICRA, de e  a  ge e a  de d 
as having a meaning distinct from and, indeed, narrower than 
c d .  Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 
2017). S ec f ca , de e  a  c  def ed  e e 
h ca  c f e e .  I  h  ca e, Pe e  d e   a ege ha  
he was ever in tribal custody or was detained by the tribe in any way. 
Thus, the court finds as a matter of law that Petitioner cannot state a 
claim under the ICRA and his reference to the ICRA provides no 
basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing, 
this case is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
34. Stathis v. Marty Indian School 
 
No. 28738, 930 N.W.2d. 653, 2019 WL 2528032 (S. Ct. S. Dakota 
June 19, 2019). High school principal at Indian reservation school 
brought action against the school, school employees, and members 
of school board, asserting claims for wrongful termination, breach 
of contract, breach of settlement agreement, libel, and slander; and 
requesting punitive damages arising from termination of his 
employment. The Circuit Court, First Judicial Circuit, Charles Mix 
362 
 
County, Bruce V. Anderson, J., granted defendants' motion to 
dismiss. Principal appealed. The Supreme Court, Gilbertson, C.J., 




35. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. 
 
No. 16-35742, 905 F.3d 565, 2018 WL 4372973 (9th Cir Sept. 14, 
2018). Confederated tribes of Colville Reservation brought 
CERCLA action against the State of Washington and Canadian 
company, seeking to hold them liable for dumping several million 
tons of industrial waste into the Columbia River. After phase one of 
a trifurcated bench trial, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Washington, No. 2:04-cv-00256-LRS, Lonny R. 
Suko, J., found the company was a liable party under CERCLA and, 
in phase two of trial, found the company liable for more than $8.25 
million of plaintiffs' response costs. After partial judgment was 
entered, the company appealed. The Court of Appeals, Gould, 
Circuit Judge, held that: (1) The district court did not abuse its 
discretion by directing entry of judgment on company's liability 
under CERCLA for response costs; (2) company expressly aimed 
waste it dumped into River at the State of Washington, thereby 
establishing requisite effects in Washington for exercise of specific 
personal jurisdiction; (3) tribes were entitled to recover investigation 
costs, as recoverable costs of removal; (4) tribes were entitled to 
recover reasonable attorney fees for prevailing in their action; (5) 
company was not entitled to divisibility defense. Affirmed. 
 
36. Havasupai Tribe v. Provencio 
 
No. 15-15754, 906 F.3d 1155, 2018 WL 5289028 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 
2018). Environmental groups and Indian tribes brought an action 
challenging United States Forest Service's approval of the 
resumption of the uranium mining operation on federal land. Mining 
companies intervened. Grand Canyon Trust v. Williams, 98 F. 
Supp.3d 1044 (D. Ariz. 2015) entered summary judgment in 
government's favor, and plaintiffs appealed. The court of 
appeals, Block, District Judge, sitting by designation, held that: (1) 
plaintiffs had Article III standing to assert claims under National 
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Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA); (2) Forest Service's conclusion that 
mining company had valid existing rights to mine uranium ore on 
public lands that were established prior to mineral withdrawal was 
final agency decision; (3) Forest Service's mineral report was not a 
major federal action requiring preparation of environmental impact 
statement (EIS); (4) Forest Service's mineral report was not an 
undertaking that triggered NHPA's consultation process; (5) groups' 
claim that Forest Service improperly determined that mining 
company had valid existing rights to mine uranium ore on public 
lands fell outside the zone of interests protected by General Mining 
Act; and (6) groups' claim that Forest Service improperly 
determined that company had valid existing rights to mine uranium 
ore on public lands fell within zone of interests protected by Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). Affirmed in part, 
vacated in part, and remanded. 
 
37. Spokane County v. Department of Fish and Wildlife 
 
No. 95029-6, 192 Wash.2d 453, 430 P.3d 655 (Wash. Dec. 06, 
2018). Counties brought action against the Department of Fish and 
Wildlife, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding 
Department's authority to regulate construction or performance of 
work that would occur exclusively above ordinary high-water line. 
The Superior Court, Thurston County, No. 16-2-04334-5, John C. 
Skinder, J., entered judgment for Department. Counties sought 
direct review. The Supreme Court, Owens, J., held that upland 
projects that are entirely landward of the ordinary high-water line 
may be subject to the Hydraulic Code, and thus subject to regulation 
by the Department. Affirmed. 
38. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency 
 
No. 18-C-108, 360 F.Supp.3d 847, 2018 WL 6681397 (E.D. Wis. 
Dec. 19, 2018). Tribe brought action against Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and Army Corps of Engineers, seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief under Clean Water Act (CWA) and 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in substantive challenge to 
refusal of EPA and Corps to exercise jurisdiction over CWA permit 
from state of Michigan for discharge of dredged or fill material into 
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certain navigable waters. Tribe moved to amend the complaint to 
add APA claims challenging EPA's withdrawal of its objections to 
permit and alleging that EPA and Corps had violated National 
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) section, and EPA and Corps 
moved to dismiss. The district court, William C. Griesbach, and the 
Chief Judge, held that: (1) EPA's withdrawal of its objections to 
permit was not reviewable under APA; (2) allegedly violated NHPA 
section did not apply because no federally funded or federally 
licensed project was involved; (3) a matter of apparent first 
impression, CWA citizen suit provision did not waive sovereign 
immunity for suits against Army Corps of Engineers; (4) CWA 
could not be used for substantive challenge to EPA's refusal to 
exercise jurisdiction; and (5) letters from EPA and Corps to tribe 
explaining refusal to exercise jurisdiction were not final agency 
actions subject to APA review. Plaintiff's motion denied; 
defendants' motion granted. 
39. Dine Citizens Against Ruining our Environment v. 
Bernhardt 
 
No. 18-2089, 923 F.3d 831, 2019 WL 1999298 (10th Cir. May 07, 
2019). Environmental advocacy groups brought an action alleging 
that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) violated National 
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) in granting applications for permits to drill 
(APD) horizontal, multi-stage hydraulically fracked wells on public 
lands. Dine Ci i ens Agains  R ining O r En  . Je ell, 312 F. 
Supp. 3d 1031 (D. N.M. 2018), entered judgment in BLM's favor, 
and the groups appealed. The court of appeals, Briscoe, Circuit 
Judge, held that: (1) the groups had standing to bring action; (2) 
environmental assessments (EA) did not arbitrarily define area of 
potential effects (APE) for each APD in way that excluded cultural 
sites; (3) EAs adequately analyzed cumulative effects of developing 
new APDs; (4) BLM did not abuse its discretion under National 
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) when it failed to consult with 
state historic preservation office (SHPO); (5) EAs were properly 
tiered to its previous environmental impact statement (EIS); (6) 
NEPA required BLM to consider cumulative impacts of reasonably 
foreseeable wells in EAs; (7) groups failed to carry their burden to 
show that BLM acted arbitrarily or capriciously in analyzing air 
pollution impacts; and 8) BLM abused its discretion by failing to 
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consider cumulative water impacts. Affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, and remanded. 
 
40. Dine Citizens Agai  R i i g O  E  . B ea  f 
Indian Affairs 
 
No. 17-17320, 932 F.3d 843, 2019 WL 3404210 (9th Cir. July 29, 
2019). A coalition of tribal, regional, and national conservation 
ga a  ( P a ff ) ed he U.S. De a ment of the Interior, 
its Secretary, and several bureaus within the agency, challenging a 
variety of agency actions that reauthorized coal mining activities on 
land reserved to the Navajo Nation. Plaintiffs alleged that these 
actions violated the Endangered S ec e  Ac  ( ESA ), Endangered 
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1973). et seq., and the National 
E e a  P c  Ac  ( NEPA ), National Environmental 
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969). et seq. The Navajo 
T a a  E e g  C a  ( NTEC ), a c oration wholly 
owned by the Navajo Nation that owns the mine in question, 
intervened in the action for the limited purpose of moving to dismiss 
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19and 12(b)(7). NTEC 
argued that it was a required party but that it could not be joined due 
to tribal sovereign immunity, and that the lawsuit could not proceed 
without it. The district court agreed with NTEC and dismissed the 
action. Aff ed. The Na a  M e ( M e )  a 33,000-acre strip 
mine. It produces coal from which the Four Corners Power Plant 
( P e  P a ) ge e a e  e ec c . The M e a d P e  P a  a e 
both on tribal land of the Navajo Nation within New Mexico. The 
Mine operates pursuant to a surface mining permit issued by the 
Department of the Interior's Office of Surface Mining Reclamation 
a d E f ce e  ( OSMRE ), de  he S face M g C  
and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1201(1977). et seq. This lawsuit 
stems from changes and renewals to the lease agreements, rights-of-
way, and government-issued permits under which the Mine and 
Power Plant operate. In 2011, APS and the Navajo Nation amended 
the lease governing Power Plant operations, including by extending 
the term of the lease through 2041. BHP Billiton (which at the time 
still owned the Mine) then sought a renewal of the existing surface 
mining permit for the Mine and a new surface mining permit that 
would allow operations to move to an additional area within the 
Mine lease area. The lease amendment and accompanying rights-of-
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way could not go into effect, and the surface mining permits could 
not be granted, without approvals from several bureaus within the 
Department of the Interior. NTEC asserted that it was a required 
party, because of its economic interest in the Mine, that it could not 
be joined due to tribal sovereign immunity, and that the action could 
not proceed in its absence. Even though dismissal would have left 
their decisions intact, Federal Defendants opposed NTEC's motion 
to dismiss, arguing that the federal government was the only party 
required to defend an action seeking to enforce compliance with 
NEPA and the ESA. The district court granted NTEC's motion to 
dismiss. The court concluded that NTEC had a legally protected 
e e   he b ec  a e  f h  , beca e he e ef Plaintiffs 
seek could directly affect the Navajo Nation (acting through its 
corporation, Intervenor-Defendant NTEC) by disrupting its 
e e   [ ] ea e ag ee e  a d he ab   b a  he 
bargained-f  a e  a d b .  The c  he d hat Federal 
Defendants could not adequately represent NTEC's interest in the 
litigation, because although the agencies had an interest in defending 
he  a a e  a d dec , NTEC'  e e   he c e f 
h  ca e fa  e ceed  h e f he age c e . We agree with the district 
court that Federal Defendants cannot be counted on to adequately 
represent NTEC's interests. Although, Federal Defendants have an 
interest in defending their decisions, their overriding interest, as it 
was in Manygoats, must be in compliance with environmental laws 
such as NEPA and the ESA. This interest differs in a meaningful 
e e f  NTEC'  a d he Na a  Na  e e g  e e   
ensuring that the Mine and Power Plant continues to operate and 
provide profits to the Navajo Nation. Finally, Plaintiffs and the 
U ed S a e  ge   a  he b c gh  e ce   h d 
that this litigation can continue in NTEC's absence. The public 
gh  e ce   a ed e ce   ad a  de  e  
under which a party, although necessary, will not be deemed 
d e ab e,  a d he ga  a  c e  he ab e ce f 
that party. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1459 (9th Cir. 1988). 
The court held that the exception does not apply here, reasoning that 
the public rights exception is reserved for litigation that 
a ce d[ ] he a e e e  f he ga  a d ee [ ]  
d ca e a b c gh .  Kescoli v Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304, 1311 (9th 
Cir. 1996). The public rights exception may apply in a case that 
c d ad e e  affect he ab e  a e ' e e ,  b  he 
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ga    de  the legal entitlements of the absent 
a e  f  he e ce   a . (e ha  added) 
(quoting Conner, 848 F.2d at 1459). Here, although Plaintiffs 
nominally seek only a renewed NEPA and ESA process, the 
implication of their claims is that Federal Defendants should not 
have approved the mining activities in their exact form. The result 
Plaintiffs seek, therefore, certainly threatens NTEC's legal 
entitlements. We also recognize, as the Tenth Circuit has pointed 
out, that refusing to apply the public rights exception arguably 
d ce[ ] a  a a  e   ha  [ ]  e, e ce  [a] Tribe, 
could seek review of an environmental impact statement covering 
significant federal action relating to leases or agreements for 
development of natural resources on [that tribe's] 
a d .  Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 559. Or, at least, no one could obtain 
such review unless the tribe were willing to waive its immunity and 
participate in the lawsuit. This result, however, is for Congress to 
address, should it see fit, as only Congress may abrogate tribal 
sovereign immunity. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 
U.S. 782, 790, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014). It is 
undisputed that Congress has not done so here. The public rights 
exception, therefore, does not apply. Affirmed.  
 
41. United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. 
Federal Communications Commission 
 
No. 18-1129, 933 F.3d 728, 2019 WL 3756373 (D.C. Cir. Aug 09, 
2019). Cellular wireless services, including telephone and other 
forms of wireless data transmission, depending on facilities that 
transmit their radio signals on bands of the electromagnetic 
spectrum. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or 
Commission) has exclusive control over the spectrum, and wireless 
providers must obtain licenses from the FCC to transmit. As part of 
an effort to expedite the rollout of 5G service, the Commission has 
removed some regulatory requirements for the construction of 
e e  fac e . The e e  cha e ged e f he FCC  
orders paring back such regulations, In re Accelerating Wireless 
Broadband Deployment by Removing Barriers to Infrastructure 
Investment (Order), FCC 18-30, 2018 WL 1559856 (F.C.C.) (Mar. 
30, 2018). The Order exempted most small cell construction from 
two kinds of previously required review historic-preservation 
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review under the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and 
environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA). Together, these reviews assess the effects of new 
construction on, among other things, sites of religious and cultural 
importance to federally recognized Indian Tribes. We grant in part 
the petitions for review, because the Order does not justify the 
C  de e a  ha   a    he b c e e   
require a review of small cell deployments. In particular, the 
Commission failed to justify its confidence that small cell 
deployments pose little to no cognizable religious, cultural, or 
environmental risk, particularly given the vast number of proposed 
deployments and the reality that the Order will principally affect 
small cells that require new construction. The Commission 
accordingly did not, pursuant to its public interest authority, 
Construction Permits, 47 U.S.C. § 319(d), adequately address 
possible harms of deregulation and benefits of environmental and 
historic preservation review. The Order s deregulation of small cells 
is thus arbitrary and capricious. As for the Tribes  c e  ha  
the Order is invalid because the Commission did not meet its 
obligations to consult with Tribes, the Commission responds that it 
extensively consulted with Tribes, and that in any event, its 
consultation obligation is not judicially enforceable. We conclude 
that the Commission fulfilled its obligation to consult. The 
Commission presented abundant evidence that it 
c ed  Tribes in the ordinary sense of the word, and 
the Tribes have offered no other concrete standard by which to 
dge he C  eff . O  h  ec d, e ca  a  ha  
the Commission failed to consult with Tribes in its meetings and 
other communications, which began in 2016 and continued through 
early 2018.  The Commission documented extensive meetings it 
held with Tribes before it issued the Order. Under Advisory 
C c  eg a , [c] a  ea  he ce  f ee g, 
discussing, and considering the views of other participants, and, 
where feasible, seeking agreement with them regarding matters 
a g  he ec  106 ce .  36 C.F.R. § 800.16(f); see also 
National Park Service and Related Programs, 54 U.S.C. § 
302706(b). The dictionary definition of cons g  ee [ g] 
ad ce  f a  f.  Consult, American Heritage Dict. (5th 
ed. 2019). Kee ah c a  ha  he FCC  eff  e e 
e g e , b ef g , c fe e ce ca , a d de e  f 
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e a  b  a C e  a he  ha  c a ,  a d 
presents evidence that Tribes did not view these meetings as 
consultations. But it offers no standard by which to judge which 
c a  e e e g e ,  he he  a e g 
e   a c fe e ce ca  a f e  a  a c ltation. We grant 
the petitions to vacate the Order  e a  f a  ce  f   
limited approval authority and remand to the FCC. We deny the 
petitions to vacate the Order  cha ge   T ba  e e   
Section 106 review and to vacate the Order in its entirety.  
 
Fisheries, Water, FERC, BOR 
 
42. Robbins v. Mason County Title Insurance Company 
 
No. 50376-0-II, 5 Wash. App.2d 68, 425 P.3d 885 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Aug. 28, 2018). Insureds filed action against title insurance 
company, alleging that terms of title insurance policy obligated 
insurer to defend them against a claim by Squaxin Island Tribe that 
the 1854 Treaty of Medicine Creek gave Tribe the right to take 
shellfish on the insureds' tidelands. The Superior Court, Mason 
County No: 16-2-00686-1, Toni A Sheldon, J., granted summary 
judgment in favor of the insurer and denied insureds' cross-motion 
for partial summary judgment. Insureds appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Bjorgen, J., held that: (1) Tribe's notification to insureds of 
plan to harvest shellfish in accordance with tribal shellfish rights 
constituted demand, as required for coverage under policy; (2) 
Tribe's demand to insureds was not founded upon a claim of title, as 
required for coverage under policy; (3) Tribe's demand to insureds 
was founded upon an encumbrance, as required for coverage under 
policy; (4) Tribe's right to harvest shellfish existed or was claimed 
to have existed prior to date of title insurance, as required for 
coverage under policy; (5) Tribe's right to harvest shellfish 
resembled profit prendre, not easement, and thus did not fall within 
policy exclusion for easements; and (6) insurer acted in bad faith in 
denying defense to insureds. Reversed and remanded. 
 
43. United States v. Uintah Valley Shoshone Tribe 
 
No. 2:17-cv-1140-BSJ, 2018 WL 4222398 (D. Utah Sept. 05, 2018). 
P a ff  M  f  S a  J dg e  a d Defe da  
competing Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court 
370 
 
on June 1, 2018. Plaintiff United States of America seeks, among 
other things, to permanently enjoin Defendants from selling and 
issuing hunting and fishing permits for use on state, federal, or tribal 
lands of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
( U e T be ). The a e f ch ce e  a eged  a e  18 U.S.C. 
§ 1343, a criminal statute, which provides the following: Whoever, 
having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to 
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or 
causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television 
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, 
signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such 
scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than 20 years, or both. The UVST, the Defendant, is not a tribe 
currently recognized by the United States. It is currently an 
ga a  c ed f M ed-B d 4 (a d he  de ce da ) 
who were formerly members of the Ute Tribe, but whose 
membership therein and relationship to the federal government was 
terminated under the Ute Partition and Termination Act of 1954 
( UPTA ). Th ee UVST ba  eade  a e a ed a  Defe da . 
The United States argued that Defendants are engaged in a scheme 
to obtain money by false representations and promises. Based on the 
agreed factual stipulations it is difficult for the Court to find such a 
scheme to obtain money by false representations and promises 
through the sale of licenses. The question presented to the Court by 
the United States was more in the nature of a declaration as to the 
absence of sovereign power in Defendants to issue hunting and 
fishing licenses. Thus, it appeared to the Court the United States as 
trustee is entitled to a ruling so declaring but denied relief by way of 
an injunction because of the absence of evidence dealing with a 
criminal statute. It was clear to the court from the history, since 
L c  e a  a e  f c g e a  a d ba  ac , ha  
Defendants have no power to issue licenses to hunt and fish on trust 
or Tribal lands. None. They should not do so, not because they have 
concocted a scheme to defraud purchasers of such licenses, but 
because they simply lack the power to issue such licenses. That 






44. Silva v. Farrish 
 
No. 18-CV-3648 (SJF)(SIL), 2019 WL 117602 (E.D. N.Y. Jan. 07, 
2019). Me be  f he Sh ec c  I d a  Na  ( he T be ), 
commenced this action alleging violations of their aboriginal 
usufructuary fishing rights under the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, and a 
continuing pattern of race discrimination in violation of Sections 
1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, b  Defe da  B a  Fa h ( Fa h ), the 
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation 
( NYDEC ), a d he S ff  C  D c  A e  Off ce 
( SCDA ) (Fa h, Lac , Segg  a d he NYDEC c ec e , he 
S a e Defe da ). The C  e ec f  ec e d  ha  he 
Complaint be dismissed in its entirety. However, the Court further 
recommends that Plaintiffs be granted leave to replead, but only as 
to their statutory claims for monetary damages against Farrish, 
Laczi, and Seggos in their individual capacities. Plaintiffs are 
members of the Shinnecock Indian Nation, a federally-recognized 
Indian tribe, who reside on the Shinnecock Indian Reservation (the 
Re e a ) ca ed  S ff  C , Ne  Y . A  a  e e a  
times, Plaintiffs have fished in the waters of Shinnecock Bay and its 
e a . Acc d g  P a ff , C a  Deed  a d e a ed 
d c e   he  ab g a  gh   f h  ch a e  
without interference. There was a pending state criminal action 
aga  h  ha  ca ed he S a e  e e t in enforcing its 
generally applicable fishing regulations, and which provided an 
adequate opportunity for judicial review of his federal constitutional 
claim. The State Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint 
on the grounds that: (i) all claims against the NYDEC, as well as 
those against Farrish, Laczi, and Seggos in their official capacities, 
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and principles of sovereign 
immunity. The claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as to 
Silva are precluded under the Younger abstention doctrine. It is 
undisputed by Plaintiffs that the Eleventh Amendment precludes 
jurisdiction over their claims for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981 and 1982 against the NYDEC. Plaintiffs maintain, however, 
that the Young exception to sovereign immunity applies to their 
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against Farrish, Laczi, 
and Seggos in their official capacities. Plaintiffs also seem to 
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suggest that state regulation of Indian fishing rights is necessarily 
preempted by federal law. The Court disagrees. Initially, the Court 
acknowledges that Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive 
relief, as pled in the Complaint, facially satisfy both components of 
he a gh f a d  de  Verizon for determining 
whether Young should apply. The Court concludes that this case is 
governed by Coeur d'Alene. Accordingly, the Young exception to 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity does not apply to 
Plaintiffs' claims against Farrish, Laczi, and Seggos in their official 
capacities. The Court recommended that Plaintiffs' claims against 
the NYDEC, along with those against Farrish, Laczi, and Seggos in 
their official capacities, be dismissed as barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
 
45. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission 
 
No. 14-1271, 913 F.3d 1099, 2019 WL 321025 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 
2019).Indian tribe filed petition for review of Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission orders denying its petition for order 
declaring that licensee for hydroelectric project failed to diligently 
pursue relicensing of project or that states had waived their authority 
to issue water quality certification for project, 147 FERC 61216, 
2014 WL 2794387, and denying its motion for rehearing, 149 FERC 
61038, 2014 WL 5293211. The court of appeals, Sentelle, Senior 
Circuit Judge, held that: (1) California and Oregon were not 
indispensable parties, and (2) states waived their authority under 
Clean Water Act (CWA) to issue water quality certification for the 
project. Petition granted. 
 
46. United States v. Turtle 
 
No. 2:18-cr-88-FtM-38MRM, 365 F.Supp.3d 1242, 2019 WL 
423346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., Feb. 04, 2019) Defendant, a member of 
the Seminole Tribe of Florida, who lived on a Seminole Indian 
reservation, was charged with selling American alligator eggs in 
violation of Lacey Act, predicated on the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA). Defendant moved to dismiss. The District Court, Sheri 
Polster Chappell, J., held that: (1) the Tribe's usufructuary rights 
included the right to sell alligator eggs gathered from the 
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reservation; (2) ESA did not abrogate the Tribe's usufructuary right 
to sell alligator eggs; but (3) Congress could regulate the Tribe's 
usufructuary rights with reasonable and necessary conservation 
measures. Motion denied. 
 
47. Ak-Chin Indian Community v. Cent. Arizona Water 
Conservation Dist. 
 
No. CV-17-00918-PHX-DGC, 378 F. Supp.3d 797, 2019 WL 
1356310 (D. Ariz. R. Mar. 26, 2019). Plaintiff Ak Chin Indian 
C  ( he C ) ed Defe da  Ce a  A a 
Wa e  C e a  D c  ( CAWCD ) f  dec a a  dg e  
and a permanent injunction regarding delivery of Central Arizona 
P ec  ( CAP ) a e   he C . CAWCD 
counterclaimed, seeking the opposite result. The Court joined the 
United States as a party under Rule 19, and the United States filed a 
crossclaim against CAWCD seeking declaratory relief regarding the 
interpretation of relevant statutes and contracts as they relate to the 
C  a e  gh . CAWCD a e ed c a  aga  he 
United States, but the Court dismissed them on sovereign immunity 
grounds. The Court granted the United States' motion for summary 
judgment on its claims against CAWCD. The Community is a 
federally recognized Indian tribe. CAWCD is a multi-county water 
conservation district and a municipal corporation authorized to 
operate and maintain the CAP, a system of canals, aqueducts, and 
related structures that deliver Colorado River water throughout 
centra  a d he  A a. The U ed S a e   h  ca e 
includes a number of federal officials and agencies that oversee 
reclamation matters. This case concerns the Ak Chin Water Rights 
Ac  f 1984, efe ed  a d c ed  h  de  a  he 1984 Ac .  
See 1984 Act, Pub. L. No. 98-530, 98 Stat. 2698 (Oct. 19, 1984). 
The 1984 Act addressed water the Community is entitled to receive 
from the Colorado River. Section 2(a) of the Act required the 
Secretary to deliver a permanent water supply to the Community of 
 e  ha  e e -five thousand acre-feet of surface water 
suitable for agricultural use except as otherwise provided under 
b ec  (b) a d (c).  1984 Ac ,  2(a). Sec  2(b), h ch  he 
section in dispute, in this case, concerns an additional 10,000 acre-
fee  ( AF ) f a e  he C  a  ece e de  ce a  
c d . I  de  ha  [ ]  a  ea   h ch ff c e  face 
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water is available, the Secretary shall deliver such additional 
quantity of water as is requested by the Community not to exceed 
ten thousand acre-fee .  1984 Ac ,  2(b). The ec  f he  a e  
ha  [ ]he Sec e a  ha  be e ed  ca   h  b ga  
referred to in this subsection only if he determines that there is 
sufficient capacity available in the main project works of the Central 
A a P ec   de e  ch add a  a .  I   de ed: 
The c  g a ed he U ed S a e   f  a  dg e  
on its claims against CAWCD. 
 
48. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella 
Valley Water Dist., et al. 
 
No. EDCV 13-00883 JGB, 162 F.Supp.3d 1053 ( C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 
2019). The Tribe utilizes water supplied by CVWD and DWA. In 
2016, CVWD  a d DWA  b c a e  e  c e g he 
Reservation served a total population of 340,000 people. Today, the 
Tribe does not pump groundwater from the Reservation. The Tribe 
currently does not use water for agricultural purposes to any 
significant degree. For standing purposes, the Tribe must show an 
a    ega  ec ed e e . U de  he S e e C  
decision in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, the creation of 
an I d a  Re e a  c a  a gh   a e   he e e  eeded 
 acc h he e f he e e a .  Cappaert v. United 
States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976). This right is referred to as a 
Winters gh .  The S e e C  he d h  Winters right 
e e e   ha  a  f a e  ece a   f f  he e 
f he e e a ,  e.  (c g Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 
546, 600-01 (1963) (emphasis added)). In this case, the Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged limitations on a Winters right and noted that 
a Winters gh   e e e  a e   he e e    ece a   
acc h he e f he e e a [.]  Agua Caliente, 849 
F.3d at 1268. The Federal Circuit, considering a similar issue, 
reached the same conclusion. See Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. United 
States, 900 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The tribe in Crow Creek 
argued any action affecting the water source at issue constitutes an 
injury to its Winters right, even if the action does not affect the 
be  ab   d a  ff c ent water to fulfill the purposes of the 
reservation. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, noting that 
a Winters right only entitled a tribe to enough water to fulfill the 
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e  f  e e a ,  e. I  e ab a ed ha  he be  
property right was usufructuary in nature in that the tribe did not 
own particular molecules of water but the advantage of its use. 
(citation omitted). The federal circuit held that the tribe cannot be 
ed b  ac  ha  d e   affec  [ ] ab   e ufficient 
a e   f f  he e  f he [ ]e e a .  Th  C  ag eed 
h he fede a  c c  a a  a d f d  ha  he T be  
provide evidence of injury to its ability to use sufficient water to 
fulfill the purposes of the reservation. 
 
49. United States v. Washington 
No. 17-35760, 928 F.3d 783, 2019 WL 2608834 (9th Cir. June 26, 
2019). The United States, on its own behalf and as trustee for a 
number of Western Washington Indian tribes, brought action 
against the State of Washington, seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief concerning off-reservation treaty rights fishing. After entry of 
injunction granting tribal fishing rights, U.S. v. State of Wash., 384 
F. Supp. 312, (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 1974), and adjudication 
of tribes' off-reservation rights, U.S. v. State of Wash., 626 F. Supp. 
1405, (W.D. Wash. Jan. 1, 1985). Skokomish tribe commenced sub 
proceeding asserting its claim to usual and accustomed fishing rights 
in Satsop River. The United States District Court for the Western 
District of Washington, Nos. 2:17-sp-01-RSM, 2:70-cv-09213-
RSM, Ricardo S. Martinez, Chief Judge, 2017 WL 3726774, 
entered summary judgment in favor of state and other tribes, and 
Skokomish tribe appealed. The court of appeals, Bea, Circuit Judge, 




50. Forest County Potawatomi Community v. United States 
 
No. 15-105 (CKK), 330 F.Supp.3d 269, 2018 WL 4308570 (D. D.C. 
Sept. 10, 2018). Indian tribe brought this action under 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) against the United States, 
challenging Department of Interior's (DOI) decision not to approve 
an amendment to a gaming compact between the tribe and State of 
Wisconsin under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). After the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Colleen 
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Kollar-Kotelly, J., 317 F.R.D. 6, granted leave to intervene to nearby 
tribe that sought to develop competing gaming facility, tribe moved 
for summary judgment, while United States and nearby tribe cross-
moved for summary judgment. The district court held that: (1) 
IGRA provision permitting tribal-state compact on any subjects 
directly related to operation of gaming activities was ambiguous, as 
would support Chevron deference; (2) interpretation of IGRA by 
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs was based upon a permissible 
construction of statute, as would entitle decision to Chevron 
deference; (3) Secretary's determination that exclusivity provision 
transferring responsibility for tribe's revenues onto another tribe 
violated IGRA was reasonable, entitling decision to Chevron 
deference; (4) Secretary's determination that proposed compact 
would have required another tribe to take responsibility for tribe's 
revenues was not arbitrary and capricious, as required to support 
tribe's APA claim; (5) Secretary's determination that compact's 
inclusion of loss of revenue from class II gaming and ancillary 
businesses violated IGRA was reasonable, and thus was entitled to 
Chevron deference; and (6) Secretary's determination that proposed 
compact calculated loss mitigation payments based on revenue from 
class II gaming and ancillary businesses was not arbitrary and 
capricious, as required to support tribe's APA claim. Tribe's motion 
denied; United States and nearby tribe's motions granted. 
 
51. Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Pauma 
and Yuima Reservation v. Unite Here International 
Union 
 
No. 16-cv-2660-BAS-AGS, 346 F.Supp.3d 1365 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 
28, 2018). Federally-recognized Indian tribe that operated casino on 
its reservation brought action alleging that union which represented 
service and manufacturing employees skirted binding dispute 
resolution process by filing series of unfair labor practice charges 
directly with National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and that 
State of California failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure that 
union would comply with dispute resolution process. Union and 
State moved to dismiss. The District Court, Cynthia Bashant, J., held 
that: (1) tribe had colorable basis for District Court to have federal 
question jurisdiction over action against State; (2) dispute between 
tribe and union over enforceability of alternative dispute mechanism 
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in tribal labor ordinance was not justiciable controversy with State 
of California; (3) claim by tribe against State for breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing for not enforcing alternative 
dispute mechanism against union in tribal labor ordinance as 
implemented into Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) gaming 
compact with State was not justiciable; and (4) court did not have 
federal question jurisdiction over dispute between tribe against 
union for opting to pursue its unfair labor charges against tribe with 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) instead of dispute 
resolution process in tribe's IGRA gaming contract with State of 
California. Motions granted. 
 
52. Brownstone, LLC. v. Big Sandy Rancheria of Western 
Mono Indians et al. 
 
No. 2:16-cv-04170-CAS(AGRx), 2018 WL 6697175 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 17, 2018). Brownstone, LLC filed this action against 
defendants Big Sandy Rancheria of Western Mono Indians (the 
T be ) a d he B g Sa d  Ra che a E e a e  A h  ( he 
A h ). P a ff a ege  he f g c a : (1) c a  f  
the breaches of two contract; (2) money had and received; (3) 
conversion; (4) Open Book Account; and (5) declaratory relief. 
Defendants moved to dismiss. Plaintiff alleges that it was selected 
by the Tribe to provide expertise in developing a large, Class III 
gaming facility. The parties entered into contracts aligned with 
different phases of the Project. Following the initial Memorandum 
f U de a d g ( MOU ), e ec ed  Ja a  16, 2007, he 
parties first entered into a Credit Agreement. The parties also 
entered into the Development Agreement on or about the same date 
as the Credit Agreement. Under the Development Agreement, 
plaintiff was to help the Tribe obtain either bridge financing or 
permanent financing for the Project. Plaintiff claimed that the 
plaintiff and the Tribal Parties continued to negotiate a third 
agreement, the Consulting Agreement, whereby plaintiff would 
provide services for the operations of the casino once completed. 
However, after the Tribe elected new leadership in September 2008, 
the Tribal Parties ultimately declined to execute the Agreement. 
Still, plaintiff claimed that it continued to seek financing sources to 
assist the Tribe with pursuing the Project, if without the complete 
cooperation of the Tribal Parties. Plaintiff alleged that the parties 
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agreed that licensing was unnecessary for the Credit Agreement and 
the Development Agreement, because those agreements only 
contracted plaintiff to perform certain services before any gaming 
operations occurred. On June 10, 2016, plaintiff filed this action. 
The T ba  Pa e  ed  d  a ff  c a   he 
grounds that (1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this 
matter; (2) that venue is improper; and (3) that plaintiff fails to state 
a claim for which relief is available. Plaintiff argues that the Court 
has subject matter jurisdiction in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 
c  efe ed  a  fede a  e  d c .  P a ff 
contends that this case requires resolution of a substantial question 
of federal law under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 2701 et seq. ( IGRA ), a  e  a  he T ba -State Compact 
between Big Sandy Rancheria and the State of California. 
Defendants responded that federal question jurisdiction does not 
provide this Court subject matter jurisdiction because a federal issue 
  a a e   he face f a ff  c a ,   a e  
f fede a  a  a ece a  e e e  f e f e f [ a ff ] 
well- eaded a e c a .  The C  f d ha  fede a  e  
jurisdiction did not confer jurisdiction over this matter because 
a ff  ca e d e   a f  he e -plead complaint rule. For 
he f eg g ea , he C  g a ed defe da    
dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).  
 
53. Koi Nation of Northern California v. United States 
De  f I e i  
 
No. 17-1718 (BAH), 361 F.Supp.3d 14, 2019 WL 250670 (D.C. 
D.C. Jan. 16, 2019). The Koi Nation of Northern California, which 
was a landless federally recognized Indian tribe, brought action 
alleging that United States Department of the Interior's (DOI) 
decision concluding that the tribe was not eligible to game on lands 
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) restored lands 
exception violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), IGRA, 
and Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), and challenging the 
subsection of the regulation on which the DOI's decision relied, 
seeking declaration that tribe qualified as an Indian tribe restored to 
federal recognition under IGRA, and injunction invalidating 
subsection of implementing regulation to extent it excluded from 
eligibility for IGRA's restored lands exception tribes 
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administratively determined to be recognized outside the formal Part 
83 Federal acknowledgement process. Koi Nation and DOI cross-
moved for summary judgment. The District Court, Beryl A. Howell, 
Chief Judge, held that: (1) tribe's claim was ripe for judicial review; 
(2) statutory six-year limitations period for challenging agency 
regulation did not apply to tribe's claim challenging DOI regulation; 
(3) be a  e ed  Fede a  ec g ,  h  ea g f 
IGRA's restored lands exception; (4) even if IGRA's restored lands 
exception was ambiguous, Indian canon of construction would 
resolve the ambiguity in tribe's favor; (5) DOI decision violated 
statute prohibiting classifying, enhancing, or diminishing privileges 
and immunities available to Indian tribe relative to other federally 
recognized tribes; and (6) DOI failed to adequately explain its 
change in policy. Koi Nation's motion granted; DOI's motion 
denied. 
 
54. Texas v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo 
 
No. EP-17-CV-179-PRM, 367 F.Supp.3d 596, 2019 WL 542036 
(W.D. Tex., Feb. 11, 2019). In litigation between State of Texas and 
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Tribe regarding gaming activities on Pueblo 
tribal land, Tribe asserted counterclaim seeking declaration that 
Texas Constitution and Bingo Enabling Act, which enabled 
charitable bingo in Texas and defined which types of organizations 
were allowed to conduct charitable bingo, violated the Equal 
Protection Clause by allowing certain organizations the right to 
conduct bingo, but omitting Indian nations and their members from 
that list, and asserting that the state Attorney General enforced 
Texas's gaming laws in a discriminatory manner. Attorney General 
moved for summary judgment, asserting that §1983 was appropriate 
vehicle for alleging a constitutional claim and that the Tribe was not 
a proper claimant pursuant to §1983, and contending that the Tribe's 
claims failed on the merits because the Bingo Enabling Act was not 
unconstitutionally written or enforced. The District Court, Philip R. 
Martinez, J., held that: (1) Section 1983 was appropriate method for 
Tribe to assert claims; (2) Tribe could assert §1983 Equal Protection 
claim alleging that State unlawfully discriminated against Indians 
when it drafted Bingo Enabling Act; (3) Tribe could assert §1983 
Equal Protection claim alleging that enforcement of Bingo Enabling 
Act discriminated against Tribe; (4) Tribe was barred from asserting 
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§1983 claim that its Equal Protection rights were violated because 
Congress had plenary power to deal with unique issues concerning 
Indian nations, and because Texas sought to unlawfully expand its 
regulatory reach; (5) district court would apply rational basis 
scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny; (6) under rational basis review, 
Bingo Enabling Act did not violate Tribe's equal protection rights; 
(7) Tribe could not prevail on §1983 claim alleging that enforcement 
of the Bingo Enabling Act violated Tribe's equal protection rights; 
and (8) under rational basis review, Texas's decision to have 
Attorney General, rather than local prosecutors, prosecute Tribe for 
alleged violations of gaming laws did not violate Tribe's equal 
protection rights. Motion granted. 
 
55. Texas v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo 
 
No. EP-17-CV-179-PRM, 2019 WL 639971 (W.D. Tex., Feb. 14, 
2019). Plaintiff State of Texas moved for Summary Judgment and 
Permanent Injunction. In 1968, the United States Congress 
simultaneously recognized the Pueblo as a tribe and transferred any 
trust responsibilities regarding the Tribe to the State of Texas. S. 
Rep. No. 100-90S. Rep. No. 100-90 (1987), at 7. After the trust 
relationship was created, Texas held a 100-acre reservation in trust 
for the Tribe. However, in 1983, Texas Attorney General Jim 
Mattox issued an opinion in which he concluded that the State may 
not maintain a trust relationship with an Indian Tribe. Jim Mattox, 
Opinion Re: Enforcement of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Code 
within the Confines of the Alabama-Coushatta Indian Reservation, 
No. JM-17 (March 22, 1983). Mattox opined that a trust agreement 
with Indian tribes discriminates between members of a tribe and 
other Texas citizens on the basis of national origin in violation of 
the Texas Constitution. Therefore, Mattox determined that no proper 
public purpose existed for the trust. Accordingly, the Pueblo, 
alongside the Alabama-Coushatta Tribe in East Texas, sought to 
establish a federal trust relationship with the United States 
government. See S. Rep. No. 100-90S. Rep. No. 100-90 (1987), at 
7. In 1999, the State sued the Tribe, and sought to enjoin gaming 
activities on the Pueblo reservation. On September 27, 2001, 
a  dg e  a  g a ed  he S a e  fa . Texas v. del Sur 
Pueblo ( Ysleta II ), 220 F. S . 2d 668, 687 (W.D. Te . 2001) 
(internal citations omitted), modified (May 17, 2002), aff d, 31 F. 
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Ap  835 (5 h C . 2002), and aff d s b nom. State of Texas v. 
Pueblo, 69 F. A  659 (5 h C . 2003), and order clarified sub 
nom. Texas v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, No. EP-99-CA-320-H, 2009 
WL 10679419 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2009). In his Memorandum 
Opinion, Judge Eisele de e ed ha  he T be ca  e gage   
eg a ed  ga g ac e  e   c e  h he e e  
eg a .  The c  de e ed ha  he T be  ac e  d d  
c  h Te a  a  a d eg a . M e e , he c  
considered e ab e fac  a d c c ded ha  [ ]he f  f [ he 
T be ] a f  e e e a e a ed b  he ega  ea  b  
h ch h e be ef  ha e bee  b a ed.  Acc d g , he T be 
was permanently enjoined from continuing its operations. The Fifth 
C c  a  aff ed J dge E e e  . State v. del sur 
Pueblo, 31 Fed. Appx. 835 (5th Cir. 2002). The facts in this case are 
undisputed. The a  ce e  a d he T be  ac e  a  
Speaking Rock Entertainment Center, which is the primary location 
f  he T be  ga g ac e . The T be  ga g e a  a e 
a significant source of employment for the Pueblo people, and it uses 
the money raised at their casino to fund several important 
governmental initiatives, including education, healthcare, and 
c a  e e a . The P eb  e a  a e  c d c ed 
pursuant to any license from the Texas Lottery Commission. The 
Court joined the refrain of Judges who have urged the Tribes bound 
by the Restoration Act to petition Congress to modify or replace the 
Restoration Act if they would like to conduct gaming on the 
reservation. The S a e f Te a  M  f  S a  J dgment 
and Permanent Injunction was granted. 
 
56. C ec ic  . U i ed S a e  De  f I e i  
 
No. 17-2564 (RC), 363 F.Supp.3d 45, 2019 WL 652321 (D.C. Feb. 
15, 2019). State and Indian tribe brought action under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) against defendant, including 
United States Department of the Interior (DOI), alleging that 
Secretary of the Interior unlawfully declined to approve amendment 
to secretarial procedures under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(IGRA) that would have allowed them to begin constructing 
commercial casino on state land. State and tribe moved to amend the 
complaint. The district court, Rudolph Contreras, J., held that: (1) 
defendants failed to show that they would be prejudiced by alleged 
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undue delay in moving to amend complaint; (2) Secretary's letter 
was final agency action, and thus subject to judicial review; (3) tribe 
and state sufficiently alleged that Secretary's letter was arbitrary and 
capricious on its face; (4) tribe and state sufficiently alleged that 
political pressure was brought to bear on officials responsible for 
approving proposed amendments; (5) tribe and state sufficiently 
alleged that political pressure caused Secretary to make decision that 
was not dictated by IGRA; and (6) proposed amendments to 
secretarial procedures plainly fell outside of DOI's definition of a 
tribal-state compact. Motion granted in part and denied in part. See 
also 344 F.Supp.3d 279. 
 
57. Frank's Landing Indian Community v. National 
Indian Gaming Commission 
 
No. 17-35368, 918 F.3d 610, 2019 WL 1119912 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 
2019). Indian community brought action against Department of 
Interior and National Indian Gaming Commission, challenging 
Interior's determination that tribe was ineligible for gaming for 
purposes of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The United 
States District Court for the Western District of Washington, 
Benjamin H. Settle, J., 242 F.Supp.3d 1156, granted summary 
judgment in favor of Department of Interior. Tribe appealed. The 
court of appeals, Morgan Christen, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) a 
tribe must appear on the Secretary's annual list of federally 
recognized tribes in order to be eligible to engage in class II gaming, 
and (2) Franks Landing Act did not grant Community permission to 
engage in class II gaming. Affirmed. 
 
58. Texas v. Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas 
 
No. 18-40116, 918 F.3d 440, 2019 WL 1199564 (5th Cir. Mar. 14, 
2019). Tribe brought action against state seeking declaratory 
judgment that its gaming activities on tribal lands were permitted 
under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). State filed 
counterclaim to enjoin tribe from conducting gaming activities 
based on Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, Alabama, and Coushatta Indian 
Tribes of Texas Restoration Act. After state's motion for permanent 
injunction was granted, state moved to realign parties, moved for 
contempt, and sought declaration that IGRA did not apply, and tribe 
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moved for relief from injunction. The United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Texas, Keith F. Giblin, United States 
Magistrate Judge, entered summary judgment in state's favor, 208 
F.Supp.2d 670, and denied tribe's motion for relief from injunction, 
298 F.Supp.3d 909. Tribe appealed. The court of appeals, Jerry E. 
Smith, Circuit Judge, held that National Indian Gaming 
Commission's (NIGC) determination that IGRA governed question 
of whether tribe could conduct class II gaming on tribal lands was 
not entitled to Chevron deference. Affirmed. 
 
59. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Newsom 
 
No. 17-55604, 919 F.3d 1148, 2019 WL 1285060 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 
2019). Indian tribes brought action against state seeking declaratory 
judgment that duration provision of tribal-state gaming compacts 
violated Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The United States 
District Court for the Central District of California, No. 5:16-cv-
01347-JFW-MRW, John F. Walter, J., 2017 WL 2971864, entered 
summary judgment in state's favor, and tribes appealed. The court 
of appeals, Gilliam, District Judge, sitting by designation, held that 
as matter of first impression, duration provisions were permitted by 
IGRA. Affirmed. 
 
60. Ci  f C cil Bl ff , I a . U i ed S a e  De  f 
Interior 
 
No. 1:17-CV-00033-SMR-CFB, 368 F.Supp.3d 1276, 2019 WL 
1368561 (S.D. Iowa, Mar. 26, 2019). City in Iowa filed suit against 
Department of Interior and National Indian Gaming Commission 
(NIGC), asserting claims under Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) and seeking declaratory judgment invalidating NIGC's 
amended final order approving site-specific gaming ordinance 
enacted by Ponca Tribe of Nebraska. The Order allowed tribe to 
conduct Class II gaming, under Indian Gaming Regulation Act 
(IGRA), on 4.8-acre tract of land in Iowa that was within tribe's 
service area, designated pursuant to Ponca Restoration Act (PRA). 
The PRA restored tribe's government-to-government relationship 
with United States, and it was subsequently placed into trust by 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), as authorized by Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA). State of Nebraska and State of Iowa 
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intervened as intervenor-plaintiffs. Parties cross-moved for 
summary judgment. The District Court, Stephanie M. Rose, J., held 
that: (1) NIGC appropriately found tribe was not estopped from 
asserting that parcel qualified for IGRA's restored lands exception; 
(2) NIGC reasonably interpreted PRA; (3) NIGC was not required 
to consider new IGRA regulations in interpreting PRA; (4) NIGC 
reasonably determined that new IGRA regulations did not apply; but 
(5) NIGC unreasonably failed to consider purported verbal 
agreement between tribe and Iowa. Plaintiffs' motion granted in part 
and denied in part; defendants' motion denied. 
 
61. Pueblo of Isleta v. Grisham 
 
No. 17-654 KG/KK, 2019 WL 1429586 (D.N.M. Mar. 30, 2019). 
Defe da  a d P a ff  ed f  a  dg e t. The 
C  f d ha : (1) Defe da  S a  J dg e  M  
h d be de ed; (2) he P eb  S a  J dg e  M  
should be granted. Plaintiffs the Pueblos of Isleta, Sandia, and 
Tesuque, and Plaintiffs-in-Intervention the Pueblos of Santa Ana, 
Sa a C a a, a d Sa  Fe e (c ec e , he P eb ), a e  (6) 
federally recognized Indian tribes that operate casinos in New 
Mexico pursuant to identical gaming compacts with the State of 
Ne  Me c  ( he S a e ). Defe da  a e he S a e G e , the 
State Gaming Representative, and the Chair and members of the 
S a e Ga g C  B a d ( NMGCB )  he  ff c a  
capacities. The Pueblos and the State entered into gaming compacts 
 2007 ( 2007 C ac ), a d aga   2015, a d 2016 ( 2015 
Compac ). Inter alia, the compacts require the Pueblos to make 
quarterly revenue sharing payments to the State, in exchange for the 
P eb  ea  e c e gh   c d c  ce a  d  f ga g 
in New Mexico. In 2017, Defendants sent the Pueblos notices of 
non-compliance and notices to cease conduct, asserting that the 
Pueblos had miscalculated their revenue sharing obligations under 
the 2007 Compacts beginning as early as April 2011. Specifically, 
Defendants claimed that, in calculating their revenue sharing 
payments, the Pueblos had improperly excluded the face value of 
free play and deducted the value of prizes won by patrons as a result 
f f ee a  age  f  he  C a  III ga g ach e  Ne  
W .  P a   he 2015 C ac , h ch e e ed Defe da  
claims, Defendants instructed the Pueblos to make additional 
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revenue sharing payments to the State under the 2007 Compacts. 
The Pueblos of Isleta, Sandia, and Tesuque filed this civil action. In 
their complaints, the Pueblos ask the Court for a judgment declaring 
ha : (1) Defe da  c a  a   he 2015 C ac  f  
additional revenue sharing payments under the 2007 Compacts 
violate federal law, and the 2015 Compacts are therefore invalid and 
effec e  e e e Defe da  a f  claims; (2) neither the 
P eb  c a   h  a   Defe da  c a  f  add a  
revenue sharing payments are subject to arbitration under the 2015 
Compacts, and, (3) Defendants have no authority as a matter of 
federal law to pursue their claims for additional revenue sharing 
a e  aga  he P eb . P a ff   f  a  
judgement was granted.  
 
62. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty v. Wisconsin 
 
No. 18-1449, 922 F.3d 818, 2019 WL 1923403 (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 
2019). Indian tribe brought action under the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (IGRA) against second tribe and State, seeking 
injunctive relief from proposed expansion of second tribe's casino, 
located in the same county. The United States District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin, James D. Peterson, J., 299 F.Supp.3d 
1026 and 2018 WL 708389, dismissed as untimely. First tribe 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Easterbrook, Circuit Judge, held 
that Indian tribe's lawsuit seeking injunctive relief from proposed 
expansion of second tribe's casino was barred by Wisconsin's six-
year statute of limitations for contract actions. Affirmed. 
 
63. Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation v. Newsom 
 
No. 2:19-cv-00025-JAM-AC, 2019 WL 2513788 (E.D. Cal. June 
18, 2019). On January 3, 2019, the Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation, 
Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation, and Viejas Band of 
Kumeyaay Indians (collec e  P a ff   T be ) f ed a 
complaint against the State of California and Governor Gavin 
Ne  (c ec e  Defe da ). P a ff  c e d Defe da  
a e  e f c g he a e  ba   ba g a d e ce age ca d 
ga e  aga  ca d   Ca f a  -tribal casinos. This, 
they argued, amounted to a breach of their Tribal-State Compacts 
and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied therein. For 
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he ea  d c ed be , he C  g a ed Defe da   
to dismiss with prejudice. In September 2015, June 2016, and 
August 2016, the State of California entered into Tribal-State 
Compacts with the Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation, the 
Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians, and the Yocha Dehe 
Wintun Nation, respectively. These agreements amended and 
superseded the 1999 Tribal-State Compacts between the parties. 
Yocha Dehe Wintun Compact, Viejas Band Compact, and Sycuan 
Ba d C ac  (c ec e  T ba  C ac ) a   18.2. Each 
Compact included a Preamble. See Tribal Compacts at 1-2. In 
relevant part, the Preambles acknowledged that the be  e c e 
gh   e a e  ach e  a d ba ed ca d ga e  c ea e[d] a 
unique opportunity to operate a Gaming Facility in an economic 
environment free of competition...and that this unique economic 
environment is of great value to the T be.  Th  e 
 a  b   f a   he Ca f a 
constitution exempting Indian tribes f  he a e  ge e a  
h b   ba g a d e ce age ca d ga e .  CAL. CONST. 
art. IV, § 19(e) (1966). Over the years, Defendants have taken 
various positions on what type of gaming is allowed in light of the 
S a e  ba   ba g a d e ce age ca d ga e . C .  33-
37, 42, 48, 74, 107, 118. See also Cal. Penal Code §§ 
330.11, 337j(f); Oliver v. Los Angeles County, 66 Cal. App. 4th 
1397 (1997); Huntington Park Club v. Los Angeles County, 206 Cal. 
App. 3d 241 (1988). P a ff  c e ded he S a e  c e  
interpretation effectively results in non-enforcement of its claimed 
prohibit . I deed, P a ff  a eged Defe da  ha e bee  
complicit in permitting, and at times even encouraging the 
ca d  a f  c d c ,  ab dg g he Tribes right of 
exclusivity. Plaintiffs failed to state a breach of Compact claim, 
because the Tribal Compacts do not contain a right of exclusivity 
independent of the one provided by the state constitution. The 
Ca f a c  de : N h a d g [Ca f a  
prohibition on Nevada-style casinos]...the Governor is authorized to 
negotiate and conclude compacts...for the conduct of lottery games, 
banking, and percentage card games by federally 
recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in California in accordance 
with federal law. CAL. CONST. Art. IV, § 19(f) (2000). The question 
of whether a federally-recognized tribe has negotiated an agreement 
with the state to conduct otherwise prohibited gaming is a matter of 
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Compact interpretation. But the question of whether federally-
recognized tribes are the only entities who may lawfully conduct 
otherwise pr h b ed ga g  . P a ff  e c  gh  
flow solely from the California constitution. This is the unavoidable 
barrier that prevents Plaintiffs from successfully maintaining their 
breach of Compact claims. Against this backdrop, Plaintiffs 
negotiated Compacts with the State in 1999. These negotiations 
culminated in Tribal-State Compacts that would only take effect if 
California voters enacted an amendment to the State Constitution 
that exempted tribes f  Ca f a  h b   Ne  Je ey-
and Nevada-style gaming. The referendum passed, and the 
Compacts took effect. With the 1999 Compacts, Plaintiffs bargained 
for an economic opportunity, codified in state law, that they did not 
previously have: the exclusive right to conduct otherwise prohibited 
gaming. There is no doubt that the 1999 exclusivity provisions 
imposed an affirmative obligation on the State. But the 1999 
compacts do not govern this suit. In 2015 and 2016, Plaintiffs 
renegotiated their Compacts with the State. See generally Tribal 
C ac . Each P a ff  C ac  c de  a e ge  c a e, 
g ha  he e  C ac  e  f h he f  a d c e e 
agreement of the parties and supersede[s] any prior agreements or 
de a d g  h e ec   he b ec  a e  [ ]he e f.  Tribal 
Compacts at § 18.2. Plaintiffs argue the most-recently entered 
Compacts guarantee the same right of exclusivity that was bargained 
f   he 1999 ag ee e . O  a  4. The C  d ag eed. The 
Compacts, although recognizing the right of exclusivity provided by 
the California Constitution, do not include any express terms 
ega d g Defe da  b ga   e e e ha  gh . I  fac , he 
Compacts contemplate the abrogation of that right, providing 
the Tribes limited recourse in the event their rights of exclusivity 
lapse. For the reasons set forth above, the Court granted with 
e d ce Defe da  M   D .  
 
64. Kalispel Tribe of Indians and Spokane County v. U.S. 
De  f he I e i  
 
No. 2:17-CV-0138-WFN, 2019 WL 3037048 (E.D. Wash. July 11, 
2019). For the reasons detailed below, the Court granted Defendants' 
Motions for Summary Judgment. Located a few miles west of 
Spokane in Spokane County, Airway Heights is home to Fairchild 
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Air Force Base, Northern Quest Casino, and, more recently, the 
Spokane Tribe's casino. Though Airway Heights falls within 
Spokane Tribe's aboriginal land, the Kalispel Tribe obtained trust 
land within Airway Heights and successfully obtained permission to 
build the Northern Quest Casino twenty years ago. Northern Quest 
Casino has proved lucrative for the Kalispel, bringing in profits that 
benefited the Kalispel tribal members by funding local governmental 
interests as well as providing direct payments to tribal members. In 
2001, the United States acquired land in trust for the 
Spokane Tribe nearby the Northern Quest Casino. Five years later, 
the Spokane Tribe sought Department of the Interior [Department] 
approval for gaming on the trust land with a proposed casino within 
two miles of the Northern Quest Casino. Permission for gaming on 
the property required a two-part determination by the Department of 
the Interior. Over the course of the next ten years the Department 
examined the Spokane Tribe's request. The Department consulted an 
expert to assess how an additional gaming facility would affect the 
surrounding community including the Kalispel. Local officials 
engaged with the Department to address concerns about the proposed 
casino. The Department initiated the processes required under the 
National Environmental Policy Act [NEPA] to assess the 
environmental impact. On June 15, 2015, the Department found in 
favor of Spokane Tribe; Governor Jay Inslee concurred, marking the 
conclusion of the approval process. In 2018, twelve years after the 
Spokane Tribe first requested a two-part determination, the casino 
opened for business with plans for further development into the 
f e. Ga g  h b ed   a d  e  he Sec e a  af e  
consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local 
officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines 
that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the 
best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be 
de e a   he d g c   Gaming on Lands 
Acquired after October 17, 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (1988). 
Bureau of Indian Affa  [BIA] eg a  def e d g 
c  a  ca  g e e  a d ea b  Indian tribes located 
within a twenty-five-mile radius of the site of the proposed gaming 
e ab h e .  25 C.F.R. § 292.2. Though the Kalispel tribe likely 
will suffer some detrimental impacts through loss of revenue, the 
Department's determination that the new casino would not be 
detrimental to the surrounding community was not arbitrary and 
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capricious. After exhaustive review, the Secretary permissibly 
weighed the benefits and detriments to the community concluding 
that approval of the new casino would not be a detriment to the 
surrounding community. The BIA spent ten years investigating the 
application, seeking expert review, and working with local officials 
and governments prior to issuing a decision. The BIA squarely 
addressed Kalispel's concerns regarding lost profits at the Northern 
Quest Casino. The Department's expert concluded that while the 
Kalispel may suffer in the short term, eventually the profits would 
rebound and both tribes would benefit. Id. Though this conclusion 
differs from the Kalispel's own expert, reliance on the agency expert 
was not arbitrary and capricious. In weighing detriment to 
the community, the Department need not find that the casino has no 
unmitigated negative impacts whatsoever, but instead the Secretary 
must weigh the benefits and possible detrimental impacts as a 
whole, e en if those benefits do not directly mitigate a specific cost 
ed b  he ca .  Stand Up for California! v. United States 
Dep't of Interior, 879 F.3d 1177, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. denied 
sub nom. Stand Up for California! v. Dep't of the Interior, 139 S. Ct. 
786, 202 L. Ed. 2d 629 (2019). The Department met its statutory 
obligations for consultation. The parties did not dispute that the 
Secretary followed the applicable regulations regarding consultation. 
Lastly, Kalispel argued that the Department violated the trust 
relationship with the Kalispel tribe. The Federal Government owes a 
duty of trust to all tribes; however, the scope of that duty must be 
established by statute and that trust duty necessarily equally applies 
to all tribes so the Government may not favor one tribe over another. 
Lawrence v. Department of Interior, 525 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 
2008), see also Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1981). 
In this situation, the Spokane and Kalispel's interests are not aligned. 
Consequently, since the Department fulfilled its statutory duty to 
examine the benefits and harm to all effected parties, the Department 
did not violate the trust relationship. Upon review of the record, the 
Court concludes that the Secretary's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence. Further, the Environmental Impact Statement 
e  a  e e e . Fede a  Defe da  C  M  f  








65. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Think 
Finance, LLC 
 
No. CV-17-127-GF-BMM, 2018 WL 3707911 (D. Mont. Aug. 03, 
2018). P a ff C e  F a c a  P ec  B ea  ( CFPB ) 
commenced this action on November 15, 2017. CFPB filed an 
Amended Complaint on March 28, 2018. The Amended Complaint 
alleges four violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act. 
Defe da  Th  F a ce, LLC ( Th  F a ce ) a d 
S b d a e  f ed he a  M   D iss on April 24, 2018. 
Think Finance operates a lending business that extends credit, 
services loans, and collects debt throughout the United States. CFPB 
operates as an independent agency of the United States Government 
created under the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 
(CFPA), 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). The Amended Complaint alleged that 
Think Finance, through the Tribal Lenders, collected loan payments 
that customers did not owe, as the loans issued to those customers 
were void ab initio due to violations of state law. CFPB alleged that 
Think Finance used unfair and abusive practices to collect on these 
void loans. Finally, CFPB alleged that Think Finance provided 
substantial assistance to Tribal Lenders and other entities who, in 
turn, committed deceptive, unfair, and abuse acts or practices by 
demanding payment for and collecting void debts. Defendants 
raised multiple grounds for dismissal, including: (1) that the 
c e f he CFPB  c a ; (2) ha  he CFPB  c a  
are not permitted by the CFPA; (3) that the Complaint fails to, and 
cannot, join indispensable parties; (4) that the Court lacks personal 
jurisdiction over Think SPV; (5) that the Complaint fails to state 
cognizable claims under the CFPA; and (6) that certain claims 
against the Subsidiaries are time-ba ed. Defe da  M   
Dismiss is denied. 
 
66. Chi e a C ee T ibe f R ck  B  Re e a i , 
Montana v. U.S. Department of Interior 
 
No. 15-71772, 900 F.3d 1152, 2018 WL 3978542 (9th Cir. Aug 21, 
2018). Tribe petitioned for review of order of Department of the 
Interior (DOI) requiring Tribe to provide back pay and other relief 
to former chairman of Tribe's governing committee after finding that 
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chairman was removed from committee in retaliation for 
whistleblowing. The court of appeals, Friedland, Circuit Judge, held 
that: (1) chairman performed services on behalf of Tribe, as required 
for whistleblower protections of American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to apply to chairman; (2) DOI's order 
did not infringe Tribe's sovereignty and powers of self-governance; 
(3) Congress acted within its spending power in conditioning the 
receipt by Tribe of ARRA funds on the waiver of the right to a 
hearing with cross-examination before the Tribe could be found to 
have violated ARRA's whistleblower protections; (4) six months 
between chairman's disclosure of misuse of federal funds and his 
removal from board was within time frame that could have led 
reasonable person to conclude that chairman's whistleblowing was 
a contributing factor in his removal; and (5) DOI's finding that 
Tribe's removal of chairman was retaliatory was not arbitrary or 
capricious. Petition denied. 
 
67. Coriz v. Rodriguez 
 
No. CIV 17-1258 JB/KBM, 347 F.Supp.3d 707, 2018 WL 4179460 
(D. N.M. Aug. 31, 2018). Tribal inmate filed petition for writ of 
habeas corpus. Petitioner moved for immediate release. The District 
Court, James O. Browning, J., held that: (1) petitioner was entitled 
to protections provided in Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA); (2) 
petitioner's failure to exhaust his tribal court remedies precluded his 
immediate release; and (3) petitioner failed to demonstrate 
exceptional circumstances warranting his immediate release. 
Motion denied. 
 
68. Na aga e  I dia  . Rh de I la d De  f T a . 
 
No. 17-1951, 903 F.3d 26, 2018 WL 4140270 (1st Cir. Aug. 30, 
2018). Indian tribe brought action against federal and Rhode Island 
agencies, alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief regarding highway bridge reconstruction over 
historic tribal land. The United States District Court for the District 
of Rhode Island, William E. Smith, Chief District Judge, 2017 WL 
4011149, granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Tribe appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeals, 
Kayatta, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) National Historic Preservation 
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Act (NHPA) did not expressly or implicitly waive federal 
government's sovereign immunity, and (2) tribe's breach of contract 
claim did not have any substantive basis in NHPA, and thus the 
federal court lacked federal question jurisdiction over the breach of 
contract claim against state agencies. Affirmed. 
 
69. In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation 
 
No. 17-md-2804, 327 F.Supp.3d 1064, 2018 WL 4203535 (N.D. 
Ohio Sept. 04, 2018). Cherokee tribe of American Indians brought 
state court action against drug companies, alleging that defendants 
allowed opioid diversion to occur in the Cherokee Nation via alleged 
actions and omissions in violation of state law. Defendant company 
removed case, which was then transferred into multidistrict 
litigation (MDL) involving various plaintiffs, asserting that the 
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of prescription opiate 
drugs were liable for costs related to opioid public health crisis. 
Band of Chippewa American Indians brought state court action 
against opioid manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies asserting 
state law claims, which the same defendant company removed, and 
which was also transferred into MDL. Both tribes moved to remand, 
defendant drug company moved to stay execution of any remand 
order pending in Chippewa tribe's action, and Cherokee tribe moved 
for oral argument pending in that case. The District Court, Dan 
Aaron Polster, J., held that: (1) company was acting under direction 
of federal officer, as required for removal under federal officer 
removal statute; (2) causal nexus existed between company's action 
under direction of federal officer and company's actions that gave 
rose to tribes' allegations, as required for removal under federal 
officer removal statute; and (3) company had colorable federal 
defense, as required for removal under federal officer removal 
statute. Motions denied.  
 
70. Navajo Nation v. Wells Fargo & Co. 
 
No. 17-CV-1219-JAP-SCY, 344 F.Supp.3d 1292, 2018 WL 
4608245 (D. N.M. Sept. 25, 2018). Indian tribe filed suit on its own 
behalf and as parens patriae on behalf of its members against 
financial services company and national banking association that 
was company's primary subsidiary, asserting claims under federal, 
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state, and tribal law arising out of unfair, deceptive, fraudulent, and 
illegal banking practices that allegedly harmed the tribe's sovereign 
and quasi-sovereign interests. Company and association moved to 
dismiss. The district court, James A. Parker, Senior District Judge, 
held that: (1) consent order between Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) and association finding that association violated the 
Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) operated as final 
judgment on the merits of CFPA claims against the association, as 
required for the order to bar under the res judicata doctrine tribe's 
CFPA claims; (2) company was in privity with association, as 
required for consent order to bar under the res judicata doctrine 
tribe's CFPA claims; (3) tribe's CFPA claims formed same cause of 
action as claims resolved by consent order, as required for the 
consent order to bar under the res judicata doctrine the tribe's claims; 
(4) tribe was in privity with CFPB for its CFPA claims, as required 
for consent order to bar under the res judicata doctrine tribe's CFPA 
claims; and (5) tribe did not allege injury to quasi-sovereign interest 
that was sufficiently concrete to create actual controversy, and thus, 
tribe lacked standing in its parens patriae capacity to maintain claims 
for violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), the 
Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), the Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Motion granted. 
 
71. Cheykaychi v. Geisen 
 
No. 17-cv-01657-PAB, 2018 WL 6065492 (D. Colo. Nov. 19, 
2018). Petitioner Harrison Cheykaychi filed a Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
Petitioner asserted that his tribal court convictions were obtained in 
a  f h  gh  de  he I d a  C  R gh  Ac  ( ICRA ), 
at 25 U.S.C. § 1302. Petitioner is a member of the Pueblo of Kewa 
(f e   a  he P eb  f Sa  D g ) ( T be ), a 
federally recognized Indian Tribe in New Mexico. See Land 
Acquisitions; Craig Tribal Association, Craig, Alaska, 82 Fed. Reg. 
4915 (17, 2017). Petitioner alleged that he was arrested on 
September 17, 2016, within the external boundaries of the 
reservation, and charged with five separate offenses arising from his 
exchange with the Tribal Police that morning. Petitioner alleged that 
during a September 19, 2016 hearing, he was coerced by threats 
from the Tribal Court to plead guilty to criminal trespass, assault on 
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a ba  ff ce , a d e c h ea ,  e cha ge f  he T be  
promise that it would drop the charges of eluding, intoxication, and 
disorderly conduct; and that he would receive a two and one-half 
year sentence. Petitioner stated that he was not appointed counsel at 
the hearing or afforded the opportunity to retain counsel. He was 
taken into custody immediately after the sentencing and was 
eventually transferred to the San Ignacio Detention Center in 
Colorado. On May 2, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus, asserting that the tribal court convictions were 
obtained in violation of the ICRA. Petitioner asks the Court to deem 
his tribal court conviction(s) invalid and to order Respondent to 
release him from custody. On May 9, 2017, the District of New 
Mexico issued an order dismissing the Kewa Pueblo based on 
sovereign immunity. On August 22, 2017, the Court issued an order 
directing Respondent Geisen to show cause why the § 1303 Petition 
should not be granted. Docket No. 13. On September 21, 2017, 
Respondent filed a Response in which he represented that, as the 
mere physical custodian of Petitioner, he was unable to address the 
e  f Pe e  ICRA c a  cha e g g he a d  f h  
ba  c  c c   aff d a  e ef be d Pe e  
release from custody. Respondent maintained that one or more tribal 
officials are necessary parties to this action. On December 28, 2017, 
a   he a e   , Pe e  a  e ea ed f  
custody, under terms of supervision, pending final disposition of the 
Petition. On September 6, 2018, the Court issued an order directing 
Respondent to contact the proper tribal official(s) to obtain their 
position as to the merits of the ICRA. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S.at 58. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 
F.3d 874, 899-900 (2nd Cir. 1996) (concluding that tribal officials 
are appropriate respondents to a § 1303 petition because they have 
an interest in opposing the petition or granting the requested relief). 
Respondent filed a status report on October 5, 2018, in which he 
states that no one from the Santo Domingo Tribe would be entering 
a  a ea a ce  c e g he c a   M . Che a ch  Pe  
for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Mr. Cheykaychi remains subject to the 
T be  2011 Ba h e  O de , h ch a   cha e ged  M . 
Che a ch  Pe ,  he h d  be e ea ed a  he Pueblo, 
or allowed to enter the Pueblo without the prior consent of the Tribe. 
The Kewa Pueblo officials have informed Respondent that they do 
not intend to contest the merits of the ICRA claims. Respondent 
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indicates that he is without authority to address the merits of the 
Pe e  c a . Beca e he  1303 Pe   ed, he 
Petition was granted, and the tribal court convictions vacated.  
 
72. Napoles v. Rogers 
 
No. 17-16620, 743 Fed.Appx. 136, 2018 WL 6130279 (9th Cir. 
Nov. 21, 2018). Plaintiffs-Appellants, seven members of the Bishop 
Paiute Indian Tribe (c ec e  P a ff ), a fede a  
recognized Indian tribe, a ea ed f  he d c  c  d a  
of their petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 25 U.S.C. § 1303, 
he I d a  C  R gh  Ac  ( ICRA ). The c  e ab hed 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, reviewed de novo, Jeffredo v. 
Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2010), and affirmed on any 
ground supported by the record, Bd. of Trustees of the Constr. 
Laborers  Pension Tr. for S. Cal. . M.M. S nd  Cons r. Co., 37 F.3d 
1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended on denial of rehearing 
(Nov. 23, 1994). The court affirmed. The district court may not 
exercise jurisdiction over a habeas petition arising under 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1303 unless Plaintiffs have exhausted their tribal remedies. See 
Alvarez v. Lopez, 835 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2016). This 
e e e   ed  he c  f g ba  e f-
g e e ,  a d h  a fede a  c   a   ha d  he 
a  ha  e ha ed a  a a ab e ba  e ed e .  Jeffredo v. 
Macarro, 599 F.3d 913 at 918, (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Plaintiffs have not exhausted the available tribal 
remedies. Plaintiffs argued they were detained within the meaning 
of § 1303, because they have been evicted from property in which 
they claim a possessory right, and because the tribal police issued 
trespass citations against them. Plaintiffs conceded, both in their 
motion for a stay before the district court and at oral argument, 
however, that a tribal court decision considering the validity of the 
trespass citations and their claim to the property is currently on 
appeal before the recently reinstated tribal appellate court. Because 
an appeal is pending in tribal court regarding the subject of 
P a ff   1303 habea  c a , P a ff  ha e  e ha ed he r 
tribal remedies and the district court did not have jurisdiction. 
Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 918. The d c  c  de  d g he 




73. United States v. Cleveland 
 
No. CR 17-0965 JB, 2018 WL 4759889 (D.N.M. Nov. 21, 2018). 
Defendant moved to dismiss indictment charging him under statute 
punishing murder of certain federal officers or persons assisting 
those officers, arising from killing of Navajo Nation Department of 
Public Safety (NDPS) officer, alleging that NDPS officer was not 
federal employee and that statute thus did not apply. The District 
Court, James O. Browning, J., held that under the Self-
Determination Contract, which granted Navajo Nation authority to 
enforce United States and Tribal Law, a Tribal officer without a 
Special Law Enforcement Commission (SLEC) does not have 
authority from the Secretary of the Interior to enforce federal laws, 
and so is not a federal employee for purposes of the Indian Law 
Enforcement Reform Act (ILERA), and thus statute punishing 
murder of certain federal officers or persons assisting those officers 
does not apply. 
 
74.  Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners L.P. 
 
No. 17-6088, 913 F.3d 959, 2019 WL 150627 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 
2019).Native American landowners brought trespass action against 
owner and operator of network of natural gas transmission pipelines. 
Granted summary judgment to plaintiffs and entered permanent 
injunction requiring removal of pipeline. Defendant appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Tymkovich, Chief Judge, held that: (1) consent of 
minority of allottees did not form complete defense to remaining 
allottees' federal trespass claim; (2) expiration of easement 
permitting natural gas pipeline across allotted tribal land created 
duty on part of pipeline's owner to remove pipeline; and (3) district 
court was required to apply federal courts' traditional equity 
jurisprudence, rather than simplified injunction rule from Oklahoma 
law, in determining whether to grant injunctive relief. Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
 
75. United States v. Denezpi 
 
No. 18-cr-00267-REB-JMC, 2019 WL 295670 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 
2019). Mr. Denezpi maintained indictment in this case was 
duplicative of his prior conviction by the Court of Indian Offenses 
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of the Ute Mountain Ute Agency and thus constitutes double 
jeopardy. On July 17, 2017, Mr. Denezpi and V.Y. traveled from 
Teec N  P , A a,  M . De e  g f e d  h e  
Towaoc, Colorado. Once inside the house, Mr. Denezpi allegedly 
barricaded the door and, by physical force and threats, forced V.Y. 
to engage in a nonconsensual sexual act. Tribal authorities arrested 
Mr. Denezpi the following day and charged him with one count of 
assault and battery in violation of Title 6, Ute Mountain Ute Code, 
Section 2; one count of making terroristic threats in violation of 25 
C.F.R. § 11.402; and one count of false imprisonment in violation 
of 25 C.F.R. § 11.404. On December 6, 2017, Mr. Denezpi entered 
an Alford plea to the assault and battery count and was sentenced to 
time served. Six months later, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. 
Denezpi on one count of aggravated sexual abuse in Indian Country. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1)-(2) (2007); 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2013). 
Mr. Denezpi claimed this prosecution violates the Fifth Amendment 
proscription against double jeopardy, because it was imposed not by 
a tribal court but by a so-ca ed CFR c ,  h ch, M . De e  
argues, is an arm of the federal government and not a separate 
sovereign. This argument misunderstands the source and nature of 
he CFR c  a h . The D b e Je a d  C a e f he F f h 
A e d e  de  ha   e  ha  ... be b ec  f  he a e 
offence to be twice put i  e a d  f fe  b.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. This motion implicated the dual sovereignty doctrine, an 
e ce   he ge e a  c e f d b e e a d , he eb  a 
single act gives rise to distinct offenses  and thus may subject a 
person to successive prosecutions  if it violates the laws of separate 
e e g .  Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1867, 
195 L. Ed. 2d 179 (U.S. 2016). See also Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 
82, 88, 106 S. Ct. 433, 88 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1985) ( [W]he  he a e 
act transgresses the laws of two sovereigns, it cannot be truly 
averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same 
offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offe ce . ) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The determination, whether two 
e e  a e e a a e e e g , d e   , a  he e  
e e g  e e  gge ,  he deg ee  h ch he 
second entity is autonomous from the first or sets its own political 
c e.  Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. C at 1867. Instead, the 
de e a  e   he a e   a a , h ca  f c ed 
question.... whether the prosecutorial powers of the two jurisdictions 
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have independent origins  or, said conversely, whether those 
e  de e f  he a e a e ce.  (c g United 
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 55 L. Ed. 2d 
303 (1978) ). The iry is thus historical, not functional  looking 
at the deepest wellsprings, not the current exercise, of prosecutorial 
a h .  The CFR c  e e c ea ed b  he I d a  De a e  
Appropriations Act of 1888. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S. Ct. 1011, 55 L. Ed. 2d 209 (U.S. 1978). 
At first, all tribal courts were CFR courts. Along with a reduced BIA 
role and increased authority delegated to the tribes, the IRA paved 
the way for tribes to develop tribal courts and phase out the C.F.R. 
c .  T da ,  be  ha e e ab hed ba  c . See 25 
C.F.R. § 11.104 (2019) (setting forth criteria for creation of tribal 
court). Only seven CFR courts  including those administered by the 
Ute Mountain Ute Agency  remain in operation. Although the CFR 
c  e a  e cha ac e c  f a  age c  f he fede a  
g e e ,  Tillett, 931 F.2d at 640, the logic of Wheeler and its 
ge  c ea  d ca e  ha  he CFR c  e   h 
crimes occurring on tribal lands derives from their original 
sovereignty, not from a grant of authority by the federal government. 
When Indian courts were first established in the 19th century, all 
such courts were CFR courts. Therefore, the CFR court which 
convicted Mr. Denezpi was exercising the sovereign powers of the 
Ute Mountain Ute Tribe and is not an arm of the federal government. 
The charges brought in the present federal indictment thus are not 
d ca e f M . De e  c c   ha  de e de  a d 
sovereign court, and therefore his prosecution in this jurisdiction 
does not violate the Fifth Amend e  D b e Je a d  C a e. 
M . De e    d  a  he ef e de ed. 
 
76. People ex rel. Becerra v. Huber 
 
No. A144214, 32 Cal.App.5th 524, 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 79 (9th Cir. Feb. 
25, 2019). State brought enforcement action against owner of 
tobacco smoke shop, who was a member of the Wiyot Band of 
Indians, alleging violation of Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The 
Superior Court, Humboldt County, No. DR110232, W. Bruce 
Watson, J., granted summary adjudication to State and entered 
permanent injunction. Owner appealed. The Court of Appeal, 
Streeter, Acting P.J., held that: (1) exercise of state court jurisdiction 
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over enforcement action did not infringe tribal sovereignty, 
supporting application of default rule of existence of general 
jurisdiction  a  f a e c , a d (2) S a e  e f ce e  f 
UCL was not preempted under doctrine of Indian preemption. 
Affirmed. 
 
77. Outliers Collective v. The Santa Ysabel Tribal 
Development Corporation 
 
No. 3:18-cv-00834-JAH-KSC, 2019 WL 1200232 (D.S.D. Cal. 
Mar. 13, 2019). Defendants The Santa Ysabel Tribal Development 
C a  ( SYTDC ) a d Da d Che e e  ( Che e e ) 
(c ec e  efe ed  a  T ba  Defe da ) ed  d  
plaintiff O e  C ec e  ( O c   P a ff ) C a  
pursuant to Fede a  R e  f C  P ced e ( Fed. R. C . P. ) 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(7). F  he ea  e  f h be , Defe da  
motions to dismiss was granted and the action was dismissed in its 
entirety as to all Defendants with prejudice. This action arises out of 
a La d U e Ag ee e  ( Ag ee e ) e e ed  b  a ba  
chartered corporation, wholly owned by the Iipay Nation of Santa 
Ysabel, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, and a Nonprofit Mutual 
Benefit Corporation, organized under the laws of the State of 
California. In pertinent part, the Agreement set forth the terms by 
which Plaintiff would lease from SYTDC interior and exterior space 
on tribal lands for the cultivation, harvesting, and processing of 
medical cannabis pursuant to the Santa Ysabel Tribal Medicinal 
Cannabis Enterprise Act. In early 2017, a dispute arose regarding 
P a ff  b ga   a  he T be  Med ca  Ca ab  Ta . 
Negotiations were unsuccessful and the Agreement was eventually 
terminated. The Tribal Cannabis Regulatory Agency revoked 
P a ff  ce e a d h b ed P a ff a d  aff a e  f  
acce g he fac , a h gh e f P a ff  e  
remained. On April 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint against 
Tribal Defendants for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of 
Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (3) Conversion; (4) Unjust 
Enrichment; and (5) Declaratory Relief. Tribal Defendants each 
timely filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 
P ced e ( Fed. R. C . P. ) 12(b)(1) a d 12(b)(7). The motions 
have been fully briefed and are now before the Court. The 
Complaint alleges jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1331. Plaintiff cites 
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to Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S. Ct. 269, 3 L. Ed. 2d 251 
(1959) to support jurisdiction over a matter brought by a non-tribal 
plaintiff against a tribal defendant when the cause of action arises 
on Indian territory. The Complaint further alleges that SYTDC 
agreed to waive its sovereign immunity from suit in favor of 
Plaintiff. In response to Defendants' motions to dismiss1, Plaintiff 
contends that the subject matter of the agreement is sufficient to 
invoke federal- e  d c . F , P a ff  e a ce  
Willams is misplaced. The Williams Court reversed the Arizona 
S e e C  dec  aff g dg e  f  a ff, a -
tribal member, in an action against a tribal member. The Court held 
that state courts did not have authority to exercise jurisdiction over 
civil suits against tribal members where the cause of action arose on 
an Indian reservation. Williams, 358 U.S. at 223. The Court 
reasoned that the exercise of jurisdiction by the state would 
de e he a h  f he ba  c  e  Re e a  affa  
and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern 
he e e .  The ac  f a h  b  a e c   e e c e 
jurisdiction, however, cannot be interpreted to mean jurisdiction 
automatically vests in District Courts. To be certain, the Supreme 
Court notes in Williams that Congress has acknowledged the 
authority of Indian governments over their reservations and the 
Cou  ha  c e  ec ed . Sec d, SYTCD  ed 
waiver of sovereign immunity has no bearing on whether this Court 
has subject-matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot 
be forfeited or waived. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 
163 L. Ed. 2d 1097 (2006) (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 
U.S. 625, 630, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860 (2002) ); See also 
Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 671 
(8th Cir. 1986) (waiver of sovereign immunity by tribal housing 
authority did not by fiat confer jurisdiction on the federal courts). 
Even if the parties agreed, as Plaintiff contends, that a dispute arising 
out of the Agreement may be submitted to any federal court of 
competent jurisdiction within this District, this Court has an 
de e de  b ga   de e e he he  b ec -matter 







78. United States v. Cooley 
 
No. 17-30022, 919 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2019). Motorist 
charged with narcotics offenses, as result of evidence discovered by 
tribal officer after seizing motorist on public highway that ran across 
reservation, filed motion to suppress this evidence. The United 
States District Court for the District of Montana, No. 1:16-cr-00042-
SPW-1, Susan P. Watters, J., 2017 WL 499896, granted motion, and 
government appealed. The Court of Appeals, Berzon, Circuit Judge, 
held that: (1) as matter of first impression, the exclusionary rule 
applies in federal court prosecutions to evidence obtained in 
violation, not of the Fourth Amendment itself, but of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act's (ICRAs) Fourth Amendment counterpart, and (2) tribal 
officer's extra-jurisdictional acts violated the ICRAs Fourth 
Amendment counterpart and required suppression of evidence. 
Affirmed. 
 
79. United States v. Aysheh 
 
No. 1:17-cr-00370-JCH, 2019 WL 1877178 (D.N.M. Apr. 26, 
2019). M . I ad Ed  A heh a d h  h ee b he  e e cha ged 
in an 18- age d c e  h c g  e  I d a -s e  
e e   a  f he I d a  A  a d C af  Ac  ( IACA ), 18 
U.S.C. § 1159. That statute criminalizes offering or selling a good 
 a a e  ha  fa e  gge    ... a  I d a  d c .  18 
U.S.C. § 1159(a). According to the indictment, in 2014, Mr. 
A heh  b he  I ad e ab hed a b e   he Ph e  
ca ed I ad  Je e   a fac e I d a -style jewelry using 
F  ab . I ad ed he e e  IJ   he e e , b   
a country of origin stamp. After importing the jewelry into the 
United States, the other Aysheh brothers supposedly sold it to 
retailers and customers throughout the country, including New 
Mexico, misrepresenting it as Indian made. The indictment accused 
the Defendants of criminal misrepresentation of Indian produced 
goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1159. It alleged that the 
Defendants conspiring to knowingly display and offer for sale for $ 
1,000 and more, jewelry manufactured in the Philippines, in a 
manner that suggested the jewelry was Indian produced ... when in 
truth and in fact, ... the good was not Indian produced ... in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1159. As noted earlier, 18 U.S.C. § 1159 criminalizes 
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ffe g  e g a g d  a a e  ha  fa e  gge    ... 
a  I d a  d c .  18 U.S.C. § 1159(a). In his motion to dismiss, 
Mr. Aysheh explains that the criminal penalty provision of § 1159 
has been challenged for vagueness and overbreadth under the First 
Amendment. Mr. Aysheh especially relies on a federal district 
c  e a a   United States v. Pourhassan, 148 F. Supp. 2d 
1185 (D. Utah 2001) f he he  he h a e  I d a  d ced  a d 
fa e  gge  de  § 1159 were unconstitutionally vague or 
overbroad. The Pourhassan court held that, e e  a g a c  
vagueness test, he h a e  I d a  d ced  a d fa e  
gge  e e  c a  ag e a d c e e , 
de ed he defe da    d  he d c e . 
Defe da  O ed M   D  a  C   he 
Indictment denied. 
 
80. Taguma v. Benton 
 
No. 19-cv-199-bbc, 2019 WL 1877171 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 26, 2019). 
In this civil action for monetary relief, plaintiff Lori Taguma, a 
member of the Lac Courte Oreilles Tribe, contended that fellow 
members of the tribe, defendants Edward and Danielle Benton, 
violated her rights by threatening her and her family members with 
violence, shooting at her and her family members, using their 
influence within the tribe to encourage others to terminate her job 
a d d c e he  he  B ea  f I d a  Affa  ea e, 
da ag g he  a d he  fa  eh c e  a d he  e  a d 
otherwise harassing her. After reviewing the complaint, the court 
concluded that plaintiff may not proceed on any claim because her 
complaint does not involve any federal claim over which this court 
ha  d c . P a ff  c a  a  ee   e a e o matters 
involving state tort or criminal law, and therefore, they must be 
brought in state court. Bresette v. Buffalo-Reyes, No. 06-C-338-C, 
2006 WL 3017256, at *1 (W.D. W . A g. 7, 2006) ( Fede a  
jurisdiction is not present just because the alleged [violation of state 
a ] cc ed  a  I d a  e e a . ). P a ff d d  a ege 
any facts that suggest that defendants were public officials or acting 
de  he c  f a e a . The de -color-of-state-law element 
of § 1983 e c de  f   each e e  ivate conduct, no matter 
h  d c a   gf .  Id. (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky et 
al., 457 U.S. 991, 1002, 102 S. Ct. 2777, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1982)). 
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Although plaintiff has made it clear that defendants have strong ties 
to members of the tribal council and are powerful within the 
c , fede a  c  ha e f d ha  [a] § 1983 action is 
a a ab e f  e  a eg g de a  f c a  gh  
de  c  f ba  a .  Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1174 
(10th Cir. 2006) (quoting R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. 
Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983)). Similarly, plaintiff may 
not sue defendants as tribal actors under Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. 
Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971), which provides relief for alleged 
constitutional violations by federal officials. Evans v. Little Bird, 
656 F. Supp. 872, 874 (D. Mont. 1987), aff'd in part, Evans v. 
McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, this case 
was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff must 
bring her claims in state court or in the tribal court that has 
jurisdiction over the Lac Courte Oreilles Tribe.  
 
81. United States v. Santistevan 
 
No. 3:19-CR-30017-RAL, 2019 WL 1915791 (D.S.D. Apr. 30, 
2019). The Government charged Aaron Santistevan (Santistevan) 
with possession of ammunition by a prohibited person. Santistevan 
moved to suppress from use at trial the evidence seized from him 
and the vehicle he was driving on December 28, 2018, on the basis 
that the officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. 
Magistrate Judge Mark A. Moreno held a suppression hearing, 
during which he received seven exhibits and heard testimony from 
five Rosebud Sioux Tribe Law Enforcement officers. The tribal 
ff ce  de e  f Sa e a  a  ea ab e de  he F h 
Amendment. Officers conducted a traffic stop for speeding and 
discovered Santistevan was driving h a e ded d e  
license. When Officer Antman learned that Santistevan was a non-
I d a , he c ac ed he T dd C  She ff  Off ce ed a e . 
Before Officer Antman was able to secure Santistevan, Santistevan 
led officers on a high-speed chase. The officers had probable cause 
 ea ch he eh c e ba ed  Off ce  A a  b e a  d g 
he aff c , Sa e a  f gh , a d he f e  he bac ea  f 
the vehicle that appeared to destroy evidence. Santistevan argues, 
a  e de ce obtained following the issuance of the search warrant 
must be suppressed as the illegal fruit of the unreasonable stop and 
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ea ch f he ca   Dece be  28, 2018.  Beca e h  C  f d 
that the stop and search were reasonable and constitutional, there is 
 ega  f   e . Sa e a  M   S e  de ed.  
 
82. Wolf v. Alutiiq Education and Training, LLC 
 
No. 2:19-cv-41-GMB, 2019 WL 1966642 (M.D. Ala. May 02, 
2019). Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Altuiiq Education & 
T a g, LLC ( AET ). P a ff M ha W f b gh  c a  
against AET denominated as race discrimination, gender 
discrimination, mental suffering, and emotional distress. After 
careful consideration of the parties' submissions and the applicable 
law, the Motion to Dismiss was granted, but Wolf was allowed to 
re-plead the claims over which this court had subject-matter 
jurisdiction. Wolf is a black woman who began her employment 
with AET's predecessor, Career Education Services. AET took over 
the contract and asked Wolf to reapply for her position. AET did not 
retain Wolf, and she alleged that Adam Bennett, a white man, was 
retained over her. AET is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Alutiiq, 
which is a wholly-owned direct subsidiary of Afognak Native 
Corporation, which was formed in 1977 under the Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1601. AET argues that Counts 
I and II must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 
because these claims are asserted pursuant to Title VII, which does 
not apply to AET, an Alaskan Native Corporation. Pursuant to 43 
U.S.C. § 1626(g), [f]or the purposes of implementation of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et seq.], a Native 
Corporation and corporations, partnerships, joint ventures, trusts, or 
affiliates in which the Native Corporation owns not less than 25 per 
centum of the equity shall be within the class of entities excluded 
f  he def  f e e  b   701(b)(1) f Public Law 88-
352 (78 Stat. 253), as amended [42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1)], or 
successor statutes. 43 U.S.C. § 1626(g). If Title VII does not apply, 
the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims. 
See Mastro v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 578 F. Appx.  801, 802 (11th 
Cir. 2014). The court found that AET was not subject to suit under 
Title VII, and that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over 
Wolf's gender and race claims asserted pursuant to Title VII in 
Counts I and II. See Jones v. Chugach Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 3:11-
cv-1217-J-34MCR, 2012 WL 472722, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 
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2012), adopted, 2012 WL 473503 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2012). Wolf 
argued that she can proceed on race discrimination claims pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. AET did not dispute that this court had subject-
matter jurisdiction over 42 U.S.C. § 1981 race claims. See also 
Jones, 2012 WL 472722, at *1 ( Defe da  a  e e  f  
employer liability under Title VII, as Defendant is an Alaskan 
Native Corporation ... however ... several cases have held that ANCs 
may be sued for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. ). AET a g ed, 
however, that the § 1981 claim was due to be dismissed because 
Wolf has not sufficiently alleged a § 1981 race claim in Count I. 
AET correctly points out that Count I expressly invokes the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and not 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Because the Amended 
Complaint expressly refers to Title VII within the paragraphs of 
Count I but not to § 1981, the court concluded that the claim in 
Count I was due to be dismissed, but the court allowed Wolf an 
additional opportunity to plead her race discrimination claim 
pursuant to § 1981. 
 
83. United States v. Washington 
 
No. C70-9213RSMSUB-PROCEEDING NO. 17-03, 2019 WL 
1989645 (W.D. Wash. May 06, 2019). This matter came before the 
C   he S ag a h T be f I d a  ( S ag a h ) 
motion seeking an order of the court to permit it to take a 
perpetuation deposition of its expert witness, Doctor C. Jill Grady, 
d e  he e e  age a d he  f f he  memory loss. Finding 
the Motion moot, the court denied the motion. Dr. Grady is a 
Cultural Anthropologist and an expert in the field of Native 
American Anthropology. She has a Bachelor of Arts Degree in 
A h g , a d a Ma e  deg ee a d Ph.D.  S c ocultural 
Anthropology from the University of Washington. Stillaguamish 
first retained Dr. Grady to conduct research related to the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act in 2002. 
Beginning in 2007, Dr. Grady began assembling evidence of 
St ag a h  a e f h g ea  gh   the capacity of an 
expert witness and researcher. In order to provide her expert 
opinions, Dr. Grady developed a comprehensive understanding of 
he e h h  f he S ag a h  e e a  e  a  ha  f 
other neighboring tribes and non-Indian settlers in the Puget Sound 
and their interactions with territorial, state and federal government. 
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D . G ad  e e   e   he  edge f he a a  
ecosystem that supports Stillaguamish fishing, hunting and 
gathering. Dr. Grady is about to turn seventy-seven years old. Dr. 
Grady currently experiences certain challenges typically associated 
with her age, some of which impact her memory recall. While Dr. 
G ad  ca ac  e a  fa  d da , he has expressed 
uncertainty regarding her memory, physical health and stamina six 
months from now, much less over more than a year from now when 
her testimony may be required. The Swinomish Indian Tribal 
C  ( S h ) e  S ag a h  motion partly 
on the basis that the procedural posture of this case has changed 
while this motion was pending before the Court. Swinomish argued 
that case deadlines have been reset, that the case and discovery will 
proceed in the normal course, and that the motion is therefore moot. 
Stillaguamish recognizes that discovery may now proceed but feels 
that the concerns initially leading it to file its motion persists. The 
court agreed that its prior order moots the Stillaguamish motion. 
Stillaguamish no longer needs leave from the court to proceed with 
discovery under Rule 26(d)(1). Accordingly, having reviewed the 
motion and the remainder of the record, the court found and ordered 
that Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians' Motion is denied as moot. 
 
84. United States v. Smith 
 
No. 17-30248, 925 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. May 28, 2019). Defendant 
Indian member of Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs was 
convicted in the United States District Court for the District of 
Oregon, Anna J. Brown, J., of fleeing or attempting to elude a police 
officer under Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) and Indian Country 
Crimes Act (ICCA). The defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Callahan, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) ACA applied to Indian 
country; (2) Indian-on-Indian exception in ICCA did not preclude 
application of ACA to all victimless crimes, and certainly not to 
offense of fleeing and eluding police; and (3) federal prosecution of 
defendant was not unlawful intrusion into tribal sovereignty. The 







85. Jim v. Shiprock Associated Schools, Inc. 
 
No. CIV 17-1114 RB/JHR, 2019 WL 2285918 (D.N.M. May 29, 
2019). Th  a e  ca e bef e he C   Defe da  
Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court found the 
motion should be granted and this case dismissed. Plaintiff Kim R. 
Jim is a former employee of defendant Shiprock Associated 
Schools, Inc. (SASI). SASI was incorporated as a nonprofit 
corporation under the laws of New Mexico in 1979 and is registered 
to conduct business within the Navajo Nation. At the time of the 
allegations in the complaint, SASI was (and still is) authorized by 
the Navajo Nation Board of Education to operate Navajo 
community schools on the Navajo reservation in Shiprock, New 
Mexico, pursuant to the Navajo Nation Code, see 10 N.N.C. § 201, 
and the Tribally Controlled Schools Act (TCSA), 25 U.S.C. § 2501. 
SASI is the grantee of Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) funds 
received for operation of educational programs on the Navajo 
Nation for the benefit of Indian students. Ms. Jim alleged that SASI 
discriminated against her and terminated her because of her 
pregnancy and maternity leave. She brought suit for pregnancy 
discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(Title VII) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). For the 
C   ha e b ec  a e  d c  e  M . J  c a , 
SASI must be a covered employer under both statutes. SASI 
c e d  ha    a ba  ga a  e e ed f  he 
definition of an employer under both Title VII and the ADA and 
disagrees that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this 
a . Re g  he Te h C c  ea g  Dille, the 
Giedosh court found that the Little Wound School Board, Inc. (the 
B a d) a f ed a  a  I d a  be  f  e  f T e VII a d 
the ADA. See 995 F. Supp. 2d at 1056 59. The Giedosh court found 
the following factors significant: (1) the Board was a nonprofit 
corporation incorporated under state law, id. at 1054; (2) he 
B a d  e be h  [ a ] c ed e  f e be  f he 
Og a a S  T be[,]  a d b a d e be  e e de c a ca -
e ec ed [ ]  f he  he T be  c  f c  
a c a [,]  id. at 1055 (citations omitted); (3) the school was 
required to adhere to tribal resolutions and ordinances and was 
tribally chartered, meaning the Tribe had the authority to e   a  
any time, for good reason, and assume the control and operation of 
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he ch [,]  d. (c a  ed); (4) [ ] e  Dille, the purpose 
of establishing the organization [was] to further the development, in 
this case the educational development, of the children living in 
Indian country, and to involve the Indian community in the 
education of the Indian children[,]  id. at 1057; (5) [ ]he B a d  
made up of members of the Tribe, and those members are 
de c a ca  e ec ed[,]  d.; a d (6) [ ]he ch , h ch  
operated by the Board, services tribally enrolled members in the 
Kyle community and the surrounding area of the Pine Ridge Indian 
Reservation.  Id. The record before the Court supports the same 
conclusion in this case. 
 
86. People ex rel. Becerra v. Native Wholesale Supply Co. 
 
No. C084031, 37 Cal.App.5th 73, 249 Cal.Rptr.3d 445 (Cal. Ct. 
App. July 2, 2019). Attorney General brought action against Indian-
chartered corporation headquartered on out-of-state reservation for 
sale of contraband cigarettes to the general public. The Superior 
Court, Sacramento County, No. 34200800014593CUCLGDS, 
David I. Brown, J., granted summary judgment in Attorney 
General's favor. The corporation appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Robie, J., held that: (1) corporation was subject to personal 
jurisdiction; (2) corporation was considered a non-Indian for 
purposes of the Indian Commerce Clause analysis; (3) 
Indian Commerce Clause did not preempt Directory Statute or the 
California Cigarette Fire Safety and Firefighter Protection Act; and 
(4) Directory Statute did not violate the equal protection clause. 
Affirmed. 
 
87. Cedar Band of Paiutes v. U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development 
 
No. 4:19-cv-30-DN-PK, 2019 WL 3305919 (D. Utah July 23, 2019). 
O  A  22, 2019, a ff  Ceda  Ba d f Pa e  ( he Ceda  
Ba d ), Ceda  Ba d C a  ( CBC ), a d CBC M gage 
Age c  ( CBCMA ) (c ec e , P a ff ) f ed a 
complaint against defendants United States Department of Housing 
a d U ba  De e e  ( HUD ). The ce a  a  f a ff  
complaint was to have the Mortgagee Letter 19-06 ( he 2019 
M gagee Le e ) that defendants issued on April 18, 2019, set 
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a de de  he Ad a e P ced e  Ac  ( APA ). O  he 
same day plaintiffs filed their complaint, plaintiffs also filed the 
Motion For Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
I c  ( M ). CBCMA  eg e ed a  a G vernmental 
Mortgagee with HUD. Through its program, the Chenoa Fund, 
CBCMA de  d  a e  a a ce ( DPA ) f  gage 
loans insured by the FHA that are originated by other lenders, as 
well as a small number of conventional loans. The FHA insures the 
vast majority of loans for which CBCMA provides DPA. CBCMA 
then purchases the first mortgages and sells them on a secondary 
market. Provisions related to FHA insurance, including provisions 
e a ed  he  e ed e e  ( MRI ) f  FHA 
insured loans, are codified at 12 U.S.C § 1709. In 2007, HUD 
b hed a f a  e ( he 2007 R e ) ha  h b ed e e  
f  d g DPA  he   h e a e  a ac  h gh 
a  a a ge e  he e a -called charitable organization provides 
a so-called gift to a homebuyer from funds that it receives, directly 
 d ec , f  he e e .  The 2007 Rule exempted 
governmental entities from this prohibition. The rule expressly 
ec f ed ha  DPA  e ed ... f  ... g e e .  The 2007 
R e a  ec f ca  ded ha  a ba  g e e  ...  a 
e b e ce f d  a e  a a ce.  C g e  e ac ed 
changes to 12 U.S.C § 1709, formally incorporating some of the 
guidance of the 2007 Rule into statute. Specifically, 12 U.S.C. § 
1709 was amended to provide that the MRI for a FHA insured loan 
could not consist, in whole or in part, of funds provided by any of 
the following parties before, during, or after closing of the property 
sale: i) The seller or any other person or entity that financially 
benefits from the transaction; and ii) Any third party or entity that is 
reimbursed, directly or indirectly, by any of the parties described in 
clause i). Notably, the 2008 amendments did not address the 
provision of DPA towards FHA insured loans by governmental 
entities. In 2012, HUD addressed that issue in an interpretive rule 
b hed  he Fede a  Reg e  ( he 2012 R e ). According to 
he 2012 R e,  a  HUD  e e a  ha  12 U.S.C. § 
1709 d d  h b  FHA f m insuring mortgages originated as 
part of the homeownership programs of Federal, State, or local 
governments or their agencies or instrumentalities when such 
agencies or instrumentalities also directly provide funds toward the 
required minimum cash invest e .  The a h g f  he 
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statute 12 U.S.C. § 1709(b)(9) through the 2012 Interpretive 
Rule and HUD Handbook and finally to the 2019 Mortgagee Letter 
does not clearly show how Defendants arrived at its new interpretive 
jurisdictional limitations. Furthermore, apart from the 2019 
Mortgagee Letter, it does not appear that Defendants would readily 
have an adequate basis to enforce jurisdictional limitations on 
governmental entities providing DPA. Instead, the 2019 Mortgagee 
Letter imposes unprecedented, new duties on mortgagees to obtain 
letters showing that the governmental entity is providing DPA to 
someone within its own jurisdictional boundaries (and in the case 
of tribes, to a tribal member) or the DPA will be used toward an 
FHA insured loan to purchase property within that governmental 
e  d c . The 2019 M gagee Le e   e eg a e 
in character than interpretive because it articulates new duties that 
were immediately imposed on mortgagees for the first time. 
The ef e, HUD  action in the 2019 Mortgagee Letter should likely 
have been preceded by notice and comment. Motion was granted. 
Defendants were enjoined from any enforcement of Mortgagee 
Letter 19-06 until further order of this court. Specifically, 
Defendants shall not deny insurance nor cause insurance to be 
denied based on noncompliance with Mortgagee Letter 19-06 and 
shall provide public notice that the effective date of Mortgagee 
Letter 19-06 was suspended until after a final determination on the 
merits of the case. 
 
88. Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. v. Burr 
 
Nos. 18-1824, 18-1856, 932 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. Aug 5, 2019).  Oil 
and gas company brought declaratory judgment action against four 
members of an Indian tribe and the Chief Judge of a tribal court, 
seeking a declaration that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over a 
breach of contract action filed by the four individual defendants 
which sought to recover royalties pursuant to an oil and gas mining 
lease. Similarly, a resources company which was a defendant in the 
same tribal court lawsuit also filed a declaratory judgment action 
against the same defendants, as well as against the Court 
Clerk/Consultant of the tribal court. Both federal court actions were 
stayed pending resolution of the tribal court action, but after tribal 
supreme court ruled that the tribal district court had jurisdiction over 
the matter, the federal plaintiffs filed motions for preliminary 
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injunction preventing defendants from proceeding further with the 
underlying tribal court action. The Tribal court judge and clerk 
moved to dismiss. Thereafter, the first two federal lawsuits were 
consolidated, and the United States District Court for the District of 
North Dakota, Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, 303 F.Supp.3d 964, 
issued a preliminary injunction. Tribal court officials appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Grasz, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) oil and gas 
companies claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against tribal 
court officials were not barred by tribal sovereign immunity; (2) oil 
and gas companies properly exhausted their tribal court remedies 
before filing suit in federal court; and (3) factors weighed in favor 
of issuance of a preliminary injunction against any tribal court 
exercise of jurisdiction in the case. The case was affirmed. 
 
89. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. McMahon 
 
No. 17-56791, 934 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. Aug 19, 2019). An action 
was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the Chemehuevi Indian 
Tribe and four of its enrolled members alleging violations of various 
federal statutory and constitutional rights in connection with 
citations by San Bernardino County She ff  Deputies of four Tribe 
members for violating California regulatory traffic laws within the 
Reservation. The Court analyzed the history and establishment of 
the Chemehuevi Reservation and concluded that the area where the 
Tribe members were cited was within the boundaries of the 
Reservation and hence was I d a  c  under 18 U.S.C. § 
1151(a). Accordingly, the court held that San Bernadino County did 
not have jurisdiction to enforce California regulatory traffic laws 
within that area. The Court held that the individual plaintiffs, but not 
the Tribe, could challenge the citations under § 1983. The Court held 
that because § 1983 was designed to secure private rights against 
government encroachment, tribal members could use it to vindicate 
their individual rights, but not the be  communal rights. The 
Court therefore vacated the district c  judgment dismissing the 










90. Priest v. Holbrook 
 
No. 18-35018, 2018 WL 5733098, 741 Fed.Appx. 510 (9th Cir. Oct. 
31, 2018). David R. Priest, a Washington State prisoner and member 
f he C e I d a  be, a ea ed  e f  he d c  c  
judgment dismissing his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 
Re g  La d U e a d I a ed Pe  Ac  ( RLUIPA ) 
alleging that defendan  c f ca  f h  g de  eag e fea he  
violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of his Native 
American religion and his rights under RLUIPA. The court reversed 
a d e a ded. The d c  c  d ed P e  f ee e e c e 
claim on the ground that Priest failed to allege a substantial burden 
to the practice of his religion. However, Priest alleged that the prison 
confiscated his sacred golden eagle feathers, he was unable to secure 
any additional feathers while incarcerated, and as a result, he was 
unable to participate in Native American religious ceremonies in 
accordance with his religious beliefs. Liberally construed, these 
a ega  e e ff c e   a a  de g [defe da ]  f e 
a  a e .  Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 
2012); Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1138 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(elements of a free exercise claim). Furthermore, contrary to the 
d c  c  h d g, P e  f ee e e c e c a  a   ba ed 
even if state remedies exist for the loss of property. See Wood v. 
Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1215 (9 h C . 1988) ( [T]he e e ce 
of state remedies is irrelevant ... where the plaintiff alleges a 
a  f a b a e gh  de  ... he B  f R gh .... ). The 
court reversed and remanded P e  f ee e e c e c a  f  f he  
proceedings consistent with this disposition. The district court 
d ed P e  RLUIPA c a   he g d ha  e  
damages are not available as a remedy for RLUIPA violations. 
However, in addition to monetary relief, plaintiff also requested 
ch he  e ef a   a  a ea  a ff  e ed .  Beca e 
the relief Priest seeks is not limited to monetary relief, the court 
e e ed d a  f P e  RLUIPA c a  a d e a ded f  he 






91. Hopi Tribe v. Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited 
Partnership 
 
No. CV-18-0057-PR, 245 Ariz. 397, 430 P.3d 362 (S.Ct. Ariz. Nov. 
29, 2018). Hopi Tribe brought an action against Flagstaff for public 
nuisance after the city moved forward with sale to ski resort of 
reclaimed wastewater for artificial snowmaking on public land. City 
filed a third-party indemnification claim against the resort. The 
Superior Court, Coconino County, No. CV2011-00701, Mark R. 
Moran, J., dismissed action against resort. The Tribe appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, 244 Ariz. 259, 418 P.3d 1032, reversed in part, 
vacated in part, and remanded. A petition for review was granted. 
The Supreme Court, Pelander, J., held that Tribe's alleged injury 
from environmental damage to land, which had religious and 
cultural significance to Tribe, was different in degree but not in kind 
or quality suffered by the public, and thus Tribe did not sufficiently 
allege the required special injury to maintain claim. The Court of 





92. Romero v. Wounded Knee, LLC 
 
No. 16-5024-JLV, 2018 WL 4279446 (D.S.D. Aug. 31, 2018). 
Plaintiff Leslie Romero initiated this action against defendant 
Wounded Knee LLC. Plaintiff claims she was sexually assaulted 
and harassed while employed by defendants. She alleges torts and 
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the South 
Dakota Human Relations Act of 1972. Plaintiff is an enrolled 
e be  f he Og a a S  T be ( T be ) a d he c de  
alleged in the complaint occurred within the exterior boundaries of 
the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation at Manderson, South Dakota. 
Defe da  fa ed  f e a e   a ff  c a ,  he 
clerk entered default against them. Plaintiff filed a motion for 
default judgment, and the court entered an order finding she was 
entitled to default judgment. The court later acknowledged it will 
 e e  f a  dg e   a ff  fa   he c  a e  
findings regarding the specific claims in the complaint on which it 
would enter judgment and the appropriate amount of damages 
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supported by evidence. To prevent an adverse final judgment, 
WKCDC raised the issues of tribal court exhaustion and tribal 
sovereign immunity in a motion to set aside default judgment. 
WKCDC indicates that nearly two decades ago the Oglala Oyata 
W a ca  ( OOW ) a  e ab hed  c d a  h he 
federal government. The OOW was a geographic designation 
covering primarily Pine Ridge. An emphasis of the OOW was 
facilitating infrastructure development funds from the federal 
g e e   P e R dge. The T be  C  c ea ed 
community governments called Districts that represent local 
interests, and each District could choose whether to participate in 
the OOW. WKCDC claims there was an OOW Board with a 
member who was also a member of an entity WKCDC refers to as 
the Wounded Knee District Task Force. According to WKCDC, 
once the OOW expired, the District Task Force became WKCDC 
a d he D c  Ta  F ce  a e  a d e  e e a fe ed  
WKCDC. WKCDC alleges its articles of incorporation demonstrate 
 aff a  h he T be a d WKCDC  tribal sovereign 
immunity. The court ordered that the case was stayed pending tribal 
court exhaustion and a further order from the court. The court further 
ordered that WKCDC, as the party asserting there is tribal court 
jurisdiction and tribal court exhaustion must occur, must file within 
thirty (30) days of the date of this order a declaratory judgment 
action in the Oglala Sioux Tribal Court naming the plaintiff Leslie 
Romero to address to that court at least the issues of tribal court 
jurisdiction and WKCDC  ba  e e g   defe e. I  
the tribal court case, Ms. Romero may contest tribal court 
d c  a d a e  he  a g e  ega d g WKCDC  ba  
sovereign immunity without waiving her assertion in this court that 
there is no tribal court jurisdiction. 
 
93. JW Gaming Development, LLC v. James 
 
No. 3:18-cv-02669-WHO, 2018 WL 4853222 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 
2018). F  2008  2011, P a ff JW Ga g, LLC ( JW 
Ga g ) e ed $5,380,000  he P e e P  Na  
casino project, believing that it was matching an investment in the 
same amount from the Canales Gr , LLC ( he Ca a e  G ). 
JW Gaming now alleges that leaders and members of both 
P e e P  Na  ( he T be ) a d he Ca a e  G  e e 
415 
 
part of a years-long scheme to fraudulently induce its investment 
and to conceal that fraud. It brings suit alleging breach of contract, 
fraud, and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
O ga a  Ac  ( RICO ), 18 U.S.C.  1961 68. Motion to 
dismiss brought by the Tribal Defendants. Because the Tribal 
Defendants were not entitled to sovereign immunity and the other 
claims are properly pleaded, the motions were denied. From 
December 2011 to April 2012, JW Gaming, tribal leadership, and 
the Canales Group engaged in negotiations, mostly via email, 
regarding the future of the Casino Project. In a promissory note 
da ed J  10, 2012 ( he N e ), The T be a d/  he Ga g 
A h  ed  e a  JW Ga g  $5,380,000.00 
investment plus interest. Tribal Defendants Leona Williams and 
Angela James signed the note, which included a limited waiver of 
sovereign immunity. The Tribal Defendants and the Canales Group 
e e e ed ha  he  e e e e g  a e a a e e ( he 2012 
Ca a e  e ) ega d g he Ca a e  e e . Af e  ea g 
about the alleged fraud, JW Gaming brought suit in Mendocino 
County Superior Court on March 1, 2018. Defendants removed it to 
federal court on May 7, 2018. The Tribal Defendants argue that JW 
Ga g   a  f c e   c ac a  ec e  f  a eged 
breach of the Note. Because the Tribe, not its representatives, was 
party to the contract, it is the real party in interest. JW Gaming 
counters that it is suing the tribal employees in their individual 
capacities for their own fraudulent conduct and that it asserts no 
claims of vicarious liability. The Supreme Court allowed a personal 
capacity suit against a tribal employee who was acting within the 
scope of his employment. The court reasoned a judgment would not 
e a e aga  he [ ] be  b  a   a  aga  [ he 
employee] to recover for h  e a  ac .  Lewis v. Clarke, 137 
S. Ct. 1285, 1291, 197 L. Ed. 2d 631 (2017). The Court rejected the 
be  a g e  ha  he de f ca  c a e  he e e  
contract should permit the application of sovereign immunity. 
I ead, [ ]he critical inquiry [was] who may be legally bound by 
he c  ad e e dg e ,  h  [ d] a e  c   
he ab.  A g Lewis to the facts alleged here, this suit was 
against the Tribal Defendants in their individual capacities and the 
Tribe was not the real party in interest. JW Gaming alleged that the 
individuals themselves engaged in fraud and that it suffered 
damages as a result. In the event of an adverse judgment, the 
416 
 
individual defendants, not the Tribe, were bound. See Lewis, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1192 93. 
 
94. Wil  . H  T i g 
 
No. 16-35320, 906 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2018). Truck owner 
brought action against tribal police officer and towing company 
alleging that towing company converted his truck by impounding it 
on reservation at state patrol's direction, towing it off of reservation, 
and releasing it to tribal police officer pursuant to tribal court order 
of forfeiture. The United States substituted for officer. The United 
States District Court for the Western District of Washington, 2016 
WL 1221655, entered summary judgment in defendants' favor, and 
owner appealed. The Court of Appeals, Pregerson, District Judge, 
sitting by designation, held that: (1) owner was required to exhaust 
his remedies before tribal court before filing suit against company 
in federal court, and (2) officer was entitled under the Westfall Act 
to immunity from the truck owner's conversion claim. Affirmed in 
part, vacated in part, and remanded. 
 
95. Wilhite v. Awe Kualawaache Care Center 
 
No. CV 18-80-BLG-SPW, 2018 WL 5255181 (D. Mont. Oct. 22, 
2018). In the late 1990s, the Crow Tribe (Tribe) determined that a 
significant number of its tribal members were in need of an on-
reservation nursing facility. On April 11, 1998, by tribal resolution, 
the Tribe established the Awe Kualawaache Care Center (Care 
Center), a forty bed, long-term nursing facility located in Crow 
Agency, Montana. The Care Center provides twenty-four-hour 
medical services exclusively to members of the Crow and Northern 
Cheyenne Tribes. The resolution stated the Care Center was an 
e a  f he C  T be,  c ea ed  ee  he ed ca  
needs of its members. Pursuant to tribal law, the Care Center gives 
hiring preference to Indians living in or near the reservation. 
Attached to the resolution was an ordinance that governed operation 
f he Ca e Ce e . The d a ce a ed ha , [a]  a  
instrumentality of the Tribe, the Care Center, its officers, 
employees, agents and attorneys shall be clothed by federal and 
tribal law with all the privileges and immunities of the Tribe ... 
including sovereign immunity from suit in any state, federal, or 
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ba  c .  The d a ce f her stated sovereign immunity may 
only be waived in accordance with the specific procedure provided 
in the ordinance. The Care Center operates under what is known as 
a 638 contract, which is a contract between a tribe and the federal 
government that provides for tribal administration of federal 
programs. Demontiney v. United States ex rel. Dept. of Interior, 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 255 F.3d 801, 805-06 (9th Cir. 2001). 
Tammy Wilhite was employed as a registered nurse at the Care 
Center. One day, a patient at the Care Center informed Wilhite that 
he had been molested during transport. Wilhite reported the 
conversation to her supervisor. When nothing was done, Wilhite 
reported the incident to law enforcement. Allegedly, Wilhite was 
subsequently harassed by her supervisor and terminated from 
e e  b  he Ca e Ce e  b a d f d ec . W h e f ed 
suit in federal district court, alleging solely that she was entitled to 
damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., (RICO). Wilhite named the Care 
Center and its board and administrator as defendants. The 
individually named defendants are all members of the Tribe. Wilhite 
d e   d e he be  e e g   e e d   he Ca e 
Center. Instead, Wilhite argues (A) the Defendants may not assert 
sovereign immunity because the Court already determined it has 
subject matter jurisdiction, (B) an insurance company is precluded 
de  25 U.S.C.  5321(c)(3) f  a e g he T be  e e g  
immunity as a defense, and (C) the individual defendants are not 
protected under sovereign immunity. Here, the Court determined it 
had subject matter jurisdiction over civil RICO claims in its prior 
de  de g he Defe da    d   ha  ba . I  d d 
not address sovereign immunity because the issue was not raised at 
that time. However, the Defendants notified Wilhite that they would 
raise a sovereign immunity defense in the event the Court denied 
their initial motion to dismiss. 25 U.S.C. § 5321(c)(1) obligates the 
United States to obtain or provide liability insurance for tribes 
operating under a 638 contract. Such insurance policies must 
c a  a  ha  he a ce ca e  ha  a e a  gh  
it may have to raise as a defense the sovereign immunity of an Indian 
be f  .  25 U.S.C.  5321(c)(3). W h e a e ed  
5321(c)(3) operated as a waiver of sovereign immunity because she 
sought nothing more than policy limits, and thus it was really the 
insurance company that was asserting sovereign immunity, not the 
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Defendants. The Ninth Circuit rejected a similar argument in Evans 
v. McKay, where it held § 5321(c)(3) exclusively applies to insurers, 
 be , a d he ef e d d  e e a  a a e  f he be  
sovereign immunity. 869 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1989). Wilhite argued 
Evans is distinguishable because it dealt with a § 1983 claim rather 
than a civil RICO claim. However, Wilhite did not articulate how or 
why the type of claim changes the meaning of the statute. The Court 
rejected W h e  a g e  a  ec ded de  Evans. If the 
plaintiff sought to recover from the tribe, tribal sovereign immunity 
would extend to tribal officials and tribal employees who act in their 
official capacity and within the scope of their authority. Cook v. AVI 
Casino Enters., 548 F.3d 718, 726-27 (9th Cir. 2008). Cook plainly 
ba ed W h e  c a  aga  he d d a  defe da  beca e he 
acts complained of consist of official action taken by the Care 
Ce e  b a d a d ad a  a d W h e e ressly sought to 
recover from the tribe. Wilhite argued Cook did not apply because 
he gh  ec e  f  he be  a ce c ,  ba  
assets. Wilhite cited no authority for the proposition that she may 
circumvent sovereign immunity by limiting her claim to policy 
limits and the Court was aware of none. Carried to its conclusion, 
the argument would mean tribes effectively waive their sovereign 
immunity by purchasing insurance, so long as a claim was limited 
to policy limits. Such a conclusion is at odds with Supreme Court 
precedent, which states sovereign immunity is not waived absent 
e e  a h a  b  C g e   c ea  a e  b  he be.  
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs. Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 
118 S. Ct. 1700, L. Ed. 2d 981 (1998). The purchase of insurance 
ha d  c e  a c ea  a e  f , a  ed b  he  
courts faced with similar arguments. See Seminole Tribe of Florida. 
v. McCor, 903 So. 2d 353, 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Atkinson v. 
Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 167-70 (Alaska 1977). The Court found it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Defendants were 
e f  . The Defe da    d  a  g a ed. 
 
96. Mitchell v. Tulalip Tribes of Washington 
 
No. 17-35959, 740 Fed.Appx. 600, 2018 WL 5307748 (9th Cir. Oct. 
25, 2018). Thomas Mitchell, his wife, and two other married couples 
are non-tribal property owners in fee simple of residences within the 
historical boundaries of the Tulalip Indian Reservation in 
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Snohomish County, Washington. They appealed dismissal of their 
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to quiet title 
aga  he T a  T be  f Wa h g  ( he T be ) ega d g 
tribal ordinances that they alleged create a cloud on their title. The 
district court dismissed the claims as unripe and did not address the 
T be  a e a e g d  f  d a  c d g e  d ca a a d 
tribal sovereign immunity. The court affirms the dismissal on 
grounds of tribal sovereign immunity. When the district court 
dismissed on grounds of ripeness, it did not address Washington law 
that recognizes cloud on title as a hardship fit for judicial 
determination. See, e.g., Robinson v. Khan, 89 Wn. App. 418, 419, 
948 P.2d 1347, 1349 (1998); Wash. Rev. Code § 7.28.010. 
Nevertheless, the court affirmed because this case must be dismissed 
under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, which protects 
Indian tribes from suit absent congressional abrogation or explicit 
waiver. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 
1670, 56 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1978). Indian tribes e  he c -
a   f   ad a  e ed b  e e g  e ;  
See McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1989) 
( Beca e he  a e e e g  e e , I d a  be  a e e f  
c e ed   a e  fede a  c . ). Th  c -law 
immunity from suit applies to actions for injunctive and declaratory 
relief. Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band of Mission Indians, 940 
F.2d 1269, 1271 (9 h C . 1991). C g e   e ca  
e e   e   ab ga e . Michigan v. Bay Mills 
Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031, 188 L. Ed. 2d 
1071 (2014) (inter a  a  ed). The be    
 defea ed b  a  a ega  ha   ac ed be d  e .  
Imperial Granite Co., 940 F.2d at 1271. The claims here are not 
brought under any federal law that abrogates tribal immunity and 
the Tribes have not waived their immunity. The Tribes, therefore, 
cannot be sued in federal court. Affirmed. 
 
97. Laake v. Turning Stone Resort Casino 
 
No. 17-3588, 740 Fed.Appx. 744, 2018 WL 5344936 (2nd Cir. Oct. 
29, 2018). A e a  J h  Laa e ( Laa e ), ceed g pro se, 
a ea ed f  he d c  c  dg e  d g h  c a  
again  T g S e Re  Ca  ( T g S e ) f  ac  f 
subject matter jurisdiction based on tribal sovereign immunity. 
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Laake had purchased a vendor booth for a multi-day event hosted 
by Turning Stone and attempted to use the booth to conduct tarot 
card readings, occult readings, and other paranormal 
demonstrations. Turning Stone employees, finding this conduct 
improper, informed Laake that he would have to stop, or he would 
be forced to leave the casino. Laake later sued Turning Stone for 
alleged violations of his First Amendment and equal protection 
rights, as well as for infliction of emotional distress and defamation 
under New York common law. The district court dismissed the 
complaint. Here, the district court properly concluded that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint against Turning 
Stone. Indian tribes have sovereign immunity from suit unless 
C g e  ha  a h ed he   he be ha  a ed  
.  C&L Enter., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian 
Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 416, 121 S. Ct. 1589, 149 L. Ed. 2d 
623 (2001) (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 
U.S. at 754.). Tribal immunity extends to tribal commercial 
enterprises, such as gambling venues. See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 
754 55. Turning Stone is a commercial enterprise, owned and 
operated by the Oneida Indian Nation of New York, a federally 
recognized Indian tribe. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible 
to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
82 Fed. Reg. 4915, 4917 (Jan. 17, 2017). Neither congressional 
abrogation of immunity nor waiver has occurred here. Therefore, 
Turning Stone, as a commercial enterprise of the Oneida Indian 
Nation of New York, was entitled to sovereign immunity. Laake 
argued ha  he I d a  C  R gh  Ac  f 1968 ( ICRA ) 
e ede  T g S e  . H e e ,   e ed a  
that suits like this against a tribe under ICRA are also barred by 
sovereign immunity. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 
at 59. ICRA provides no private right of action against a tribe and 
may be enforced only in tribal court or by a petition for habeas 
corpus in federal court. 98 S.Ct. 1670; Shenandoah v. U.S. Dept. of 
Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 713 14 (2nd Cir. 1998). The court affirmed 







98. Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca County, 
New York 
 
No. 11-CV-6004 CJS, 354 F.Supp.3d 281 (W.D. N.Y. Dec. 11, 
2018). Indian tribe brought action challenging county's ability to 
impose and collect ad valorem property taxes on parcels of real 
estate it owned. Parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The District Court, Charles J. Siragusa, J., held that tribal sovereign 
immunity barred the county from bringing suit against the tribe. The 
tribe's motion was granted. 
99. Barron v. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium 
No. 3:18-cv-00118-SLG, 373 F.Supp.3d 1232 (D. Alaska Jan. 2, 
2019). Former employee brought §1981 action in state court against 
employer, an Alaska Native tribal health consortium, alleging 
disparate treatment and retaliation on the basis of race. After 
removal, employer moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. The District Court, Sharon L. Gleason, J., held that: (1) 
employer was an arm of Alaska's tribes with tribal sovereign 
immunity, and (2) as a matter of first impression, Congress did not 
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity as to §1981 claims. Motion 
granted. 
100. Alaska Logistics, LLC v. Newtok Village Council 
No. 3:18-cv-00108-SLG, 357 F.Supp.3d 916 (D. Alaska Jan. 11, 
2019). Logistics company brought action against the governing 
body of Newtok Village tribe and contractor, asserting claims for 
breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, quantum 
meruit, misrepresentation, and unfair trade practices, arising out of 
an agreement to transport construction materials and cargo. 
Governing body brought counterclaims, alleging fraud, 
misrepresentation, unfair and deceptive practices, and breach of 
contract. Company filed counterclaims to counterclaims, which 
were identical to company's original causes of action. Governing 
body moved to dismiss and to strike company's counterclaims to 
counterclaims. The District Court, Sharon L. Gleason, J., held that: 
(1) governing body did not waive its tribal sovereign immunity by 
asserting counterclaims; (2) company failed to establish that 
governing body agreed to a forum selection clause that manifested 
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the tribe's intent to surrender tribal sovereign immunity in clear and 
unmistakable terms; (3) company failed to show that jurisdictional 
discovery was warranted on the issue of tribal sovereign immunity; 
and (4) company's counterclaims to counterclaims, were redundant, 
and thus, could be stricken. Motions granted. 
101. Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians v. Washington 
No. 17-35722, 913 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. Jan. 22, 2019). Stillaguamish 
Tribe of Indians brought action against State of Washington and the 
Attorney General of Washington, seeking a declaration that its tribal 
sovereign immunity barred any lawsuit for indemnification arising 
from a contract with the State of Washington concerning 
construction of a revetment to protect salmon populations in a river 
on tribal lands following a landslide near the river. The United States 
District Court for the Western District of Washington, Robert J. 
Bryan, Senior District Judge, 2017 WL 3424942, granted the tribe's 
summary judgment motion. Defendants appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, McKeown, Circuit Judge, held that under the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, the district court lacked federal question jurisdiction 
over declaratory judgment action that was based on existence of a 
tribal immunity defense. Vacated and remanded. 
102. Edwards v. Foxwoods Resort Casino 
No. 17-CV-05869 (JMA) (SIL), 2019 WL 486077 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 
7, 2019). On October 6, 2016, Plaintiff Curtis Edwards and Victoria 
Edwards visited the Foxwoods Resort Casino. Plaintiffs are both 
New York residents. While inside the Casino, they were confronted 
and detained by Casino security on suspicion of credit card fraud at 
the neighboring Mohegan Sun Casino. Curtis was informed that he 
was being arrested and that the police were on their way. Upon the 
arrival of tribal police, Curtis was advised again that he was under 
arrest and would be transported to police headquarters. Victoria 
insisted the officers examine a photo of the suspect. Once the police 
confirmed that Curtis did not match the appearance of the suspect, 
he was released from custody. When Plaintiffs returned to their hotel 
room, an unidentified employee of the hotel opened Plaintiffs' room, 
saw them, and abruptly left. Defendant Foxwoods Resort Casino is 
a b e  ca ed  he S a e f C ec c [.]  P a ff ' 
complaint alleges violations of the Fourth Amendment based on: (1) 
423 
 
false imprisonment; (2) false arrest; and (3) unlawful detention. 
Plaintiffs also allege that the actions of the Tribal police officers 
underlying these violations were motivated by Plaintiffs' race. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs bring state law claims of (1) assault and 
battery; (2) negligent hiring; and (3) trespass. Defendants have 
moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
Defendants argue that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking because: 
(1) Plaintiffs fail to a raise a federal question; (2) Indian tribes are 
not citizens of a state and therefore destroy complete diversity; (3) 
28 U.S.C. § 1343 is not an independent source of jurisdiction; and 
(4) T ba  S e e g  I  ec de  P a ff  c a . I  
response, Plaintiffs' motion papers argue that: (1) the allegations of 
racial profiling and constitutional violations are sufficiently pled and 
raise federal questions; and (2) any claim of sovereign immunity has 
bee  a ed b  S e e g  I  Wa e  O d a ce N be  
011092-01,  h ch he T be e ac ed. He e, he e e e  c ab e 
federal claims. To the extent Plaintiffs sought to invoke federal 
question jurisdiction by claiming the Defendants violated their 
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, such an 
argument is unavailing. These constitutional protections did not 
apply to Defendants. Moreover, Plaintiffs could not sue Defendants 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ( Section 1983 ) beca e e f he 
Defendants were acting under the color of state law. Defendants' 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was granted.  
103. Long v. Snoqualmie Gaming Commission 
No. 77007-1-I, 435 P.3d 339, 2019 WL 912132 (Wash Ct. App. 
Div.1, Feb. 25, 2019). Former chief executive officer (CEO) of 
Native American tribe's casino brought action against tribe's gaming 
commission, alleging commission violated terms of a settlement 
agreement by refusing to rescind revocation of former CEO's 
gaming license. The Superior Court, King County, No. 17-2-01853-
8, Jeffrey M. Ramsdell, J., dismissed action. Former CEO appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Leach, J., held that: (1) any waiver by tribe 
of its own sovereign immunity, without more, did not also 
necessarily waive commission's sovereign immunity in matters 
falling within exclusive purview of commission, and (2) settlement 
agreement executed between tribe and former CEO, waiving tribe's 
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sovereign immunity for purposes of resolving any dispute arising 
under agreement, did not constitute waiver of immunity of 
commission. Affirmed. 
104. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC 
No. 18-116518-1166, 917 F.3d 451, 2019 WL 92265866 (6th Cir. 
Feb. 26, 2019). Litigation trustee brought strong-arm proceeding to 
avoid allegedly fraudulent transfers, and Indian tribe named as 
defendant moved to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. The 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, Walter Shapero, J., 516 B.R. 462, denied the motion, and 
the Indian tribe appealed. The District Court, Paul D. Borman, J., 
532 B.R. 680, reversed and remanded. On remand, the Bankruptcy 
Court, Shapero, J., 559 B.R. 842, granted motion to dismiss, and 
litigation trustee appealed. The District Court, Borman, J., 584 B.R. 
706, affirmed. Appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, Clay, 
Circuit Judge, held that: (1) Congress did not unequivocally express 
intent to abrogate Indian tribe's sovereign immunity from cause of 
action by litigation trustee in strong-arm capacity to set aside 
allegedly fraudulent prepetition transfers made by Chapter 11 debtor 
to tribe; (2) while tribal sovereign immunity could be waived by 
litigation conduct, it could not be waived by the litigation conduct, 
 f be, b  f be  a eged a e  eg   age ; a d (3) ga  
conduct of filing bankruptcy petition does not waive tribal sovereign 
immunity as to a separate, adversarial fraudulent transfer avoidance 
claim. Affirmed. 
105. Solomon v. American Web Loan 
No. 4:17cv145, 375 F.Supp.3d 638 (E.D. Va. 2019). These motions 
arose out of complicated lending scheme that involving tribal 
immunity, forced arbitration, and several layers of corporate entities 
in an attempt to avoid liability for allegedly usurious interest rates. 
At its core, this case involves a lending scheme envisioned by Mark 
C  ( C ), he eb  he a d h  c a e e es attempt to 
use the sovereign immunity of the Otoe-Missouria Indian Tribe (the 
T be )  e ade h  a . M df  f he g fede a  c  
favoring tribal immunity, self-governance, and a safe treasury, the 
court rejected his arguments. Plaintiffs produced enough evidence 
to show that Curry shifted all of the risk of his scheme to the Tribe 
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and kept the lion's share of the revenue for himself, through a 
scheme that infringed upon the Tribe's self-governance and placed 
the Tribe's treasury at risk. In other words, Plaintiffs made a 
sufficient showing that Curry was acting for himself, not for the 
T be. Defe da   de ed. 
106. Gingras v. Think Finance, Inc. 
 
No. 16-2019-cv, 922 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2019). The federal 
government and many states have laws designed to protect 
consumers against predatory lending practices. In this case, the court 
considered what happens when those laws conflict with the off-
reservation commercial activities of Indian tribes. The court held 
that, notwithstanding tribal sovereign immunity, federal courts may 
entertain suits against tribal officers in their official capacities 
seeking prospective, injunctive relief prohibiting off-reservation 
conduct that violates state and substantive federal law. The court 
also considered the specific lending agreements between these 
Plaintiffs and these Defe da  a d he d ha  he ag ee e  
arbitration clauses were unenforceable and unconscionable. Payday 
loans are ostensibly short-term cash advances for people who face 
unexpected obligations or emergencies. The loans are typically for 
small sums that are to be repaid quickly in anywhere from several 
ee   a ea . T ca , e e de  cha ge fee  a d e e  
that, when annualized, result in interest rates far in excess of legal 
limits or typical borrowing rates, often exceeding 300%, 500%, or 
e e  1,000%.  Th   ed a da  a  ade b  P a  
Green, LLC, an online lending operation, which holds itself out as a 
tribal lending entity wholly owned by the Chippewa Cree Tribe of 
he R c  B  I d a  Re e a , M a a.  J. A . 150. The 
borrowers were Plaintiffs-Appellees Jessica Gingras and Angela 
Given, who are Vermont residents. In July 2011, Gingras borrowed 
$1,050 at an interest rate of 198.17% per annum. She repaid that 
loan and borrowed an additional $2,900 a year later, this time with 
an interest rate of 371.82%. She has not repaid the second loan. To 
receive their loans, Gingras and Given were required to sign loan 
agreements. The loan agreements provided for arbitration in the 
event of a dispute between the borrower and Plain Green. The loan 
agreements also provide that Chippewa Cree tribal law governs the 
loan agreement and any dispute arising under it. An arbitrator, 
whom the borrower may select from the American Arbitration 
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A c a  ( AAA )  JAMS, ha  a  T ba  La  a d a  
a b a  a a d  be ed b  b a a  e de ce a d  
be c e  h [ he a  ag ee e ] a d T ba  La .  Ch e a 
C ee ba  c  e e e e ed  e  a de he a b a  a a d 
if it does not comply with tribal law. Gingras and Given alleged that 
the loan agreements violated Vermont and federal law. The loans 
g a ed f  P a  G ee , LLC. P a  G ee  Ch ef E ec e 
Off ce   Defe da  J e  R e e;  e be  f P a  G ee  
Board of Directors, Ted Whitford and Tim McInerney, were also 
defendants. Gingras and Given brought this class action in the 
District of Vermont, seeking, among other relief, an order barring 
Defendants from continuing their current lending practices. Tribal 
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that they are entitled to tribal 
sovereign immunity. The district court disagreed and denied their 
motion. It concluded that tribal sovereign immunity does not bar suit 
against the Tribal Defendants in their official capacities for 
prospective, injunctive relief under a theory analogous to Ex parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). 
S ec f ca , he d c  c  ead he S e e C  dec   
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. 782, 134 S.Ct. 
2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014), to condone that form of action to 
vindicate violations of state law. All Defendants also moved to 
compel arbitration pursuant to the loan agreements. The district 
court denied those motions. It concluded that the arbitration 
agreements are unconscionable and unenforceable because they 
insulate Defendants from claims that they have violated state and 
federal laws. In particular, it held that because the agreements apply 
tribal law exclusively and restrict all arbitral awards review solely 
by a tribal court, the neutral arbitral forum is illusory. All 
Defendants timely appealed. First, the court concluded that the 
arbitration agreements were unenforceable because they were 
designed to avoid federal and state consumer protection laws. 
Similar to the agreement in Hayes, P a ff  ag ee e  e ed 
the application of tribal law only and disclaimed the application of 
state and federal law.4 See J. App. 116 17. The arbitration 
mechanism in the agreements purported to offer neutral dispute 
resolution but appears to disallow claims brought under federal and 
state law. The Supreme Court has made clear that arbitration 
ag ee e  ha  a e a a  gh  o pursue federal statutory 
remedies are prohibited. See Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 
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570 U.S. 228, 235 36, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 186 L.Ed.2d 417 (2013).. By 
applying tribal law only, arbitration for the Plain Green borrowers 
appears wholly to foreclose them from vindicating rights granted by 
fede a  a d a e a . We ag ee h he F h C c  ha  [ ]he 
just and efficient system of arbitration intended by Congress when 
 a ed he FAA a   a  h   h   f fa ce.  P a  
Green is a payday lending entity cleverly designed to enable 
Defendants to skirt federal and state consumer protection laws under 
the cloak of tribal sovereign immunity. That immunity is a shield, 
however, not a sword. It poses no barrier to plaintiffs seeking 
prospective equitable relief for violations of federal or state law. 
Tribes and their officers are not free to operate outside of Indian 
lands without conforming their conduct in these areas to federal and 
state law. Attempts to disclaim application of federal and state law 
in an arbitral forum subject to exclusive tribal court review fare no 
better. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.  
 
107. Bell v. City of Lacey 
 
No. 3:18-cv-05918-RBL, 2019 WL 2578582 (W.D. Wash. June 24, 
2019). Defendants Nisqually Tribe, John Simmons and Elatta 
T a  (c ec e  he Tribe Defe da ) ed f  J dg e  
on the Pleadings. After being arrested and charged with a crime in 
the city of Lacey, Bell was held for 19 days at a detention facility 
owned and operated by the Nisqually Tribe on Reservation land. 
The facility detains non-tribal members pursuant to an Agreement 
between the Tribe and the City of Lacey whereby the latter pays the 
former for incarceration services. At the end of his time at the 
facility, Bell suffered a stroke. He has now sued numerous parties 
including the Nisqually T be a d he T be  Ch ef E ec e 
Officer, John Simmons, and its Chief Financial Officer Eletta Tiam 
(Bell also sued several Doe Defendants who allegedly failed to give 
him medical treatment, but they are not the subject of this Order). 
Bell alleged claims for false imprisonment, declaratory and 
injunctive relief, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 
negligence against all three Tribe Defendants. 
The Tribe Defe da  ed  d  Be s claims against them, 
arguing that the claims are barred by sovereign immunity and 
because they are factually implausible and time-barred. However, 
the Ninth Circuit has held that tribal officers allegedly violating 
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federal law are not immune from suits seeking prospective relief 
under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe 
Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 
Burlington N.R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 
1991) (overruled on other grounds)). In this case, no waiver or 
abrogation had occurred. Consequently, the claims for monetary 
relief against the Tribe Defendants were dismissed. However, 
beca e Be  c a  c e  Ex Parte Young, but the parties do 
not address it in their briefs, the court found it lacked sufficient 
a e a   dec de he he  Be  c a  f  dec a a  a d 
injunctive relief against Simmons and Tiam could be dismissed. 
That question was reserved pending f he  b ef g. Be  a  
argument was that he may sue the Tribe as a third-party beneficiary 
of the T be  Ag ee e  h he C . The Ag ee e  a ed 
the T be  e e g    he f g e e : the 
Nisqually Indian Tribe is a Sovereign Nation with all immunities 
attendant thereto with the following exception that the parties to this 
agreement have specifically negotiated: The 
Nisqually Indian Tribe does hereby expressly consent to venue in 
the courts of the state of Washington for any legal dispute by and 
between the parties to this agreement and further agrees that any 
such dispute shall be interpreted pursuant to the laws of the state of 
Wa h g . Acc d g  Be , he a  c ded a  a a   he 
Agreement and can therefore sue the Tribe in a state or federal court. 
U de  Wa h g  a , [ ]he c ea  f a h d-party beneficiary 
contract requires that the parties intend that the promisor assume a 
direct obligation to the intended beneficiary at the time they enter 
into the c ac .   Postlewait Const., Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. 
Companies, 106 Wash. 2d 96, 99 (1986) (quoting Lonsdale v. 
Chesterfield, 99 Wash. 2d 353, 361 (1983)). Here, the Agreement 
expressly allocated mandatory responsibilities for medical treatment 
and transportation to the City. While the Agreement stated that the 
Tribe  de  a d b a d   a e , h  d d  h  
that the parties intended to create a contractual obligation. 
Furthermore, even if inmates could be considered third-party 
beneficiaries under the Agreement, the waiver of sovereign 
immunity did not clearly encompass claims brought by third parties. 
The Agreement only waived sovereign immunity for disputes 
be ee  he a e   h  ag ee e ,  he a e a e   h  
ag ee e  ha  a e a  efe ed  a  ha g ec f ca  
429 
 
eg a ed  he a e  e ce . C e e , he Ag ee e  d d 
 e ca  e e  a  e   a e e e g   
for third-party beneficiaries. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 
58. The c  f d ha  Be  e a g a g e  a  ac ed 
e . Be  a g ed ha  h  c a  d   habea  beca e he 
alleged that the T be  Ag ee ent to detain state prisoners is 
illegal. However, as the Tribe Defendants correctly point out, Bell 
could not maintain a habeas action when he was no longer being 
detained. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). There 
was no dispute that Bell has been released from Tribal custody and 
there was no clear indication that he would be returned to it. Finally, 
Bell contended that Simmons and Tiam cannot invoke sovereign 
immunity because they were sued in their individual 
capacities. See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1288 (2017). 
H e e , c  a    e   he cha ac e a  f he 
a e   he c a  he  a e g he he  a c a   ac a  
against an officer in their official capacity. Id. at 1290. He e, Be  
claims against Simmons and Tiam stem from policy-level decisions 
made as representatives of the Tribe and administrative conduct 
undertaken as officers of the T be. N e f S  a d T a  
actions were directed at Bell personally. Sovereign immunity thus 
e e d   S  a d T a  f  Be  c a  ee g e a  
relief. For the above reasons, all claims against the Tribe were 
dismissed and the false imprisonment, conspiracy, negligent and 
reckless infliction of emotional distress, and negligence claims 
against Simmons and Tiam were dismissed. The court ordered 
f he  b ef g  he e f he he  Be  c a  f  dec a a  
and injunctive relief against Simmons and Tiam should survive 
under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young.  
 
108. Williams v. Big Picture Loans, LLC 
 
No. 18-1827, 929 F.3d 170, 2019 WL 2864341 (4th Cir. July 3, 
2019). Borrowers brought putative class action against lending 
entity, and related defendants, alleging that payday loans carried 
unlawfully high interest rates. The United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia, No. 3:17cv00461REPRCY, Robert 
E. Payne, Senior District Judge, 329 F.Supp.3d 248, denied motion 
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants filed 
interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals, Gregory, Chief Judge, 
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held that: (1) burden of proof to demonstrate tribal immunity as an 
arm of the tribe was on party seeking such immunity, and (2) entities 
were entitled to sovereign tribal immunity. Reversed and remanded 
with instructions. 
 
109. Joan Wilson and Paul Franke, M.D., v. Alaska Native 
Tribal Health Consortium 
 
No. 3:16-cv-00195-TMB, 399 F.Supp.3d 926, 2019 WL 2870080 
(D. Alaska, July 3, 2019). Defendants Alaska 
Native Tribal Health C '  ( ANTHC ), A d e  Te be '  
( Te be ) a d R a d He ge e '  ( He ge e ) (c ec e  
I d d a  Defe da ) ed  D  f  Lac  f S b ec  
Matter Jurisdiction and to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 
( M   D ). F  he ea  e a ed be , 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was granted. ANTHC is a 
T ba  Organization and inter-Tribal consortium of federally 
recognized Alaska Tribes and Tribal O ga a  which co-
manages Alaska Native Med ca  Ce e  ( ANMC ), a e a -care 
hospital that provides medical services in Anchorage, Alaska. From 
2014 to 2016, ANTHC employed Wilson as Chief Ethics and 
Compliance Officer. From 2013 to 2016, ANTHC employed Franke 
by contract as the Chief Medical Officer of ANMC. Wilson and 
F a e a e ed ha  he  ha e a e edge f he da -to-
da  e a  f ANTHC, c d g b g ac ce  f ANMC. 
They repeatedly allege that Teuber, President of ANTHC, and 
Helgesen, Chief Executive Officer of ANTHC and Hospital 
Administrator of ANMC, e e e -a a e  ha  ANMC a d 
ANTHC's various billing practices were fraudulent. Specifically, 
Plaintiffs allege that ANTHC engaged in the following fraudulent 
practices: double billing for certain medical services; billing for 
services performed by ineligible providers; billing for 
unauthenticated services; and accepting incentive payments from 
Medicaid and Medicare without satisfying program requirements. 
Plaintiffs allege that Wilson e ea ed  b gh  he e e   he 
a e  f ANTHC a d He ge e ,  e ea ed  a e ed  
e e e he e [ a a e] ac ce .  O  Ma  6, 2016, He ge e  
terminated Wilson's employment with approval from Teuber, his 
direct supervisor. In June 2016, ANTHC notified Franke that his 
contract, which was due to expire on June 7, 2016, would not be 
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renewed. On August 29, 2016, Plaintiffs initiated this action against 
ANTHC as a qui tam lawsuit on behalf of the government and under 
ea  a   he Fa e C a  Ac  ( FCA ). On December 6, 
2017, the United States declined to intervene in the action. On June 
21, 2018, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint as a private action 
on behalf of themselves against ANTHC. Plaintiffs alleged that their 
employment at ANTHC was terminated as a result of Plaintiffs' 
opposition to ANTHC's fraudulent billing practices in violation of 
federal and state laws. Defendants moved for dismissal of each of 
Plaintiffs' four claims. ANTHC contends that dismissal is 
a a e beca e ANTHC  a  a  f he be,  h ch ea  
it is both entitled to tribal sovereign immunity, which bars all claims 
aga  , a d   a e  b ec   ab  de  he FCA 
retaliation provision. The quasi-jurisdictional nature of sovereign 
immunity means that if ANTHC is found to maintain such 
immunity, this Court lacks jurisdiction to resolve this action as it 
pertains to ANTHC. T ba  sovereign immunity protects Indian 
tribes from suit absent express authorization by Congress or clear 
a e  b  he be.  T ba  sovereign immunity extends 
to tribal g e g b d e   e e  ac g a  a  a  f he 
be  as well as organizations comprised of multiple tribes. 
In White v. University of California, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals set forth the appropriate analysis to determine whether an 
e   a  a  f he be.  If a c  finds that an entity is an 
a  f he be,  ha  e   b h (1) e ed  
maintain tribal sovereign immunity, and (2) is not liable under the 
FCA e a a  , beca e    a e  de  he 
FCA. White, established a five-factor analysis to determine if an 
e   a  a  f he be:  (1) he e h d f c ea  f he 
economic entities; (2) their purpose; (3) their structure, ownership, 
and management, including the amount of control the tribe has over 
the entities; (4) the tribe's intent with respect to the sharing of its 
sovereign immunity; and (5) the financial relationship between the 
tribe and he e e . P a ff  a g ed ha  ANTHC   a  a  
f he be  beca e  a  c ea ed b  C g e ,  d ec  b  
resolution of the tribes; and tribal status is not required in order to 
obtain federal funding through the Indian Self-Determination and 
Ed ca  A a ce Ac  ( ISDEAA ).  The ISDEAA, in pertinent 
a , de e e  ha  a  e -tribal consortium ... shall have the 
rights and responsibilities of the authorizing Indian tribe and § 
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325(a) authorizes the fifteen tribes and tribal health organizations to 
f  a c ,  h ch e e a  beca e ANTHC. 
Furthermore, ANTHC was incorporated as a tribal non-profit 
organization. Based on these facts, the Court found that ANTHC's 
creation, authorized by Congress and formed by regional 
health e e  a d be ,  a f d g ha    a  a  f he 
be.  The C  f d ha  he be  a d eg a  health entities 
identified in § 325(a) P.L. 105-83 intended to share their immunity 
with ANTHC, which supports a f d g ha  ANTHC  a  a  f 
he be.  F  he f eg g ea , h  C  f d ha  a  
analysis of the five factors articulated in White demonstrates that 
ANTHC  a  a  f he be.  Beca e ANTHC  a  a  f he 
be,   a a  tribal sovereign immunity, which deprives this 
Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims brought against 
ANTHC and simultaneously establishes that ANTHC is not a 
e  b ec   he FCA. Acc d g , Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss was granted with respect to the FCA claim against ANTHC 
identified in Count I, which was dismissed with prejudice. 
 
110. Ja  Ma a cik . A c ic Sl e Na i e A  L d., 
d/b/a Samuel Simmonds Memorial Hospital 
 
No. 2:19-cv-0002-HRH, 2019 WL 3554687 (D. Alaska Aug. 5, 
2019). Plaintiff is Jason Matyascik. Defendant is Arctic Slope 
Native Association, Ltd., d/b/a Samuel Simmonds Memorial 
H a . Defe da   he P.L. 93-638 regional health organization 
f  he A c c S e Reg  f A a a.  P a ff a ege  ha  [ ]  
or ab  Ma  14, 2018,  he c ac ed h  defe da   e e  
h  e e  c ac  a  defe da '  h a  a  a h c a ,  
P a ff a ege  ha  defe da  ef ed  h  he c ac , 
e a g [h ] e e  h  d g h  he h ee-
month notice called for in the contract for early termination. Plaintiff 
a  a ege  ha  [d] g he 2017-2018 term of [his] employment, 
[defendant] promised to reimburse several unpaid sums to him yet 
fa ed  f f  h e e .  Defe da  ed to dismiss 
plaintiff's claims, arguing that the court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction because it is entitled to tribal sovereign immunity and 
because plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies. 
T ba  e e g     ec  tribes themselves, but 
a  e e d   a  f he be ac g  beha f f he be.  White 
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v. Univ. of Calif., 765 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014). Defendant 
argued that it is an arm of its member tribes. Defendant was entitled 
to sovereign immunity because it is an arm of its member tribes. 
And, if defendant was entitled to sovereign immunity, defendant has 
not waived that immunity as to plaintiff's contract and statutory 
claims. As for plaintiff's conversion claim, plaintiff conceded that 
he has not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). See Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 
656 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jerves v. United States, 
966 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1992))  (FTCA de  ha  bef e 
an individual can file an action against the United States in district 
c , [he]  ee  a  ad a e e  f [h ] c a ). 
P a ff  c e  c a  a  d ed. Defe da '    
dismiss was granted. Plaintiff's contract and statutory claims were 
dismissed with prejudice, and plaintiff's conversion claim was 
dismissed without prejudice. 
 
Sovereignty, Tribal Inherent 
 
111. Gustafson v. Poitra 
 
No. 20170423, 916 N.W.2d 804, 2018 WL 4087949 (N.D. Aug. 28, 
2018). Non-Indian fee owner of two parcels of land located on 
Indian reservation by virtue of a foreclosure judgment brought 
action against claimants claiming an interest in the parcels. 
Following a bench trial, the District Court, Rolette County, 
Northeast Judicial District, Anthony S. Benson, J., entered judgment 
quieting title to fee owner, finding claimants' lessor's lien to be void, 
and awarding fee owner a money judgment in the amount of 
$67,567.98 a d a e  fee   he a  f $6,620. C a a  
appealed. The Supreme Court, McEvers, J., held that: (1) an express 
determination by the trial court in a prior foreclosure action, that it 
had jurisdiction over non-Indian owned fee land located within 
Indian reservation, had res judicata effect in fee owner's subsequent 
action to quiet title to the land, and (2) the tribal court did not have 







112. World Fuel Services, Inc. v. Nambe Pueblo 
Development Corporation 
 
No. CIV 18-0836 JB/SCY, 362 F.Supp.3d 1021, 2019 WL 293231 
(D.N.M. Jan. 23, 2019). Petroleum fuel supplier brought action 
against federally chartered tribal corporation seeking to compel 
arbitration of contract dispute concerning unpaid federal excise 
taxes allegedly owed to supplier pursuant to fuel supply agreement 
with respect to fuel sales on tribal land. Tribal corporation moved to 
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, 
for failure to state a claim. The District Court, James O. Browning, 
J., held that: (1) District Court had diversity jurisdiction; (2) District 
Court would construe tribal corporation's motion to dismiss for 
failure to exhaust tribal remedies as motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim, rather than as motion to dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction; (3) Indian tribe's sovereign immunity extended 
to tribal corporation; (4) tribal corporation waived its sovereign 
immunity for purposes of arbitration; (5) supplier was required to 
exhaust tribal remedies; and (6) stay pending exhaustion of tribal 
court remedies was warranted. Motion granted in part and denied in 
part. 
 
113. Stanko v. Oglala Sioux Tribe 
 
No. 17-3176, 916 F.3d 694, 2019 WL 846573 (8th Cir. Feb. 22, 
2019).  An arrestee, who was not a member of an Indian tribe, 
brought §1983 action against a federally recognized tribe, the Oglala 
Sioux Tribe, and various tribal officers, seeking damages for 
violation of the plaintiff's constitutional and civil rights in 
connection with allegations that the arrestee was traveling on a 
federally-maintained highway on reservation land when he was 
arrested, detained, assaulted, battered, and robbed. The United 
States District Court for the District of South Dakota, Jeffrey L. 
Viken,, Chief District Judge, 2017 WL 4217113, granted 
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Arrestee 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Loken, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) 
arrestee did not state an Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) claim, and 





114. Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria of Northern Paiute 
Indians 
 
No. 17-15515, 922 F.3d 892, 2019 WL 1781404 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 
2019). Former tribal administrator sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief against tribe, tribal court, and tribal court judge to avoid tribal 
court jurisdiction over claims that she defrauded tribe and breached 
her fiduciary duties to it. The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of California, William Horsley Orrick, J., 234 
F.Supp.3d 1042, dismissed action. Former administrator appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Piersol, Senior Judge for the District of South 
Dakota, sitting by designation, held that: (1) tribal court had subject-
matter d c  e  be  claims against administrator; (2) 
administrator reasonably should have anticipated that her conduct 
on tribal land would have fallen within tribes regulatory jurisdiction; 
(3) conduct of administrator threatened or had some direct effect on 
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of tribe; 
a d (4) be  adjudicatory authority did not exceed its regulatory 
authority over conduct of administrator during her employment. 
Affirmed. 
 
115. Employers Mutual Casualty Company v. Branch 
 
No. CV-18-08110-PCT-DWL, 381 F.Supp.3d 1144, 2019 WL 
1489121 (D. Ariz. Apr. 4, 2019). This case involves an attempt by a 
tribal court to assert jurisdiction over a party that never set foot 
h  he be  e e a , e e  c ac ed h a  ba  
members or organizations, and never expressly directed any activity 
h  he e e a  c f e . E e  M a  Ca a  
C a  ( EMC )  a  I a-based insurance company. In 2004, 
EMC sold commercial general liability policies to Service Station 
E e  a d Sa e , I c. ( SSES ) a d M a  B d g 
A c a e , I c. ( M a ). Ne he  c a  ha  a  ba  
affiliation. While these insurance policies were in place, SSES and 
Milam were each hired to perform certain work on a gas station in 
Chinle, Arizona. This gas station was situated on tribally-owned 
land within the Navajo Nation reservation. In March 2005, an 
employee of a subcontractor that had been hired by Milam 
accidentally breached a fuel line. This breach, which went 
undetected for five months, caused over 15,000 gallons of gasoline 
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to leak into the ground. In response, the Navajo Nation sued an array 
of parties, including SSES, Milam, and EMC, in Navajo tribal court. 
EMC, in turn, moved to dismiss on the ground that it was not subject 
to tribal jurisdiction. After the tribal courts rejected this argument, 
EMC filed this action in federal court seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief. The Court holds that EMC is not subject to tribal 
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has never held that a tribal court 
has jurisdiction over a non-member, and although the Ninth Circuit 
has issued several decisions recognizing (or noting the possibility 
of) such jurisdiction, those cases have almost exclusively involved 
instances where a non-member was physically present on tribal land 
and thereafter engaged in the conduct giving rise to liability. 
Moreover, to the extent the Ninth Circuit has suggested an insurance 
company may be sued in tribal court despite the absence of any 
physical presence on tribal land, its decisions have been limited to 
circumstances where the policyholder was a tribal member, and the 
insurance company engaged in conduct specifically directed toward 
the reservation. No court has ever recognized tribal jurisdiction 
under the circumstances presented here, where an insurance 
company simply sold a policy to a non-tribal member. The Court 
thus concluded this case does not satisfy either of the jurisdictional 
tests recognized by the Ninth Circuit: (1) EMC is not subject to 
jurisdiction under he gh   e c de  e  beca e EMC ha  e e  
done anything to enter tribal land (and thus cannot be excluded), and 
(2) neither of the exceptions recognized in Montana v. United States, 
450 U.S. 544 (1981), is applicable. 
 
116. Hestand v. Gila River Indian Community 
 
No. 17-16583, 765 Fed.Appx. 334, 2019 WL 1765219 (9th Cir. Apr. 
19, 2019). Plaintiff-Appellant John Hestand filed a complaint in 
tribal court against Defendants-Appellees Gila River Indian 
Community and Linus Everling, in his official capacity, 
(Defendants) alleging age discrimination. The tribal court dismissed 
He a d  c a   he ba  f ba  e e g  . Af e  
the tribal court of appeals affirmed, Hestand filed a complaint in the 
d c  c . He a ea ed he c  de  g a g Defe da  
motion to dismiss with prejudice, and its conclusion that claim and 
issue preclusion barred his claims. The court affirmed. Hestand 
argued that federal questions involving sovereign immunity are 
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always subject to de novo review. However, the court has previously 
explained the genera  e ha  fede a  c  a   ead d ca e 
questions whether of federal, state, or tribal law already resolved 
in tribal court absent a finding that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction 
or that its judgment be denied comity for some other valid rea .  
AT & T Corp. . Coe r d Alene Tribe, 295 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 
2002).. While the court reviews de novo a dis ric  co r s 
determination whether sovereign immunity applies, Linneen v. Gila 
River Indian Committee., 276 F.3d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 2002), this 
case involved a ribal co r s determination. Principles of comity 
generally require the court to recognize and enforce tribal court 
decisions. See AT & T Corp., 295 F.3d at 903.. There are, however, 
[ ]  c c a ce  [ ha ] ec de ec g : when the tribal 
court either lacked jurisdiction or denied the losing party due 
ce  f a .  Id. Ne he  a ed he e. The ba  c  
jurisdiction was never challenged Hestand himself brought the 
claims to tribal court. For the first time on appeal, Hestand claimed 
that violations of due process entitle him to de novo review. But the 
district court did not consider this issue, and it was therefore waived. 
See Tibble . Edison In l, 843 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016).. 
Even if the court were to consider the claim, Hestand alleged no 
actual due process violations by the tribal court; instead, he included 
a ge e a  acc a  ha  he ac  f he Defe da  a d ba  
c  de ed P a ff  d e ce  gh .  Th  c c  
a ega  d d  ec de ec g  f he ba  c  dec . 
Moreover, Hestand did not appeal the factual and legal bases for the 
d c  c  h d g ha  c a  a d e ec  ba ed h  
claims. Instead, he attempted to argue the merits of his suit, claiming 
that the Indian Civil Rights Act somehow abrogates sovereign 
immunity in suits involving tribal employees, and that sovereign 
immunity was not a viable defense. Yet this is precisely what claim 
preclusion seeks to prevent. See Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health 
Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) ( Re  d ca a ... ba  
litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were raised or 
could have been raised in the  ac . ) ( g W. Radio 
Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
Because the district court correctly held that claim and issue 





117. Muscogee Creek Indian Freedmen Band, Inc. v. 
Bernhardt 
 
No. 18-1705 (CKK), 385 F.Supp.3d 16, 2019 WL 1992787 (D.D.C. 
May 6, 2019). Persons whose lineal ancestors were Creek Nation 
Freedmen and citizens of Muscogee Creek Nation (MCN) brought 
action against MCN's principal chief, Interior Secretary, and other 
federal officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to secure 
rights and privileges of MCN citizenship. Defendants moved to 
dismiss. The District Court, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, J., held that: (1) 
plaintiffs were required to exhaust their tribal remedies before 
bringing action; (2) presence of federal defendants did not obviate 
plaintiffs' obligation to first seek administrative and judicial 
remedies in tribal forums; and (3) plaintiffs failed to establish that it 
would be futile to require them to exhaust their tribal remedies. 
Motions granted in part and denied in part. 
 
118. State v. Thompson 
 
No. A18-0545, 929 N.W.2d 21, 2019 WL 2079426 (Minn. Ct. App. 
May 13, 2019). Defendant was convicted in the District Court, 
Beltrami County, John G. Melbye, J., of first-degree driving while 
impaired (DWI). Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Johnson, J., held that: (1) the fact that the tribal police officer who 
initially observed defendant's impairment was not a peace officer for 
purposes of impaired driving laws was irrelevant to defendant's 
conviction; (2) as a matter of first impression, a state law-
enforcement agency is authorized to enforce impaired-driving laws 
on an Indian reservation to the extent that such an offense is 
committed by a non-Indian; and (3) tribal officer did not unlawfully 
detain or arrest defendant. Affirmed. 
 
119. Rincon Mushroom Corporation of America v. Mazzetti 
 
No. 09-cv-2330-WQH-JLB, 2019 WL 2341376 (S.D. Cal. June 3, 
2019). The matter before the Court is the Ex Parte Motion for an 
Emergency Order Staying Enforcement of the Rincon Tribal Court 
J dg e  Pe d g A ea   T ba  C  f A ea  f ed b  
Plaintiff Rincon Mushroom Corporation of America. On October 
20, 2009, Plaintiff Rincon Mushroom Corporation of America 
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(RMCA) initiated this action by filing the Complaint. The action 
concerns tribal regulation of non-Indian fee simple land (the 
Property) located within the boundaries of the reservation of the 
Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians (the Tribe). Defendants 
Bo Mazzetti, John Currier, Vernon Wright, Gilbert Parada, 
Stephanie Spencer, Charlies Kolb, and Dick Watenpaugh (the 
Rincon Band Defendants) are tribal officials sued in their individual 
and official capacities. The Complaint alleges the following ten 
causes of action: (1) intentional interference with contract; (2) 
intentional interference with advantageous economic relationship; 
(3) conspiracy to intentionally interfere with contract; (4) conspiracy 
to intentionally interfere with advantageous economic relationship; 
(5) conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of equal protection and equal 
privileges and immunities under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); (6) civil 
RICO; (7) civil RICO conspiracy; (8) negligent interference with 
contract; (9) negligent interference with advantageous economic 
relationship; and (10) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On September 
21, 2010, the Court granted a motion to dismiss filed by the Rincon 
Band Defendants. Court dismissed the Complaint for failure to 
exhaust tribal court remedies. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed that Plaintiff RMCA must exhaust tribal remedies 
on the issue of tribal jurisdiction before bringing suit in federal 
c . The C  f A ea  a ed, We e ha e ha  e a e  
now deciding whether the tribe actually has jurisdiction under the 
second Montana exception. We hold only that where, as here, 
the be  a e  f d c   c ab e   a b e,  he 
tribal courts get the first chance to decide whether tribal jurisdiction 
is actually permitted. If the tribal courts sustain tribal jurisdiction 
and Rincon Mushroom is unhappy with that determination, it may 
then repair to federal court. However, the Court of Appeals held that 
this Court abused discretion by dismissing the case rather than 
staying it. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and 
remanded with instructions to stay the case pending Plaintiff 
RMCA  e ha  f ba  e ed e . In the years following the 
Order staying the case, the Court ordered and the parties filed three 
status reports as to the exhaustion of tribal remedies. On June 25, 
2015, the Court issued an Order administratively closing the case 
h  e d ce  a  a   e  e e , a d h  
prejudice to the resolution of any statute of limitations issue 
a c a ed h he f g f h  c a .  O  J  26, 2017, he 
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C  de ed P a ff RMCA    e e  he ca e. The 
C  a ed, [T]he record reflects that RMCA has been afforded 
multiple opportunities to challenge tribal jurisdiction through 
motions for partial summary judgment and a trial on the issue of 
jurisdiction. Finally, RMCA will also have the opportunity to seek 
ba  c  a e a e e e  f he ba  c  g  
jurisdiction. The Court concluded that RMCA has failed to establish 
that it lacks an adequate opportunity to challenge tribal court 
jurisdiction. The Court reviewed the record, which established legal 
and factual disputes between the Rincon Band Defendants and 
Plaintiff RMCA but did not demonstrate that the assertion of tribal 
jurisdiction was motivated by a desire to harass or was conducted in 
bad faith. The Court concluded that the evidence in the record was 
ff c e   e he e f ce e  f he a  che e a  
the product of bad faith conduct or was perpetuated with a motive 
 ha a .  A & A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 
781 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1986). For the reasons stated in the 
C  J  26, 2017 O de , he C  f d ha   e ce   
the exhaustion requirement applied in this case based on express 
jurisdictional prohibition, lack of opportunity to challenge 
jurisdiction, or a plain lack of jurisdiction.  
 
120. C e  D Ale e T ibe . Ha k  
 
No. 17-35755, 933 F.3d 1052, 2019 WL 3756886 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 
2019). The a e  e e ed he d c  c  de  d g f  
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction an action filed by 
an Indian tribe seeking to enforce a tribal court judgment against 
nonmembers. The panel held that inherent in the recognition of a 
ba  c  dg e  aga  a e be   a e  ega d g 
the extent of the powers reserved to the tribe under federal law. 
Because the action presented a substantial issue of federal law, the 
district court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331. In 2016, the tribe ed he Ha   he C e  d A e e T ba  
C  ( he T ba  C ) f  encroachment on submerged lands 
without a permit in violation of tribal law. The Hawks were served 
with notice but did not answer the complaint or otherwise contest 
the allegations. The Tribal Court accordingly entered default 
judgment against the Hawks in the form of a $3,900 civil penalty 
and a declaration that the tribe was entitled to remove the 
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encroachments. The tribe subsequently sought federal recognition 
a d e f ce e  f he T ba  C  dg e  b  f g a 
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho. 
A tribe  a h  d e   g f  fede a  a  b  a he  
de e  f  he he e  e  f a ed e e g  h ch 
ha  e e  bee  e g hed.  United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 
313, 322 (1978) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Felix Cohen, 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 122 (ed. 1945)). Tribal 
e e g  e e he e  e   a  he ffe a ce f C g e  
a d  b ec   c e e defea a ce.  Id. at 323. Thus, because 
fede a  a  def e  he e  b da e  f a  Indian tribe  e  
over non-Indians,  Na l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 851, the question of 
he he  a ba  c  ha  ad d ca e a h  e  e be  
 a fede a  e .  Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land 
& Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 324 (2008).  
 
Tax 
121. Tulalip Tribes v. Washington 
 
No. 15-CV-940 BJR, 349 F.Supp.3d 1046, 2018 WL 4811893 
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2018). Indian tribe and municipality located on 
Indian reservation brought action against state of Washington, its 
governor, director of the Washington State Department of Revenue, 
county, county treasurer, and county assessor, seeking declaration 
and injunction prohibiting state and county from collecting retail 
sales and use tax, business and occupation tax, and personal property 
tax from non-Indian owned businesses located in the municipality, 
arguing that the collection of taxes imposed on tribal sovereignty 
and was preempted by operation of federal law. The District Court, 
Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, J., held that: (1) state and county's 
collection of taxes from non-Indian owned businesses in 
municipality located on Indian reservation was not preempted by 
operation of federal law, and (2) state and county's collection of 
taxes did not infringe on Indian tribe's tribal sovereignty. Ordered 
accordingly. 
122. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Biegalski 
No. 18-12094, 757 Fed.Appx. 851, 2018 WL 6437564 (11th Cir. 
Dec. 7, 2018). Indian tribe brought action against executive director 
of State Department of Revenue for injunctive and declaratory relief 
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regarding state's imposition of tax on electricity delivered to tribe's 
reservations. The United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida, D.C. Docket No. 0:16-cv-62775-RNS, Robert N. 
Scola, Jr., 2017 WL 4570790, dismissed with prejudice based on 
claim preclusion and later, 2018 WL 1902838, denied tribe's motion 
for consideration. Tribe appealed. The Court of Appeals held that 
action was barred, on claim preclusion grounds, by previous 
judgment that tax was not preempted by federal law. Affirmed. 
123. Everi Payments, Inc. v. Washington State Department 
of Revenue 
 
No. 50791-9-II, 6 Wash. App.2d 580, 432 P.3d 411 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Dec. 11, 2018). Taxpayer brought action seeking business and 
occupational (B&O) tax refund. The Superior Court, James Dixon, 
J., 2017 WL 3317325, granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Department of Revenue, and taxpayer appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Worswick, J., held that: (1) state was not categorically 
barred from levying a B&O tax on taxpayer; (2) Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (IGRA) did not expressly preempt B&O tax 
imposed on taxpayer; (3) cash access services provided by taxpayer 
at tribal casinos fell outside the realm of the IGRA, and were, 
therefore, capable of being subject to generally-applicable state tax 
laws, including a B&O tax; (4) Washington-Tribal Compacts did 
not operate to preempt B&O tax imposed on taxpayer; (5) Indian 
Trader Statutes did not apply, and thus, did not preempt imposition 
of a B&O tax on taxpayer; (6) B&O tax was not preempted by 
federal law; and (7) Department of Revenue rule governing taxation 
of non-enrolled persons doing business in Indian county did not 
apply to prevent the Department from assessing a B&O tax on 
taxpayer. Affirmed. 
 
124. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Riverside 
County 
 
No. 17-56003, 749 Fed.Appx. 650 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2019). Plaintiff 
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians appeals the summary 
judgment entered in favor of Defendant Riverside County and 
Intervenor-Defendant Desert Water Agency, upholding the right of 
he C   a e  a d c ec  a e  e e  a  ( PIT ) 
from non-Indian lessees of Indian trust lands on the Agua Caliente 
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Reservation. In Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County 
of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), we held that this very 
tax is permissible. Plaintiff argues that our cursory preemption 
analysis there is clearly irreconcilable with White Mountain Apache 
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), and therefore not controlling. 
In Bracker, he S e e C  ec g ed ha  [ ] e d ff c  
ee  e  a e  ca e  e h ,  h ch a S a e 
asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in 
ac   he e e a .  448 U.S. a  144. I  ch ca e , Bracker 
c  ha  a c   h d  be de e de   
echa ca   ab e c ce  f a e  ba  e e g .  
I ead, c  h d e gage  a a c a ed   he 
a e f he a e, fede a , a d ba  e e  a  a e.  I  Agua 
Caliente, decided nine years before Bracker, we did not expressly 
engage in that particularized, interest-balancing inquiry. But we did 
c de  he c g e a  e beh d he eg a  dea g 
h I d a  a d I d a  a d ,  he PIT  ega  c de ce, a d he 
indirect economic effect of the PIT on the tribe and tribal members. 
See Agua Caliente, 442 F.2d at 1186 87. A few years later, in Fort 
Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 
1976), we again upheld the assessment and imposition of a PIT on 
non-Indian lessees of land held in trust by the federal government 
for an Indian tribe.1 In Fort Mojave, we engaged in a more extensive 
a a  f he PIT  effec   fede a  a d ba  e e , 
foreshadowing the later requirements of Bracker. Indeed, in 
Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. Thurston County 
Board of Equalization, 724 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2013), we 
observed that our PIT cases, including Fort Mojave, a ed a 
a  de f a a   Bracker. We conclude that our PIT 
precedents are not clearly irreconcilable with Bracker. Additionally, 
relying on Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145. Plaintiff 
argues that 25 U.S.C. § 465 bars this tax. Once again, we already 
add e ed h  e: I  Agua Caliente, for example, we stressed 
ha  [ ]he Ca f a a   e  e e  d e     
a  he a d a  ch,  h ch d be ba ed b  § 465, b  a he  
a e  he f  ca h a e  f he e ee  e e   ,  h ch   
covered by § 465.  Chehalis, 724 F.3d at 1158 n.7 (alteration in 




125. Blue Lake Rancheria Economic Development 
Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
 
No. 16150-17L, 152 T.C. No. 5, 2019 WL 1077266 (T.C. Mar. 6, 
2019). Corporation of federally recognized Indian tribe, and 
corporation's division, petitioned separately for review of IRS 
determinations to proceed with liens to collect unpaid employment 
taxes arising from division's business operations. Actions were 
consolidated. The Tax Court, Goeke, J., held that: (1) IRS notices of 
determination to sustain tax liens were sufficient to provide Tax 
Court with jurisdiction; (2) state law did not restrict Indian tribal 
corporation's power, pursuant to charter issued by Department of 
Interior (DOI) under Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), to create 
legally distinct corporate division whose federal employment tax 
liabilities were not collectible from corporation by IRS; (3) Indian 
tribal corporation's power to create legally distinct corporate 
division was within scope of IRA; and (4) Indian tribal corporation's 
division acted as legally distinct entity, and thus IRS could not 
collect division's employment tax liabilities from corporation. 
Ordered accordingly. 
 
126. Big Sandy Rancheria Enterprises v. Becerra 
 
No. 1:18-cv-00958-DAD-EPG, 395 F.Supp.3d 1314, 2019 WL 
3803627 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2019). Plaintiff Big Sandy Rancheria 
E e e  ( BSRE ) b gh  h  ac  cha e g g he 
a ca  f Ca f a  c ga e e a  a d ce g a e . 
BSRE is a tribal corporation incorporated under section 17 of the 
Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 5124 ( IRA ), h ch 
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to issue a charter of 
incorporation to any Indian tribe upon petition by such tribe. 
Although only BSRE, and not the tribe, was a plaintiff to the instant 
action, BSRE alleged that corporations created pursuant to section 
17 f he IRA e e e e a  a e  eg  f he ba  g e e .  
Defendants did not dispute that Indian tribes are exempt from the 
Ta  I c  Ac  ( TIA ) h b  b  d d d e ha  
plaintiff BSRE is equivalent to an Indian tribe. Defendants argued 
that BSRE, as a corporation organized under section 17 of the IRA, 
was a distinct entity from the Big Sandy Rancheria Band of Western 
Mono Indians regardless of how the latter is constitutionally 
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organized and that BSRE therefore cannot invoke the tribe  
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 or its exemption from the TIA. 
He e, BSRE e ha ed ha   e c e  d b e  bacc  
d c   I d a  be  a d I d a  ba  e be   he  a d  
and does not make any sales to non-members or the general public. 
Notably, tribe-to-tribe transactions involving the movement of 
goods through a state, including outside of Indian country, are not 
immune from state regulation. Indeed, many courts have affirmed 
a e  ff-reservation authority to enforce state laws. See, e.g. 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 
447 U.S. 134, 100 S.Ct. 2069 (1980) at 161 62 (authorizing off-
e e a  e e , g [ ]   g f ca  ha  he e e e  
take place outside the reservation, in locations where state power 
over Indian affairs is considerably more expansive than it is within 
e e a  b da e ); Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode 
Island, 449 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) ( I   be d e ad enture 
that a state may seize contraband located outside Indian lands but in 
a   a ba  e h . ). The c  f d  ha  a ff  
cha e ge  he a e  licensing requirements failed as a matter of 
a . F  he ea  e  f h ab e, (1) he A e  Ge e a  
motion to dismiss and CDTFA    d  f  ac  f 
d c  e e g a ed; (2) P a ff  f f h ca e f ac  a  
dismissed for lac  f d c ; (3) P a ff  e a g ca e  f 
action were dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 
 
Trust Breach and Claims 
 
127. Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc. v. United States 
 
No. 15-342L, 140 Fed.Cl. 447, 2018 WL 5069161 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 17, 
2018). Inter-tribal council representing Arizona Indian tribes sued 
United States, claiming breach of tribal trust obligations under 
Arizona-Florida Land Exchange Act (AFLEA) by failing to ensure 
sufficient security for full payments to be made by landowner for 
land exchange involving sale of land that was former site of Indian 
boarding school, by failing to collect and deposit or make up trust 
payments on which landowner defaulted, and by failing to prudently 
invest trust funds. Government moved to dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction and for failure to state claim. The Court of 
Federal Claims, Firestone, Senior Judge, held that: (1) claim based 
on insufficient initial security requirements was time barred; (2) 
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government fulfilled its trust obligation to ensure adequate security; 
(3) government was not required to make up defaulted payments; 
(4) portion of prudent investment claim was time barred; and (5) 
timely portion of prudent investment claim was sufficiently alleged. 
Motion granted in part and denied in part. 
 
128. Oneida Indian Nation v. Phillips 
 
No. 5:17-CV-1035, 360 F.Supp.3d 122, 2018 WL 6001002 
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2018). Oneida Nation of American Indians 
brought action against trustee and trust, alleging that Oneida Nation 
had right to possess 19.6 acres of land as part of Oneida reservation 
under federal treaty, statutory and common law, and the federal 
constitution, and that trustee's conduct in executing and recording 
various documents in county land records was an unlawful attempt 
to obtain possession and control over that land, seeking declaratory 
judgment and permanent injunction. Trustee and trust 
counterclaimed that trust had right to possess land under federal and 
state treaty, statutory and common law, and the federal constitution, 
and that trustee's conduct was lawful action to maintain possession 
and control over land. Oneida Nation moved to dismiss 
counterclaim for failure to state a claim. The District Court, Glenn 
T. Suddaby, Chief District Judge, held that trust and trustee failed to 
plausibly allege a claim to the disputed land. Motion granted.  
 
129. Pueblo of Jemez v. United States 
 
No. CIV 12-0800 JB\JHR, 366 F.Supp.3d 1234, 2018 WL 6002913 
(D.N.M. Nov. 15, 2018). Pueblo of Jemez Indian Tribe brought 
action under federal common law and the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 
seeking a judgment that the tribe had exclusive right to use, occupy, 
and possess the lands of the Valles Caldera National Preserve 
pursuant to its continuing aboriginal title to such lands. United 
States objected to admission of hearsay contained in testimony of 
tribe member and the tribe's memorandum of law. District Court, 
James O. Browning, J., held that: (1) American Indian oral tradition 
evidence was inadmissible hearsay; (2) oral tradition evidence was 
admissible under enumerated exceptions to rule against hearsay; and 
(3) oral tradition evidence was inadmissible under residual hearsay 




130. Pueblo of Jemez v. United States 
 
No. CIV 12-0800 JB\JHR, 2019 WL 1139724 (D.N.M. Mar. 12, 
2019). This matter came before the Court on: (i) the United States' 
Motion on the Pleadings and for Summary Judgment, filed August 
17, 2018; and (ii) the United States' Motion on the Pleadings and for 
Summary Judgment, filed August 17, 2018 (collectively the 
M ). The a  e  e e: ( ) he he  P a ff P eblo of 
Jemez' admissions that other tribes used the Valles Caldera National 
Preserve lands defeat its claim that it was the exclusive aboriginal 
user of the lands; (ii) whether admissions that the third-party owners 
e fe ed h Je e  P eb  Va e  Caldera use means that Jemez 
Pueblo did not maintain any aboriginal title through continuous use; 
(iii) whether any statutes of limitations accrued and expired in the 
decade  eced g he U ed S a e  cha e f he Va e  
Caldera; (iv) whether rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
ba  Je e  P eb  c a , beca e he P eb  f Sa a C a a  a 
necessary and indispensable party; and (v) whether the laches 
d c e ba  Je e  P eb  c a , beca e Je e  P eb  
supported the United States' acquisition of the Valles Caldera rather 
than asserting its aboriginal title claim. First, the Court concludes 
that whether other tribes used the Valles Caldera does not per se 
defea  Je e  P eb  c a   ab g a  e e  ha  a d. The 
Court concluded further that genuine issues of material fact remain 
regarding the extent of other tribes' Valles Caldera use. The United 
S a e  a e ed ha  [ ]  ca  ea ab  be d ed ha  he  
be  ed he P e e e a d   a a e  ha  defea  P a ff  
abo g a  e c a .  A h gh he U ed S a e  C  f A ea  
f  he Te h C c   h  ca e a ed ha ,  e ab h ab g a  
e, a T be  h  ha   ed a d cc ed he a d  he 
exclusion of other Indian groups,  P eblo of Jeme  . Uni ed S a es, 
790 F.3d 1143, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), the exclusive-use-and-
occupancy rule is subject to exceptions for joint and amicable use, 
dominant use, and permissive use, See Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of 
Tex. v. United States, No. 3-83, 2000 WL 1013532, at *12 (Fed. Cl. 
June 19, 2000). Hence, evidence of other Pueblos' Valles Caldera 
e   ece a  defea  Je e  P eb  ab g a  e c a . 
Je e  P eb  a e  ha   e f he Va e  Ca de a a  
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d a .  P a ff P eb  f Je e  Re e  O   
Defendant United States' Motion on the Pleadings and for Summary 
J dg e  a  19, f ed A g  31, 2018 ( Re e ). The d a  
use exception to the exclusive use rule recognizes that, where 
another tribe commonly uses the land with the claimant tribe, proof 
f he c a a  be  dominance over the other tribe preserves its 
exclusive use of the land. See United States v. Seminole Indians of 
Fla., 180 Ct. Cl. 375, 383-86 (1967). M e e , he c a a  be s 
dominance illustrates its ability to exclude other tribes from the area, 
even if it never chooses to exercise that ability. Second, the Court 
c c ded ha  Je e  P eb  ad  ha  h d-party owners 
interfered with its Valles Caldera use does not defeat Jemez 
P eb  ab g a  e c a . The U ed S a e  a e  ha  he 
[ ]he Te h C c  e a ded h  case so that the parties could 
b  e de ce ab  he he  he Baca g a   e f he a d b  
he Baca he   he  cce  ac a  e fe ed h he 
Je e  P eb  ad a  cc a c  a d e  f he a d  
question here before or after 1946,   ( g Pueblo of Jemez v. 
United States, 790 F.3d at 1168), a d c e d  ha  [ ]he B d a d 
Dunigan families exercised their ownership in a manner that defeats 
Je e  c a  ha   a a ed a  e  he P e e e,  I deed, 
the Tenth Circuit has directed the Court to determine whether there 
a  ac a  b a a  e fe e ce b  he  h Je e  
P eb  ad a  e  f he Va e  Ca de a, Pueblo of Jemez v. 
United States, 790 F.3d at 1166, and mentions that substantial 
e fe e ce c d e  f  h e e e e  a d e, a h ed 
b  he fede a  g e e  b h a  a d  fac ,  790 F.3d at 
1166 (citing United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 
1383, 1393 (Ct. Cl. 1975) ). The Court, however, in accord with 
controlling Supreme Court of the United States of America 
precedent, interpreted this statement to indicate that aboriginal title 
extinguishment could result only from Congressionally authorized 
e fe e ce h Je e  P eb  ad a  Va e  Ca de a e. 
See, e.g., United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 
(1941)( E g h e  f I d a  e ba ed  ab g a  
possession is of course a different matter. The power of Congress in 
ha  ega d  e e. ); Cty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 
470 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1985) ( [C] g e a  e   e g h 
I d a  e  be a  a d a b g ,  a d   be gh  
ed.   ( g United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 
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U.S. at 346, 354) ). Hence, based  he Te h C c  a da e  
c de  e de ce f b a a  e fe e ce b  he ,  Pueblo of 
Jemez v. United States, 790 F.3d at 1166, the Court has identified 
five factors, none of which by itself is dispositive, that could support 
a finding that non-Indians substantially interfered with aboriginal 
title over time so as to effectuate a gradual taking absent express 
Congressional intent: (i) the creation of an Indian reservation; (ii) 
Congressionally authorized non-Indian settlement of historic tribal 
lands; (iii) a Congressionally ratified Executive Order increasing the 
size of reservation lands set aside for exclusive Indian use; (iv) a 
cabinet-level order, pursuant to a Congressional act, imposing 
restrictions on Indian use of their historic lands; and (v) 
Congressional or executive action designating tribal land for 
conservation, recreation, or commercial use, such as a forest reserve, 
grazing district, or the like. Third, the Court concluded that the 
statutes of limitations to which the United States directs the Court 
d   ba  Je e  P eb  ab g a  e c a . The U ed S a e  
c e ded ha  Je e  P eb  c a   e-barred if the United 
S a e  e ed e fe e ce h  ab g a  e,  M  a  27 
(quoting Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, 790 F.3d at 1147), then 
a e  ha  he fac  a e c ea  ha  Baca he ' cce  
ec ded ad a  I d a  e  a a e  ha  ca ed P a ff  
cla   acc e b h bef e a d af e  1946,  M  a  27. I  
addressing the United States' argument that the Baca heirs' use of 
the Valles Caldera is a cloud on title sufficient to trigger accrual 
against the United States in 1860, the Tenth Circuit counters that 
a e  cc a c  a d e f a d a   fee e, a d 
aboriginal title, can occur, because the nature of Indian occupancy 
differs significantly from non-I d a  e e ' cc a c .  Id. at 
1165. The Tenth Circuit highlights such disparate use when it states 
ha    ... ea   ee h  a eacef  a d a e I d a  eb  
might have used portions of this large area of land for its traditional 
purposes while one agreeable rancher was using portions of it for 
g a g e c .  Id. Jemez Pueblo argued that Jemez people 
a e d g b h e d  f B d a d D ga  e h  
continued to access the Valles Caldera for traditional purposes, to 
include hunting game, taking eagles, and conducting religious 
pilgrimages to Redondo Peak, See Response at 22-23, a d ha   
claim accrued only when the United States acquired an interest in 
he Va e  Ca de a  2000 a d bega  g he Je e  P eb  
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access to the la d  a a e  c e  h  ab g a  e,  
Response at 27 (quoting Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, 790 F.3d 
at 1152). Based on the nature of aboriginal occupancy, the Court 
was not convinced that, as a matter of law, a taking occurred 
between 1860 and 2000, and, therefore, did not bar Je e  P eb  
claim based on the United States' theory that the statute of 
a  acc ed. Defe da   de ed. 
 
131. Goss v. Bonner 
 
No. CV-18-08295-PCT-SMB, 2019 WL 2137266 (D. Ariz. May 16, 
2019). Plaintiff Keith Goss is a podiatrist who previously worked 
for T ba C  Reg a  Hea h Ca e C a  ( TCRHCC ), 
which is owned by the Navajo Nation and is operated under the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 
( ISDEAA ), Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203. Plaintiff filed this 
action in Coconino County Superior Court. The FAC brought 
individual counts of defamation against the Individual Defendants. 
Plaintiff allege that beginning around March 1, 2017 and continuing 
throughout June, he became aware of statements made by each of 
the Individual Defendants to people outside of official workplace 
proceedings. He alleges that the statements were published to people 
and impeached his honesty, integrity, or reputation. He also alleges 
that the Individual Defendants knew that the statements were false. 
In the alternative, Plaintiff brought a Bivens claim for violation of 
right to privacy. On October 19, 2018, the United States 
concurrently removed this action from the Superior Court to this 
court a d f ed a N ce f S b ,  b g he U ed 
States for the Individual Defendants in each of the seven defamation 
claims pursuant to the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort 
C e a  Ac  f 1988, c   a  he We fa  
Ac ,  28 U.S.C. § 2679. ( he Sc e Ce f ca ). The D ec  f 
the Torts Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 
Justice, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, certified that the 
I d d a  Defe da  e e c e ed e  ac g h  he 
scope of their deemed federal employment as employees of the 
Indian Health Service in carrying out functions authorized under the 
Self-Governance Compact with TCRHCC at the time of the 
c de  g g e  .  The U ed S a e  he  b gh  a 
motion to dismiss the Defamation Counts pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). 
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When a federal employee is sued for a wrongful or negligent act, the 
We fa  Ac  a h e  he A e  Ge e a   ce f  ha  a 
United States employee was acting within the scope of his 
employment at the time of an incident which gives rise to a civil 
c a .  Meridian International Logistics, Inc. v. United States 939 
F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1991)1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)-
(2)). The action then proceeds under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
( FTCA ). Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 420, 
115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995). H e e , [b]eca e he g e ment has not 
waived its sovereign immunity under the ... FTCA ... for claims 
a g  f be   a de ,  he C  ac  b ec -matter 
jurisdiction over a defamation claim against the United States, and 
such claim must be dismissed. See Dora v. Achey, 300 Fed.Appx. 
550, 551 (9th Cir. 2008). [T]he A e  Ge e a  ce f ca   
he f , b   he f a  d   he he  he fede a  ff ce   
immune from suit and correlatively, whether the United States is 
e  b ed a  defe da .  Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 
246 (2007) (quoting Lamagno, 515 U.S. at 432). The party 
cha e g g he ce f ca  bea  he b de  f esenting 
e de ce a d d g he A e  Ge e a  ce f ca  b  a 
e de a ce f he e de ce.  Jackson v. Tate, 648 F.3d 729, 732 
(9th Cir. 2011). The question of whether a federal employee is acting 
within the course and scope of his employment is determined by 
applying respondeat superior principles of the state in which the 
alleged tort occurred. Green v. Hall, 8 F.3d 695, 698 99 (9th Cir. 
1993). In cases where the United States is substituted for an 
e ee ha   a  a ba  e ee, [ ]he ba  e ee  
also be deemed to have acted as a federal employee in carrying out 
he a eged   ac .  Wilson . Hor on s Towing, 906 F.3d 
773, 781 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, (2019 WL 825553, Apr. 22, 
2019). The Ninth Circuit recently articulated that the test found in 
Shirk v. U.S. ex rel. Dep't of Interior, 773 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2014), 
also applied to challenges to Attorney General Certifications. 
Wilson, 906 F.3d at 781. The Wilson court found that the test had 
two parts. First, the district court looks at whether the language of 
he fede a  c ac  e c a ed he ac  ha  he a ff 
ascribes to the empl ee.  Id. (quoting Shirk, 773 F.3d at 1007). 
Sec d, he c   a  he he  he e ee  ac  fe  
within the scope of employment as defined by state law. Id. In 
A a, [ ]he c d c  f a e a   h n the scope of 
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employment if it is of the kind the employee is employed to perform, 
it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limit, 
a d   ac a ed a  ea   a  b  a e  e e he a e .  
Smith v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc., 876 P.2d 1166, 
1170 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).  As to the first prong of the Shirk test
whether the language of the federal contract encompassed the 
activity that the plaintiff ascribes to the employee Plaintiff only 
a e  h  e  h  Re e  he M   D . P a ff  
argument is somewhat circular, alleging that the statements were not 
ade  he c e f e e , a d h  ca  be ca g  
he c ac   ag ee e .  I  he FAC, Plaintiff alleges that the 
Individual Defendants acted outside the scope of their employment 
but does not specifically state how the allegations were not related 
 f c  f he h a . I   he P a ff  b de   de 
evidence that disproves the Scope Certification, and Plaintiff has not 
shown that the Individual Defendants were not acting pursuant to 
the Self-Governance Compact. As to the second prong of the Shirk 
test he he  he e ee  ac  fe  h  he c e f 
employment Plaintiff argue that the Individual Defendants were 
not acting in the scope of their employment. Plaintiff argues that 
he e a   eg a e  ac  he  he Defe da  ff he 
work site and in social settings made statements about Plaintiff 
being dangerous and taking kick-bac .  Ta e  a  e, P a ff  
a ega  d   e ab h ha  he defe da  ac  e ceeded he 
scope of his employment. Now that the court has determined that 
the United States is the proper defendant for the Defamation Counts, 
the court now considers the United States' motion to dismiss for lack 
of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). The United 
States argues that dismissal is warranted because the action is 
covered under the FTCA, and the government has not waived its 
sovereign immunity in defamation claims. The United States also 
a g e  ha  d a   a a ed d e  P a ff  fa e  
exhaust administrative remedies. Here, Plaintiff does not dispute 
that the Defamation Claims cannot go forward under the FTCA. 
Rather, Plaintiff argues that there are questions as to whether the 
Individual Defendants are considered federal actors and whether 
they were acting within the scope of employment. For the reasons 
stated above, the court finds that the United States is the proper 
Defendant. Accordingly, the Defamation Counts must be dismissed, 
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and the court need not address the United States' additional 
arguments. 
 
132. Western Shoshone Identifiable Group by Yomba 
Shoshone Tribe v. United States 
 
No. 06-896L, 143 Fed.Cl. 545, 2019 WL 2480154 (Fed. Cl. June 13, 
2019). Yomba Shoshone Tribe, Timbisha Shoshone Tribe, 
Duckwater Shoshone Tribe, and individual enrolled tribal members 
sued United States, asserting breach of trust claim due to federal 
government, as trustee, allegedly breaching its fiduciary duty by 
mismanaging three tribal trust funds due to imprudent investing in 
securities that were too short-term, resulting in less than maximum 
returns over thirty-three-year period, for which tribes sought to 
recover $216,386,589.83 in damages. Bench trial was held. The 
Court of Federal Claims, Marian Blank Horn, J., held that: 
(1) tribes had standing to pursue breach of trust claim for all three 
funds; (2) government had fiduciary duty to invest tribal trust funds; 
(3) Department of Interior's (DOI) investment policies did not 
warrant deference; (4) largest fund was prudently invested for 
several time periods; (5) largest fund was imprudently invested for 
other time periods; and (6) smaller two funds were imprudently 
invested except during final year. Ordered accordingly. 
 
133. Moody v. United States 
 
No. 2018-2227, 931 F.3d 1136, 2019 WL 3309394 (Fed. Cir. July 
24, 2019). Lessees, who had entered into five agricultural leases 
with Indian tribe, brought action against United States, alleging that 
government breached leases by terminating them and ordering 
lessees to vacate land and that government's actions constituted 
taking without just compensation under Fifth Amendment. The 
United States Court of Federal Claims, No. 1:16-cv-00107-EJD, 
Edward J. Damich, Senior Judge, 135 Fed.Cl. 39, dismissed 
complaint, and lessees appealed. The Court of Appeals, Dyk, Circuit 
Judge, held that: (1) United States was not party to leases; (2) United 
States' alleged revival of leases did not subject it to liability for 
breach of implied-in-fact contracts; and (3) Bureau 
of Indian Affairs' (BIA) alleged violation of regulations in canceling 






134. Bell v. City of Lacey 
 
No. 3:18-cv-05918-RBL, 2019 WL 3412713 (W.D. Wash. July 29, 
2019). On June 24, 2019, the Court issued an order dismissing the 
Nisqually Tribe from the case and dismissing all claims for damages 
against Nisqually CEO John Simmons and CFO Eletta Tiam. 
However, the Court declined to dismiss the declaratory and 
injunctive relief claim against Simmons and Tiam pending 
additional briefing on whether that claim may proceed under the 
doctrine of Ex parte Young.  After reviewing the submissions from 
b h a e , he C  he eb  g a  he T be Defe da  M  
for Judgment on the Pleadings in full and dismisses all claims 
against Defendants Simmons and Tiam. Although a state official 
acting within the scope of their valid authority normally enjoys 
sovereign immunity, if the official is enforcing a law that conflicts 
h fede a  a h  he  a e ed f [ he ] ff c a   
e e e a e cha ac e .  Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.123, 159 60 
(1908). A court may therefore issue declaratory judgment and enjoin 
official conduct in conflict with the Constitution or congressional 
statutes. Id. at 155-56; Na l Audubon Soc , Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 
835, 848 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that Ex parte Young extends to 
claims for declaratory relief). This doctrine applies equally to tribal 
officials. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 F.3d 
1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2007). The tribe Defendants argue that Ex parte 
Young d e    Be  c a  f  c e a d dec a a  
relief against Simmons and Tiam for several reasons. First, they 
argue that Simmons and Tiam are not proper defendants for an Ex 
parte Young action because they lack the requisite connection to 
e f ce e . Sec d, he  a e  ha  Be  e e ed e ef d 
require affirmative acts by the tribe itself, rather than just tribal 
officials. Third, they contend that Bell lacks standing, and his claim 
for declaratory and injunctive relief is not ripe. The Court agrees. If 
a plaintiff wants to enjoin unlawful government action, Ex parte 
Young does not permit them to sue just any official. Okpalobi v. 
Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 416 (5th Cir. 2001). Rather, the defendant 
 ha e e c ec  h he e f ce e  f he ac   
avoid making that official a mere representative of the 
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a e.  Culinary Workers Union, Local 226 v. Del Papa, 200 F.3d 
614, 619 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157). 
Th  c ec   be fa  d ec ; a ge e a ed d   e f ce 
state law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible 
for enforcing the challenged provision will not subject an official to 
.  Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 
919 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court cannot conclude that Simmons and 
Tiam are proper defendants in an Ex parte Young action. Attempts 
to assert a claim under Ex parte Young a  a   a  e d  
a d ba  e e g   f he tribe e f  he ea , 
b a a  a   e e .  Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project 
Agr. Imp. & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 
2002); Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1320 (9th Cir. 
1992) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of 
Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)). Th  a  be he ca e f he 
relief requested can not be granted by merely ordering the cessation 
of the conduct complained of but will require affirmative action by 
the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign 
e .  Shermoen, 982 F.2d at 1320 (quoting State of 
Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1969)). Courts have 
also addressed this issue by asking whether the judgment sought 
d e e d e f  he b c ea   d a ,  e fe e 
with the public administration, or if the effect of the judgment would 
be to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to 
ac .  Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Shermoen, 982 F.2d 
at 1320). The tribe Defe da  M  f  J dg e   he 
Pleadings is granted in full. Defendants Simmons and Tiam are 
dismissed from the case. 
 
135. Little Traverse Bay Band of Odawa Indians v. Whitmer 
 
No. 1:15-cv-850, 398 F.Supp.3d 201, 2019 WL 3854299 (W.D. 
Mich. Aug. 15, 2019). Plaintiff, the Little Traverse Bay Band of 
Odawa Indians ( he Tribe ) c a ed ha   1855, he U ed S a e  
entered a treaty with its predecessors and created 
an Indian reservation spanning more than 300 square miles in the 
Northwest portion of Michigan's Lower Peninsula. 
The Tribe sought declaratory judgment from the court that the 
claimed reservation has continued to exist to this day and has not 
been diminished or disestablished by any government action. 
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Defendant and Intervenor-Defendants' moved for summary 
judgment. Collectively, the Defendants asserted that summary 
judgment was warranted on the Plaintiff's claim for a declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief because no Indian reservation was 
ever created, or in the alternative, any reservation created was 
subsequently diminished. Whether a reservation was created 
depends upon the construction of an 1855 treaty between the United 
States and the Tribe's political predecessors. But treaties 
between Indian tribes and the United States are not interpreted like 
other international compacts, other laws, or even other contracts. 
Instead, when construing an Indian treaty, the court   
beyond the written words to the larger context that frames the 
T ea , c d g he h  f he ea , he eg a , a d he 
ac ca  c c  ad ed b  he a e .  Minnesota v. Mille 
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196, 119 S.Ct. 1187, 
143 L.Ed.2d 270 (1999) (quoting Choctaw Nation v. United States, 
318 U.S. 423, 432, 63 S.Ct. 672, 87 L .Ed. 877 (1943)). Once versed 
 he e e a  h , [c]  ca  g e a  a g age ha , 
viewed in historical c e  a d g e  a fa  a a a ,   c e  
to a tribe's a e  c a .  Or. Dep't of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath 
Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 774, 105 S.Ct. 3420, 87 L.Ed.2d 542 
(1985). Ultimately the court concluded that, after a review of the 
entirety of the historical record, summary judgment was warranted 
on the Tribe's claims because the 1855 treaty cannot plausibly be 
read to create an Indian reservation, even when giving effect to the 
terms as the Indian signatories would have understood them and 
even when resolving any ambiguities in the Treaty text in favor of 
the Indians. The 1855 Treaty simply cannot bear the construction 
that the Tribe would place on it, especially considering the historical 
context. The Tribe's predecessor bands bargained for and received
permanent homes in Michigan in the form of individual allotments. 
They did not bargain for an Indian reservation, and no such 
reservation was created by the unambiguous treaty terms because 
the terms do not establish federally set-aside land 
for Indian purposes or indefinite federal superintendence over the 
land. See Oklahoma Ta  Com n . Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian 
Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511, 111 S.Ct. 905 (1991).). The Tribe asserted 
that their predecessors understood that a treaty requiring the United 
States to withdraw land from sale for their benefit created 
an Indian reservation. But the court concluded that when the Treaty 
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is placed in the relevant historical context, it cannot plausibly be 
read to have created an Indian reservation, and the 
Tribe's predecessors did not believe that it did so. Accordingly, the 
court determined summary judgment was warranted on 





136. Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v. 
Whitmer 
No. 1:15-cv-850, 365 F.Supp.3d 865, 2019 WL 687882 (W.D. 
Mich. Jan. 31, 2019). American Indian tribe brought action against 
Michigan State and municipal officials for failure to recognize 
reservation land. Government moved for judgment on the pleadings. 
The District Court, Paul L. Maloney, J., held that: (1) tribe was not 
judicially estopped from claiming interest in reservation land; (2) 
prior proceeding before Indian Claims Commission did not 
collaterally estop tribe from claiming interest in reservation land; 
and (3) tribe's claims were not barred by Indian Claims Commission 
Act. Motion denied. 
137. Navajo Nation v. San Juan County 
No. 18-4005, 929 F.3d 1270, 2019 WL 3121838 (10th Cir. July 16, 
2019). Indian tribe and tribal members brought action alleging that 
county commission and school board districts within county 
violated Equal Protection Clause. The United States District Court 
for the District of Utah, No. 2:12-CV-00039-RJS, Robert J. Shelby, 
J., denied county's motion to dismiss, 2015 WL 1137587, entered 
summary judgment in tribe's favor, 150 F.Supp.3d 1253, 162 
F.Supp.3d 1162, rejected county's proposed remedial plan, 266 
F.Supp.3d 1341, and adopted special master's remedial election 
districts, 2017 WL 6547635. County appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Moritz, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) tribe was not 
prohibited by consent decree and settlement order in Voting Rights 
Act (VRA) litigation from bringing lawsuit; (2) United States' 
approval of original district boundaries pursuant to consent decree 
did not deprive district court of jurisdiction over tribe's action; (3) 
county commission districts were unconstitutionally based on race; 
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(4) deviation of 38% in populations between school board districts 
violated Equal Protection Clause's one-person, one-vote principle; 
(5) district court did not clearly err in concluding that racial 
c de a  ed a ed  c ea g c  ed 
remedial redistricting plans; (6) county's drawing of race-based 
boundaries for districts was not narrowly tailored to its compelling 
interest in complying with VRA; (7) district court did not clearly err 
in concluding that race was not predominate factor in its expert's 
redistricting plans; and 8) district court did not abuse its discretion 
when it prioritized compliance with one-person, one-vote principle 
over c  ad a e b de . Aff ed. 
138. Brakebill v. Jaeger 
No. 18-1725, 932 F.3d 671, 2019 WL 3432470 (8th Cir. July 31, 
2019). This appeal arose from a challenge by six Native American 
a ff    f N h Da a  e ec  atutes. North 
Dakota requires a voter to present a specific form of identification 
at the polls before receiving a ballot. That identification must 
de, a g he  h g , he e  c e  e de a  ee  
address. Six plaintiffs sued the North Dakota Secretary of State, 
alleging that the provisions place an unconstitutional burden on the 
right to vote of many Native Americans. The district court agreed 
and enjoined the Secretary from enforcing certain statutory 
requirements statewide. The Secretary appealed. The court 
concluded that the alleged burdens did not justify a statewide 
injunction a d aca e he d c  c  de . The  c c ded f  
ha  he a ff  fac a  cha e ge  he e de a  ee  add e  
requirement likely failed and that the statewide injunction as to that 
provision cannot be justified as a form of as-applied relief. The 
district court thought the residential street address requirement 
posed an impermissible legal obstacle because Native American 
communities often lack residential street addresses. The Secretary 
disputed whether street addresses are truly lacking in 
these communities and complains the district court mistakenly 
relied on outdated evidence about two counties that had not finished 
assigning addresses as of 2011. But even assuming that a plaintiff 
ca  h  ha  a  e ec  a e e  e ce e  b de e 
e e e   some voters, that showing did not justify broad 
relief that invalidates the requirements on a statewide basis as 
applied to all voters. Here, the plaintiffs have not presented evidence 
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that the residential street address requirement imposes a substantial 
burden on most North Dakota voters. Even assuming that 
some communities do not have residential street addresses, that fact 
did not justify a statewide injunction that prevents the Secretary 
from requiring a form of identification with a residential street 
address from the vast majority of residents who have them. The 
c  f he  c c ded ha  he a e  e e e   e ent an 
enumerated form of identification did not impose a burden on voters 
that justified a statewide injunction to accept additional forms of 
identification. The district court found that 4,998 otherwise eligible 
Native Americans and 64,618 non-Native voters lacked a qualifying 
identification. The court also found that 65.6% of the Native 
American group were missing at least one of the underlying 
documents needed to obtain a valid identification from the State. 
These data, however, leave 513,742 of 583,358 eligible voters in the 
state, or 88 percent, as to whom the plaintiffs have not shown a lack 
of qualifying identification. In short, the evidence is insufficient to 
show that the valid form of identification requirement places a 
substantial burden on mos  N h Da a e . The d c  c  
order of April 3, 2018, granting a preliminary injunction is vacated, 
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